Tax Simplicity and Heterogeneous Learning Philippe Aghion Ufuk - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Tax Simplicity and Heterogeneous Learning Philippe Aghion Ufuk Akcigit (College de France) (Chicago) Matthieu Lequien Stefanie Stantcheva (Banque de France) (Harvard) 1 78

Motivation: The Value of Tax Simplicity Hard to design policies that fulfill intended goals, minimize hassle, and remain simple enough to be understood. Complexity of policies can be “regressive” If affects low income, low educated most. The very people targeted by transfers may be unable to take advantage of them (good for revenues, bad for social welfare). Often, low take-up of potentially beneficial policies (even if low visibility, low stigma). Tax simplicity = conceptual + practical simplicity. “Simple” = easy to understand and logistically light to handle. 2 78

Research Questions Do people respond only to monetary incentives or does tax simplicity come into consideration as well? How much do they value simplicity? Is there a costly learning process about complex tax system? Are certain agents quicker to learn and understand? 3 78

Setting: Self-Employed in France Self-employed are good group for studying effects of simplicity: Can adjust their own income more easily. Direct map between their own understanding and their choices (no “employer” in between). France is a good quasi-laboratory with valuable policy variation: Three fiscal “regimes” for the self-employed which differ in monetary incentives and tax simplicity. Regimes have changed a lot over time. They impact different agents heterogeneously (even conditional on same income). 4 78

New Administrative Data New tax returns from the French Internal Revenue Service 1994-2012. Annual sample of 500,000 households 1994-2012. Full population data for 2011 (36 million households). Extending as we speak to full population for 2007-2012. All income streams (individual & household) + demographics. Sample of 100,000 tax returns per year matched to large-scale survey with education, occupation, social insurance benefits data. Panel of all businesses (entry, exit, startups). 5 78

Strategy and Findings (I): Value of Simplicity Regimes are subject to eligibility thresholds: “notches” at which the tax monetary incentives and tax hassle changes. Find strong “bunching” and excess masses. Total wedge = function of income elasticity, tax hassle cost (or value of tax simplicity) & policy parameters (income tax, social insurance contribution rate, etc..). Key variations in policy parameters give us many “data moments:” ◮ across individuals (because of activity type & tax bracket) ◮ over time. Use excess mass to back out i) income elasticity (standard) and ii) value of tax simplicity (non standard). Find large preferences for tax simplicity: 150 to 600 euros per year (up to 60 hours at net of tax median wage). Small income elasticities. 6 78

Strategy and Findings (II): Costly, Heterogeneous Learning Use variation over time and introduction of new regimes to show people take time to learn. Costs of tax complexity. Many, especially low education, low skill, make wrong regime choice and leave a lot of money on the table. They also learn more slowly. “Regressive costs of tax complexity.” 7 78

Related Literature Taxation and entrepreneurship: Cullen and Gordon (2006,2007), Gentry and Hubbard (2000), Bruce (2000). Taxable income elasticities: Gruber and Saez (2002), Saez, Slemrod and Giertz (2012). Determinants of entrepreneurship: Hamilton (2000), Schoar (2010), Adelino, Schoar and Severino (2015), Schmalz, Sraer, and Thesmar (2016). Bunching methods: Saez (2010), Chetty et al. (2011), Kleven and Waseem (2013), Kleven (2016), Best et al. (2015), Best and Kleven (2016), Best et al. (2015), Chetty et al. (2013). Combined with structural methods: Einav, Finkelstein, and Mahoney (2017). Empirical Studies with French Tax Data: Piketty (...), Landais (2013), Garbinti et al. (2016, 2017). 8 78

Outline of this Talk Landscape of Self-employment and Institutional Background 1 Data and Descriptive Statistics 2 Bunching: Graphical Evidence 3 Estimating the Value of Tax Simplicity 4 Tax Complexity and Learning 5 Misreporting 6 9 78

Landscape of Self-Employment and Institutional Background 10 78

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Activity Types: Different Activities Have Different Policy Parameters (1) Industrial and Commercial Services (I&C Services): construction work, plumbery, carpenters, auto repair, dry cleaning... (2) Industrial and Commercial Retail (I&C Retail): bakeries, butcheries, cheese shops, restaurants, .. (3) Non Commercial (NC:) professional activities, consulting, coaching, translation services, sales agents services, expert services, empty property subleasing, liberal professions (doctors, lawyers in private practices, notaries..). 14 78

Tax Simplicity by Regime Choice Options 15 78

Summary of the Self-Employed Regimes y = revenues. Full formula z = z ( y , policy parameters ) = taxable income. c = operating costs as a % of revenues y . (1) Standard ( r ) (2) Simplified ( m ) (3) Super simplified ( f ) Revenues < y ∗ Revenues < y ∗ Eligibility Graph None kt kt + FC t − 2 < f ∗ Income tax & SI contribution base Net business income Gross revenues × (1- rebate) Gross revenues z r = y r ( 1 − c ) z m = y m ( 1 − µ ) z f = y f 16 78

Summary of the Self-Employed Regimes y = revenues. Full formula z = z ( y , policy parameters ) = taxable income. c = operating costs as a % of revenues y . (1) Standard ( r ) (2) Simplified ( m ) (3) Super simplified ( f ) Revenues < y ∗ Revenues < y ∗ Eligibility Graph None kt kt + FC t − 2 < f ∗ Income tax & SI contribution base Net business income Gross revenues × (1- rebate) Gross revenues z r = y r ( 1 − c ) z m = y m ( 1 − µ ) z f = y f Standard ( τ y + τ ss Standard ( τ y + τ ss Income tax & SI contribution rate r ) m ) Flat rate τ f 16 78

Summary of the Self-Employed Regimes y = revenues. Full formula z = z ( y , policy parameters ) = taxable income. c = operating costs as a % of revenues y . (1) Standard ( r ) (2) Simplified ( m ) (3) Super simplified ( f ) Revenues < y ∗ Revenues < y ∗ Eligibility Graph None kt kt + FC t − 2 < f ∗ Income tax & SI contribution base Net business income Gross revenues × (1- rebate) Gross revenues z r = y r ( 1 − c ) z m = y m ( 1 − µ ) z f = y f Standard ( τ y + τ ss Standard ( τ y + τ ss Income tax & SI contribution rate r ) m ) Flat rate τ f Registration procedure Standard Standard Simplified 16 78

Summary of the Self-Employed Regimes y = revenues. Full formula z = z ( y , policy parameters ) = taxable income. c = operating costs as a % of revenues y . (1) Standard ( r ) (2) Simplified ( m ) (3) Super simplified ( f ) Revenues < y ∗ Revenues < y ∗ Eligibility Graph None kt kt + FC t − 2 < f ∗ Income tax & SI contribution base Net business income Gross revenues × (1- rebate) Gross revenues z r = y r ( 1 − c ) z m = y m ( 1 − µ ) z f = y f Standard ( τ y + τ ss Standard ( τ y + τ ss Income tax & SI contribution rate r ) m ) Flat rate τ f Registration procedure Standard Standard Simplified Tax accounting requirements Detailed Only for audit Only for audit and monitored not monitored not monitored 16 78

Summary of the Self-Employed Regimes y = revenues. Full formula z = z ( y , policy parameters ) = taxable income. c = operating costs as a % of revenues y . (1) Standard ( r ) (2) Simplified ( m ) (3) Super simplified ( f ) Revenues < y ∗ Revenues < y ∗ Eligibility Graph None kt kt + FC t − 2 < f ∗ Income tax & SI contribution base Net business income Gross revenues × (1- rebate) Gross revenues z r = y r ( 1 − c ) z m = y m ( 1 − µ ) z f = y f Standard ( τ y + τ ss Standard ( τ y + τ ss Income tax & SI contribution rate r ) m ) Flat rate τ f Registration procedure Standard Standard Simplified Tax accounting requirements Detailed Only for audit Only for audit and monitored not monitored not monitored Timing of payments Annual Annual Monthly or quarterly and separate and separate and joint. 16 78

Eligibility Thresholds and Regime Choice Options Possible regime choice options � Standard � Standard Tolerance Region � Simplified Threshold depends on activity type k & year t � Super Simplified, if also family • I&C Retail (≈80K) coefficient < f ∗ • I&C Services and Non Commercial (≈32K) y ∗ kt = eligibility threshold Revenues Back 17 78

Eligibility Thresholds Have Changed a Lot Over Time Two major reforms. 1999: expansion of the simplified regime. 2008: introduction of the super-simplified regime. 18 78

Rebates µ Have Also Changed 19 78

French Tax System: Same Income, Very Different Tax Rates. “Family coefficient” FC determines tax bracket. FC = Y / N ( Y = taxable income Y , N = number of parts). E.g.: 2 adults have N = 2 , +1 kid N = 2 . 5 , + 2 kids N = 3 , + 3 kids N = 4 . Same taxable income can imply very different tax rates for different people. Tax paid by agent in bracket M : T ( FC , N ) = N × [ � M − 1 m = 1 τ m × ( fc m − fc m − 1 ) + τ M × ( fc − fc M − 1 )] 20 78