(Straw) Man in the Middle: A Modest Post-Snowden Proposal Brussels, - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

(Straw) Man in the Middle: A Modest Post-Snowden Proposal Brussels, Belgium Jacob Appelbaum [redacted] 10 December 2015 Jacob Appelbaum ([redacted]) (Straw) Man in the Middle: 10 December 2015 1 / 26

Post-Snowden? What does that mean? Jacob Appelbaum ([redacted]) (Straw) Man in the Middle: 10 December 2015 2 / 26

Understanding the plumbing Mass surveillance works by first illegally and generally seizing data, and then indiscriminately searching all data, until a specific search term is found. This is selector based surveillance, a kind of surveillance that requires mass surveillance. It comes from vulnerabilities in core internet and other network protocols. Jacob Appelbaum ([redacted]) (Straw) Man in the Middle: 10 December 2015 3 / 26

A shift? We have experienced a huge shift. Jacob Appelbaum ([redacted]) (Straw) Man in the Middle: 10 December 2015 4 / 26

Key changes Specific understanding about a handful of protocols. Jacob Appelbaum ([redacted]) (Straw) Man in the Middle: 10 December 2015 5 / 26

Key changes A general and pervasive fear; a feeling of helplessness. Jacob Appelbaum ([redacted]) (Straw) Man in the Middle: 10 December 2015 6 / 26

Key changes People have lost faith in the authorities and adopted a fatalistic attitude. Jacob Appelbaum ([redacted]) (Straw) Man in the Middle: 10 December 2015 7 / 26

A new assumption A pervasive fear of mass surveillance, jokes about being on lists; a new default of total monitoring! Jacob Appelbaum ([redacted]) (Straw) Man in the Middle: 10 December 2015 8 / 26

A new default to fight passive attackers Changes are now detectable. Jacob Appelbaum ([redacted]) (Straw) Man in the Middle: 10 December 2015 9 / 26

A new default to fight passive attackers Changes are now detectable. Encryption is here to stay. Passive interception moves to active. Jacob Appelbaum ([redacted]) (Straw) Man in the Middle: 10 December 2015 9 / 26

A new default to fight passive attackers Changes are now detectable. Encryption is here to stay. Passive interception moves to active. Signal/ZRTP clients and Let’s Encrypt CA change the game. Jacob Appelbaum ([redacted]) (Straw) Man in the Middle: 10 December 2015 9 / 26

A new default to fight passive attackers Changes are now detectable. Encryption is here to stay. Passive interception moves to active. Signal/ZRTP clients and Let’s Encrypt CA change the game. This impacts Law Enforcement and Intelligence; focusing on LE. Jacob Appelbaum ([redacted]) (Straw) Man in the Middle: 10 December 2015 9 / 26

Cultural differences In the US, the UK and in other countries in Europe - searches and notification are different. Cryptography brings us to a new convergence for all cultures at once. Jacob Appelbaum ([redacted]) (Straw) Man in the Middle: 10 December 2015 10 / 26

A recent European Court of Human Rights ruling Oversight isn’t enough: accountability is required Jacob Appelbaum ([redacted]) (Straw) Man in the Middle: 10 December 2015 11 / 26

Checking validity Example interactions with the police: Siren on an otherwise unmarked car pulling over a driver Drive to a well lit area, dial 112/911, confirm identity of ”officer” No know raid by armed people Did they declare they are police? How do we verify it? Knock at the door with a search warrant Is it a valid warrant? Other examples such as a famous Tupac shooting involving police in plain clothing Jacob Appelbaum ([redacted]) (Straw) Man in the Middle: 10 December 2015 12 / 26

Reality check In most of these situations - we acknowledge the serious issue of police impersonation. Jacob Appelbaum ([redacted]) (Straw) Man in the Middle: 10 December 2015 13 / 26

How do we detect crimes? Cyber cyber cyber Jacob Appelbaum ([redacted]) (Straw) Man in the Middle: 10 December 2015 14 / 26

How do we detect crimes? Cyber cyber cyber (Hint: You will receive nearly no help from any authority!) Jacob Appelbaum ([redacted]) (Straw) Man in the Middle: 10 December 2015 14 / 26

An example standard of evidence In the German Chancellor Merkel case there was a supposed lack of evidence. Jacob Appelbaum ([redacted]) (Straw) Man in the Middle: 10 December 2015 15 / 26

An example standard of evidence In the German Chancellor Merkel case there was a supposed lack of evidence. Thus we see - we need a new standard of evidence! Jacob Appelbaum ([redacted]) (Straw) Man in the Middle: 10 December 2015 15 / 26

A short summary First, we acknowledge a change in thinking because of Snowden. Secondly, we see a move towards more and more transparency. Thirdly, we control those we can control and not those that we don’t... Jacob Appelbaum ([redacted]) (Straw) Man in the Middle: 10 December 2015 16 / 26

Wait, control? I have no democratic control over the majority of services. I do have democratic control over a small set of services: local LE, national LE Jacob Appelbaum ([redacted]) (Straw) Man in the Middle: 10 December 2015 17 / 26

Wait, transparency? The new protocols force transparency, the proposed standard of evidence give us data for action; but how might we choose what to act on? Jacob Appelbaum ([redacted]) (Straw) Man in the Middle: 10 December 2015 18 / 26

Ask the honest parties to prove their honesty They sign their interception request in real time, point it to a given court (docket, judge, case, etc.) just as with the search of the home. Jacob Appelbaum ([redacted]) (Straw) Man in the Middle: 10 December 2015 19 / 26

And anyone who doesn’t sign... Is subject to investigation with the collected evidence. Jacob Appelbaum ([redacted]) (Straw) Man in the Middle: 10 December 2015 20 / 26

Wait, what? There is no requirement that cryptophone or signal help with this proposal - only that a system of real time notification is implemented by states and their relevant agencies. Jacob Appelbaum ([redacted]) (Straw) Man in the Middle: 10 December 2015 21 / 26

Wait, what about TARGETED surveillance Like cryptography that horse has left the barn with the move from passive to active. Jacob Appelbaum ([redacted]) (Straw) Man in the Middle: 10 December 2015 22 / 26

Wait, what about malware The same standard of evidence and notification should apply. Jacob Appelbaum ([redacted]) (Straw) Man in the Middle: 10 December 2015 23 / 26

Help the (honest) police No ”Golden Key” required Jacob Appelbaum ([redacted]) (Straw) Man in the Middle: 10 December 2015 24 / 26

Help the (honest) police No ”Golden Key” required A trade of the secrecy property that keeps security for the majority of users Jacob Appelbaum ([redacted]) (Straw) Man in the Middle: 10 December 2015 24 / 26

Help the (honest) police No ”Golden Key” required A trade of the secrecy property that keeps security for the majority of users Law enforcement is always asking for a way to do this; my proposal allows an avenue while also asking them to give up secrecy and commit to accountability and transparency. Jacob Appelbaum ([redacted]) (Straw) Man in the Middle: 10 December 2015 24 / 26

An equal standard From homes to phones - interference is not secret, lawful processes exist, crimes committed by thousands of unlawful attackers now subject to reporting. Jacob Appelbaum ([redacted]) (Straw) Man in the Middle: 10 December 2015 25 / 26

Questions? Jacob Appelbaum ([redacted]) (Straw) Man in the Middle: 10 December 2015 26 / 26