SoK: Security Evaluation of Home-based IoT Deployments Omar Alrawi , Chaz Lever, Fabian Monrose, Manos Antonakakis 1
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Alexa, unlock the front door. 3
Internet of Things 4
Internet of Things 4
Internet of Things 4
Internet of Things 4
Internet of Things 4
Internet of Things 4
Internet of Things 4
Internet of Things 4
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Prior Work 6
Prior Work • Security Analysis of Emerging Smart Home Applications 6
Prior Work • Security Analysis of Emerging Smart Home Applications • DolphinAttack: Inaudible Voice Commands 6
Prior Work • Security Analysis of Emerging Smart Home Applications • DolphinAttack: Inaudible Voice Commands • Soteria: Automated IoT Safety and Security Analysis 6
Prior Work • Security Analysis of Emerging Smart Home Applications • DolphinAttack: Inaudible Voice Commands • Soteria: Automated IoT Safety and Security Analysis • Skill Squatting Attacks on Amazon Alexa 6
Prior Work • Security Analysis of Emerging Smart Home Applications • DolphinAttack: Inaudible Voice Commands • Soteria: Automated IoT Safety and Security Analysis • Skill Squatting Attacks on Amazon Alexa • Rethinking Access Control and Authentication for the Home Internet of Things 6
Wouldn ’ t be nice to know
• Cloud endpoints Wouldn ’ t be nice to know
• Cloud endpoints • Exposed services Wouldn ’ t be nice to know
• Cloud endpoints • Exposed services • Mobile App Wouldn ’ t be nice to know
• Cloud endpoints • Exposed services • Mobile App Wouldn ’ t be nice to • Network know
• Cloud endpoints • Exposed services • Mobile App Wouldn ’ t be nice to • Network know • Consumer report evaluation?
Overview of Prior Work Studied Components Mitigations Unexplored Directions Devices Patching bugs Mobile app Cloud integration services Vendor responsibility Cloud services Network (by association) Network discovery protocols User control and visibility 8
Device Mobile App IoT Components Cloud Endpoints Network 9
Evaluating Off The Shelf Devices 10
Evaluating Off The Shelf Devices • Evaluation of IoT devices should be: • Objective • Transparent • Measurable • Reproducible 10
Evaluating Off The Shelf Devices • Evaluation of IoT devices should be: • Objective • Transparent • Measurable • Reproducible • Device Representation • Media devices vs appliances 10
Evaluating Off The Shelf Devices • Evaluation of IoT devices should be: • Objective • Transparent • Measurable • Reproducible • Device Representation • Media devices vs appliances • Easy to understand • Consumer oriented 10
Lab Setup 11
IoT Lab Evaluation Device 12
IoT Lab Evaluation Device • Internet pairing 12
IoT Lab Evaluation Device • Internet pairing • Configuration 12
IoT Lab Evaluation Device • Internet pairing • Configuration • Updateable 12
IoT Lab Evaluation Device • Internet pairing • Configuration • Updateable • Exposed services 12
IoT Lab Evaluation Device • Internet pairing • Configuration • Updateable • Exposed services • Vulnerable Services 12
IoT Lab Evaluation Device UPnP services RCE vulnerability • Internet pairing CVE-2012-5958-65 Dropbear SSH RCE vulnerability • Configuration CVE-2013-4863 • Updateable • Exposed services • Vulnerable Services 12
IoT Lab Evaluation Cloud Backends 13
IoT Lab Evaluation Cloud Backends • Types of cloud backends • 1 st , 3 rd , or hybrid 13
IoT Lab Evaluation Cloud Backends • Types of cloud backends • 1 st , 3 rd , or hybrid • TLS/SSL • Self-signed • Name mismatch • Vulnerable TLS/SSL version 13
IoT Lab Evaluation Cloud Backends • Types of cloud backends • 1 st , 3 rd , or hybrid • TLS/SSL • Self-signed • Name mismatch • Vulnerable TLS/SSL version • Insecure protocols 13
IoT Lab Evaluation Cloud Backends • Types of cloud backends • 1 st , 3 rd , or hybrid • TLS/SSL • Self-signed • Name mismatch • Vulnerable TLS/SSL version • Insecure protocols • Vulnerable software • Services 13
IoT Lab Evaluation • 12 different backends, 1 st Party Cloud Backends • Supports SSL v2/v3 • CVE-2013-4810 – RCE JBoss Server • Types of cloud backends • 1 st , 3 rd , or hybrid • TLS/SSL • Self-signed • Name mismatch • Vulnerable TLS/SSL version • Insecure protocols • Vulnerable software • Services 13
IoT Lab Evaluation Mobile App 14
IoT Lab Evaluation Mobile App • Permissions • Requested unused 14
IoT Lab Evaluation Mobile App • Permissions • Requested unused • Programming errors • Incorrect use of crypto 14
IoT Lab Evaluation Mobile App • Permissions • Requested unused • Programming errors • Incorrect use of crypto • Hardcoded secrets • API keys for cloud services 14
IoT Lab Evaluation Mobile App • Permissions • Requested unused • Programming errors • Incorrect use of crypto • Hardcoded secrets • API keys for cloud services • Hardcoded Crypto key • uLi4/f4+Pb39.T19 • UMENG_MESSAGE_SECRET: … 14
IoT Lab Evaluation Network 15
IoT Lab Evaluation Network • Protocols in use • Insecure Protocols • Custom Protocols 15
IoT Lab Evaluation Network • Protocols in use • Insecure Protocols • Custom Protocols • Encryption between • Device to Cloud • Device to Mobile App • Mobile App to Cloud 15
IoT Lab Evaluation Network • Protocols in use • Insecure Protocols • Custom Protocols • Encryption between • Device to Cloud • Device to Mobile App • Mobile App to Cloud • MITM Attack on • Device to Cloud • Device to Mobile App • Mobile App to Cloud 15
IoT Lab Evaluation Network • Protocols in use • Insecure Protocols • Custom Protocols • Encryption between • Device to Cloud • Device to Mobile App • Mobile App to Cloud • MITM Attack on • Device to Cloud • Partial Encryption Across the Internet • Device to Mobile App • No Encryption on the LAN • Mobile App to Cloud 15
Scoring The Components Scorecard Rating Independent system components scoring Documented Modular 16
Component Framework 17
Component Framework 17
Component Framework 17
Component Framework 17
Component Framework 17
Component Framework 17
Component Framework 17
Component Framework 17
Component Framework 17
Component Framework 17
Component Framework 17
Component Framework 17
Component Framework 17
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Evaluation Takeaways 20
Evaluation Takeaways • Cloud managed • Auto update • Encrypted local traffic with authenticated services 20
21 What's Next?
21 What's Next? • Longitudinal analysis • Do updates improve the Things?
21 What's Next? • Longitudinal analysis • Do updates improve the Things? • Accurate representation • Inducing device activities
How Can You Access/Contribute? • Evaluation data is public • Feel free to reach out: • Request specific device evaluation • Sponsor devices for evaluation • Additional questions • Download our data • https://YourThings.info • Contact email: • contact@YourThings.info 22
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