Sociological Theory II Week 5: Collective Action Hilary 2019 Dr Anna Krausova http://users.ox.ac.uk/~sant3223/
Recall last weeks: ▪ Prisoner’s dilemma, the stag hunt and dictator game ▪ Social norms ▪ Interaction dynamics ▪ Is it clear yet why we sometimes cooperate, even when it isn’t (doesn’t seem to be) in our individual rational interest? ➔ The persistent puzzle of collective action
Collective action “The notion of collective action comprises the broad range of social phenomena in which social actors engage in common activities for demanding and/or providing collective goods .” (Baldassarri, p. 391). ▪ puzzle of collective action as the free rider problem (Olson) ▪ puzzle of the tragedy of the commons (Ostrom) ▪ puzzle of altruism in general ▪ puzzle of contentious collective action
Collective action ▪ Some examples: ▪ Voting in elections, protecting the environment, participating in protest, vaccinating your children, donating blood, rioting ▪ Common (everyday) v. rare (extraordinary) ▪ Institutionalised v. non-institutionalised (contentious) settings ▪ Firms ▪ Activism ▪ Unions ▪ Social protest ▪ Elections ▪ Ethnic violence ▪ NGOs ▪ Revolutions
Free rider problem (Olson, 1971) Common good problem for ‘large groups’ ▪ “It does not follow, because all of the individuals in a group would gain if they achieved their group objective, that they would act to achieve that objective, even if they were all rational and self-interested. (Olson, 1971: 2) ▪ Need for: ▪ External coercion and/or ▪ Separate incentives
How much of a problem is the ‘free rider problem’? Empirical evidence for cooperation abundant (Baldassarri, 2011), even ▪ when no external constraint (Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 1990) or separate incentives (Piliavin, 2009) Does altruistic action need to be explained by rational egoistic ▪ motives? (Piliavin & Charng, 1990) Question of ‘negligibility’ and imperceptible differences central for Olson ▪ However, questionable (Brennan, 2015; Tuck, 2008) ▪ Imperceptibility of individual contribution on aggregate output ≠ imperceptibility ▪ of action - e.g. social norm of contributing (Brennan, 2015) ➔
How much of a problem is the ‘free rider problem’? Still, real empirical problems ▪ requiring inquiry Vaccinations – negligible & ▪ imperceptible effect of one decision (in Olson’s terms ) ➔ But, anti-vax movement UK, 87% of children vaccinated ▪ against measles – 95% for ‘herd immunity’ ➔ increase in cases (~1000 in 2018, 259 in 2017) https://www.independent.co.uk/news/health/anti-vaccine-movement- world-health-organisation-who-diseases-mmr-antivax-a8732621.html
Overcoming the free rider problem: Motivations • Decentralized, one-shot collective action situations ≠ collective cooperation (if agents rational & self-interested) • Cf. Bowles & Gintis’ cooperation as evolutionary advantage (last week) • Neither explains why individuals sometimes cooperate ➔ Mixed motivations ▪ Unconditional co-operators ▪ ‘saints, heroes, fanatics’ ( Elster, p.398) ▪ Fairness norms ▪ Emotions (shame, empathy, etc.) ▪ Conditional co-operators ▪ ‘if and only if my contribution increases average benefit’ ▪ if a certain number if people cooperate (dictator game) ▪ if separate incentives are available (Olson) ▪ ‘tit for tat’ (Axelrod, 1984)
Overcoming the free riding problem: Situational factors ▪ Motivations may be necessary, but not sufficient ▪ Context and situational dynamics ▪ Two examples: ▪ The murder of Kitty Genovese ▪ The rescue of Jews during WWII
The Kitty Genovese Case ▪ Kitty Genovese stabbed to death in 1964 in a middle-class neighborhood in Queens ▪ According to NYT (1964), murder continued for half an hour while 38 bystanders watched without intervening or notifying the police ▪ Why did no one help? (http://www.nytimes.com/1964/03/27/37-who-saw-murder- didnt-call-the-police.html?_r=0 )
Bystander intervention & diffusion of responsibility (Darley & Latané, 1968) ▪ More bystanders in an emergency, more likely somebody will intervene? ▪ Instead: diffusion of responsibility ▪ Experiment: help during simulated seizure? ▪ 85% of only witness to emergency helped, versus 62% when another person present, and 31% when four other bystanders also present ▪ The more people, the longer it takes for someone to intervene
Diffusion of responsibility? ▪ Not so simple; exceptions to this ‘rule’ (Piliavin, 2009) ▪ Clarity of emergencies – cues ➔ ▪ Victim characteristics ▪ Bystander characteristics (training, confidence, etc.) ▪ Attribution of helpfulness also important ▪ Empathy ‘feels good’ (Piliavin, 2009)
Clarity of emergencies & cues 1 ➔ cont. : ▪ Kitty Genovese story quite different in fact ▪ Stabbed in lungs – difficult to scream for help ▪ Many interpreted as domestic dispute or drunk squabble ▪ One did rush to help (https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/11/us/remembering-kitty- genovese.html
Clarity of emergencies & cues 2 ▪ Famous Czech architect Jan Kaplicky – died after collapsing in busy Prague street aged 72 ▪ Seen as drunk - ambulance called after 15 minutes – heart failure ▪ Everyone kept thinking that Mr Kaplicky is drunk. Even the officers, who called the ambulance… ” She recalls , however, that he had ‘clean shoes, clothes and a carefully wrapped scarf’. “ That is not what a drunk looks like. ” (Selfridges building in Birmingham) ▪ Role of prejudice? How do we react to visual (not only verbal) cues? ▪ Recall high calculation costs! (esp. in emergencies)
‘The importance of being asked’ (Varese & Yaish, 2000) ▪ Why did certain individuals help Jews during WWII? ▪ Altruistic Personality? : ▪ rescuers ‘stronger sense of attachment to others and their feeling of responsibility for the welfare of others, including those outside their immediate familial or communal circle’ ( Oliner and Oliner 1988: 249). ▪ But, individuals are more likely (17 times!) to help when asked (also evidence for situations ranging from charity giving to blood donations) (Varese & Yaish, 2000) ▪ Being asked as trigger ▪ Only 4% of those asked did not help ▪ Selection mechanism: prior acquaintance & signals
Overcoming the free rider problem: coercion Cooperation in the ‘underworld’?: ▪ Varese & Campana (2013) Trust low, no external enforcement ▪ But, co-offending and cooperation ▪ ➔ Coercion mechanisms: ▪ ‘Hostage taking’ ▪ Kinship-ties ▪ Violence ▪ Cutting off options ▪ Cost of exit (also Ahlquist & Levi, 2013) (Yakuza member, finger missing)
What about social movements? ▪ Collective action puzzle par excellance (at least for social movement scholars!) ▪ No external enforcement (usually) ▪ Less common than everyday cooperation ▪ Also, general interest in social change Did you think of social movements and protest as examples of collective action first? Clear parallels and similar, if not the same puzzles, but often studied separately ▪ Cooperation / altruism – social psychology ▪ Social movements – political sociology ▪ But, need for more scholarly dialogue (Piliavin, 2009) ▪ Analytical sociology potentially integrating (Baldassarri, 2011)
How do social movements mobilise? ▪ Interests/grievances alone not enough (agree with Olson!) ▪ Social movement scholarship: ▪ Political opportunities + resource mobilisation + framing processes (McAdam et al, 1996) ▪ Return of emotions (Jasper, 2011) ▪ Neither individual motivations nor structural factors alone: ▪ Dynamics of interest formation - social interactions “Individual interest cannot be disentangled from group interest and is partly defined by group expectations.”( Baldassarri, p. 411) ➔ Social movements also work to define ‘public good’
Collective action ≠ collective outcomes ▪ So far, explaining cooperation ▪ But , not outcomes of that cooperation (sometimes conflated) ▪ Intended consequences ▪ Unintended consequences ▪ Recall, e.g., Boudon’s perverse effects What helps explain the efficacy of collective action?
Puzzle of social movement impact “And even then, when the protesters succeed in forcing governments to respond, they do not dictate the content of those responses. As to the variety of specific circumstances which determine how much the protesters will gain and how much they will lose, we still have a great deal to learn” (Piven & Cloward, 1979 : 32) "When and how does mobilisation make a difference? When and how do activists achieve their goals? Is protest a necessary and/or sufficient condition for producing social and political change?" (Bosi et al., 2016 )
What is social movement impact? • Little consensus on how to define or measure outcomes • legislative change ; organisational impact ; biographical consequences (Amenta & Caren, 2004, McAdam et al, 2001) • Gamson’s (1975) typology of social movement outcomes based on (1) acceptance and (2) advantages they receive: OUTCOMES ADVANTAGES ACCEPTANCE Yes No Yes Full response Co-optation No Pre-emption Collapse
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