Sociological Theory II Week 1: Micro & Macro Hilary 2019 Dr Anna Krausova
Introduction ▪ Office hours ▪ Wednesdays 2pm - 4pm ▪ Room 8 at New (New College Lane) ▪ Lecture slides ▪ http://users.ox.ac.uk/~sant3223/ ▪ Please do ask questions ▪ Week 3 Lecture on Gender: Dr Amanda Palmer
Taking a step back ▪ What is society, and what does the individual do within it ▪ Homo sociologicus ▪ As the object of study of sociology? ▪ individuals programmed by ‘social structures’; lives determined by social origin / position ▪ individual is ‘acted upon’; actions channelled by external constrains do not leave any substantial room for choice ▪ Versus Homo economicus ▪ A rational actor only interested in maximising economic benefits, who acts upon society
Methodological holism ▪ Durkheim’s functionalism ▪ “social facts” • External to the individual; Social norms, values and structures/institutions “ A social fact is any way of acting, whether fixed or not, capable of exerting over the individual an external constraint; or, which is general over the whole of a given society whilst having an existence of its own, independent of its individual manifestations ” (Durkheim, 1982: 59) ▪ Durkheim’s types of suicide: ▪ Anomic ▪ Altruistic ▪ Egoistic ➔ only interested in “deviant” rates of suicide, different to the “normal” rate ➔ E.g. during economic crises ▪ But , unclear how these “social facts” emerge, operate, reproduce themselves, etc.
Methodological individualism ▪ Weber’s interpretive sociology ▪ The “intentional actor” “For sociological purposes there is no such thing as a collective personality which ‘acts’. When reference is made in a sociological context to a State, a nation, a corporation, a family or army corps, or to similar collectivities, what is meant is ... only a certain kind of development of actual or possible social actions of individual persons.” (Weber, 1921: 14) ▪ A simple aggregation model: ▪ Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1905) Protestant religious doctrine generates certain values • ➔ Individuals with those values adopt certain kind of orientations to economic behaviour ➔ Individual orientations to economic behaviour help bring about capitalist economic organisation in a society ▪ A bigger side-question: Do values impact the economy (Weber), or does the economy determine values? (Marx) ▪ Either way, is simple aggregation from individual to society enough? ➔ Micro-macro linkages
Now to micro and macro linkages… But first…. ▪ The most important question! Why did I break my knee skiing in Austria this break? Clear causality, right? Or not so much? What is the most pertinent question? ▪ What concrete steps led to the accident? ▪ Or, what made it more likely that while skiing, I will sustain such a serious injury? Exercise: Write down your best guess as to why I broke my knee skiing.
Now to micro and macro linkages… But first…. ▪ The most important question: Why did I break my knee skiing in Austria this break? ▪ Sociological Imagination: “Neither the life of an individual nor the history of a society can be understood without understanding both.” (C. Wright Mills, 1959: 3)
Now to micro and macro linkages… But first…. ▪ The most important question: Why did I break my knee skiing in Austria this break? My likelihood of ▪ accident… Compared to whom? • How do we decide whether the individual is more important than society? ➔ Cannot do so a priori!
Now to micro and macro linkages… But first…. ▪ The most important question: Why did I break my knee skiing in Austria this break? ▪ Individual factors ▪ E.g. Propensity for risk-taking + Physical fitness • Systemic factors • Women 3x more likely to have binding not release (Posch et al., 2017) ➔ Women 3x more likely overall to suffer knee ligament injury while skiing, compared to men (Ruedl et al., 2011) (10x more likely according to Daily Telegraph! ) ▪ Did intentions matter? Or ‘social fact’ of greater risk for women? Or, combination? ▪ Biological differences; but why not researched earlier / equipment not adjusted?
Sociology of risk and accidents ▪ Perrow’s Normal Accidents ▪ Nuclear accidents, for example ▪ Common sense: individual operator mistakes ▪ But, “it is the interaction of the multiple failures that explains the accident” (Perrow, 1999: 7) ▪ Beck’s Risk Society (1992) ▪ Unequal distribution of risks within “modern” society But, helping us understand micro-macro links? ▪ E.g., the ‘social accident’ (Factor et al, 2007) ▪ “Looking at road accidents, we suggest that social causes at the macro level – such as cultural differences – might account for the attitudes and behaviors of drivers and their relationship to road accidents on the micro- level” (p.918) ▪ Or, ‘feedback loops’ ( Bellaby & Lawrenson, 2001) ▪ “The body and space can be both real and culturally constructed, and cultural constructs can be real in their consequences. Thus statistical risk assessment contributes to the construction of roads in ways that neglect motorcycling safety.” (p.385)
Analytical Sociology ➔ Causal mechanisms & structural individualism ➔ Analytical Sociology ▪ explanations, and mechanisms; not purely descriptive/interpretive ▪ E.g. asks not only what ‘social facts’ we can observe, but how they ‘come about’ ▪ considers the importance of individual intentions and actions, but within wider social structures “Structural individualism is a methodological doctrine according to which social facts should be explained as the intended or unintended outcomes of individuals’ actions. Structural individualism differs from traditional methodological individualism in attributing substantial explanatory importance to the social structures in which individuals are embedded.” (Hedström & Bearman, 2009: 4)
Aggregation models ▪ Prisoner’s dilemma (not again!) ▪ Two players (actors) ▪ Assumptions: ▪ no trust between the actors; only motivation for each player is to maximise one utility, that is minimum prison years (no room for moral beliefs, for example) ▪ Shelling (1978): ▪ ‘system of interaction’ between individual and environment ▪ interaction between different individuals + ▪ interaction between individuals and environment+ ▪ how previous interactions affects further interactions ▪ 1 st assumption: behaviour is purposive ▪ 2 nd assumption: behaviour is contingent ▪ Equilibrium analysis ▪ Prisoner’s dilemma represents an inefficient equilibrium (total pay off would be higher if they cooperated) ▪ Can be extended to Mutli- person ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’
=D Multiple prisoners’ dilemmas (Shelling, 1978) =C Individual Collective Payoffs Payoff C C C 9 3 3 3 C C D 8 2 2 4 C D D 7 1 3 3 D D D 6 2 2 2 C = cooperate D = defect
=D Multiple prisoners’ dilemmas (Shelling, 1978) =C Individual Collective Payoffs Payoff C C C 9 3 3 3 C C D 8 2 2 4 C D D 7 1 3 3 D D D 6 2 2 2
=D Multiple prisoners’ dilemmas (Shelling, 1978) =C Individual Collective Payoffs Payoff C C C 9 3 3 3 C C D 8 2 2 4 C D D 7 1 3 3 D D D 6 2 2 2
=D Multiple prisoners’ dilemmas (Shelling, 1978) =C Individual Collective Payoffs Payoff C C C 9 3 3 3 C C D 8 2 2 4 C D D 7 1 3 3 D D D 6 2 2 2
1 =D Multiple prisoners’ dilemmas (Shelling, 1978) =C ▪ For the collective, best if all three players cooperate 2 ▪ But , if you don’t know what the other players are going to choose, always better for you individually to defect ▪ Shape of curve depends on different payoffs and if they change based on the n of people involved 3 ▪ 1: more people ➔ larger the payoffs, but still individually better to defect, and the relative difference stays the same ▪ 2: difference in payoff for defecting v. cooperating the more people play ▪ 3: difference in payoff for defecting v. cooperating the more people play
Threshold models ▪ Other scenarios: where at some point, as the number of people increases, it becomes more costly to defect (or vice versa) ( ➔ lecture on collective action ) ▪ E.g. Granovetter’s (1978 ) threshold model of collective behaviour probability of individual participating in ▪ collective action with n participating benefit , but cost ▪ moral obligation ▪ heterogeneity: each individual has a ▪ threshold low threshold: high propensity to ▪ participate
Threshold models Individual Threshold Action a 0 participates unconditionally ▪ Example 1 participates because 1 other has b 1 ▪ Average threshold: participates because 2 others have c 2 4.3 d 3 participates because 3 others have ▪ Participation: 8 e 4 participates because 4 others have If these were 10 ▪ f 4 participates because 4 others have people in a square, 8 of them will engage in g 5 participates because 5 others have collective behaviour, h 6 participates because 6 others have such as a demonstration i 8 participates because 8 others have j 10 (does not)
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