Ecole Internationale de Printemps Syst` emes R´ epartis : METIS2008 RFID Security Gildas Avoine UCL, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium Department of Computing Science and Engineering RFID Security gildas.avoine@uclouvain.be
Introduction Outline of this Talk Part 1: RFID primer Part 2: Security threats in RFID systems Part 3: Ensuring Privacy RFID Security gildas.avoine@uclouvain.be
Part 1: RFID Primer RFID Security gildas.avoine@uclouvain.be
Outline 1 First Step 2 Daily Life Examples 3 Tags Characteristics 4 Identification and Authentication Protocols RFID Security gildas.avoine@uclouvain.be
First Step RFID Security gildas.avoine@uclouvain.be
Definition Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) is a method of storing and remotely retrieving data (typically an identifier) using devices called RFID tags or transponders. An RFID tag is a small object that can be attached to or incorpo- rated into a product, animal, or person. RFID tags contain antennas to enable them to receive and respond to radio-frequency queries from an RFID transceiver. RFID Security gildas.avoine@uclouvain.be
Architecture and Definitions Infrastructure Identifier Request − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − → Unique Identifier ← − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − Data Request (+ Auth) − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − → Data (Encrypted) ← − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − RFID Security gildas.avoine@uclouvain.be
History RFID exists since the forties (IFF, Russian spy). Commercial RFID applications appeared in the early eigthies. Boom which RFID technology is enjoying today relies on the willingness to develop small and cheap RFID tags. Auto-ID Center created in 1999 at the MIT. (EPC code) RFID Security gildas.avoine@uclouvain.be
Daily Life Examples RFID Security gildas.avoine@uclouvain.be
Daily Life Examples Applications Management of stocks (Wal-Mart, US DoD, etc.) Libraries (Santa Clara Library, etc.) Pets identification Anti-counterfeiting (luxury articles, etc.) Sensor networks (Michelin’s tyres, etc.) Acess control (Building, ⋆ Famous Baja Beach Club, etc.) Automobile ignition keys (TI DST Module, etc.) Localization of people ⋆ (Amusement parks, etc.) Electronic documents (IDs, Passports, etc.) Public transportation (Paris, Boston, etc.) RFID Security gildas.avoine@uclouvain.be
Quelques formats de tags RFID Security gildas.avoine@uclouvain.be
Daily Life Examples Readers RFID Security gildas.avoine@uclouvain.be
Tags Characteristics RFID Security gildas.avoine@uclouvain.be
Tag Characteristics tamper−resistance communication distance yes memory meters centim. no 4 2 0 1 8 2 1 computation c r i c o r t i x e r t m e m m m 0 . 2 y $ 0 s y s a EPC Gen2 e v 0 8 i 0 . s $ s a p H z G 4 2 . e v i power source s s a p − e 3 i $ m v i H z e t M c 0 s a 0 9 9 3 6 1 5 O S I Eg. Logistics cost H z M 5 6 3 . 3 1 4 4 4 Eg. Access Control 1 O I S z H K 3 5 1 − 2 4 standard 1 frequency RFID Security gildas.avoine@uclouvain.be
Tags Characteristics Communication Model application presentation application application session transport transport network internet communication data link physical physical physical OSI TCP / IP RFID RFID Security gildas.avoine@uclouvain.be
Tags Characteristics Standards ISO International Organization for Standardization ( www.iso.org ) EPC Electronic Product Code ( http://www.epcglobalinc.org/ ) RFID Security gildas.avoine@uclouvain.be
Tags Characteristics ISO Standards Generalities There exist numerous ISO standards on contactless identification 18046 11785 17365 17364 11785 10536 15418 10374 11784 15434 15693 14443 17366 18000 15962 18047 15961 19789 17358 24710 15459 15963 17367 18185 117363 24721 19762 RFID Security gildas.avoine@uclouvain.be
Tags Characteristics About EPCglobal “The EPCglobal Network TM was developed by the Auto-ID Centre, a global research team directed through the Massachusetts Institute of Technology with labs around the world.” “Our mission is to make organizations more effective by enabling true visibility of information about items in the supply chain. To that end, EPCglobal develops and oversees standards (...)” “EPCglobal is a neutral, consensus-based, not-for-profit standards organisation.” RFID Security gildas.avoine@uclouvain.be
Tags Characteristics EPCglobal Specifications 900 MHz Class-0 13.56 MHz ISM Band Class-1 860MHz – 930 MHz Class-1 Class-1 Generation-2 UHF (RFID Conformance Requirements) EPCglobal Architecture Framework Version 1.0 EPC Tag Data Standard Version 1.1 rev 1.27 Class-1 Generation 2 UHF Standard Version 1.0.9 Class-1 Gen 2 EPC Standard is now part of ISO 18000-6 Standard RFID Security gildas.avoine@uclouvain.be
Identification and Authentication Protocols RFID Security gildas.avoine@uclouvain.be
RFID Goal WHY do I want to use RFID? What should be the primary GOAL of the protocol? RFID Security gildas.avoine@uclouvain.be
Protocols Identification vs Authentication 2/ Management of stocks (Wal-Mart, US DoD, etc.) Libraries (Santa Clara Library, etc.) Pets identification Anti-counterfeiting (luxury articles, etc.) Sensor networks (Michelin’s tyres, etc.) Access control (Famous Baja Beach Club, etc.) Automobile ignition keys (Texas Instruments, etc.) Localization of people (Amusement parks, etc.) Electronic documents (Passports, etc.) Transport Ticketing (Metro in Paris, etc.) Counting cattle Faciliting sorting of recyclable material RFID Security gildas.avoine@uclouvain.be
Authentication vs Identification Identification: Get Identity of remote party. Authentication: Get Identity + Proof of remote party RFID Security gildas.avoine@uclouvain.be
Classification of the Applications RFID Security gildas.avoine@uclouvain.be
Part 2: Security Threats in RFID Systems RFID Security gildas.avoine@uclouvain.be
Outline Classification of the threats Analysis of the threats Relationship between threats and communication model RFID Security gildas.avoine@uclouvain.be
Classification RFID Security gildas.avoine@uclouvain.be
Classification Impersonation Information Leakage Malicious Traceability Denial of Service RFID Security gildas.avoine@uclouvain.be
Impersonation RFID Security gildas.avoine@uclouvain.be
Impersonation Definition Definition (resistance to impersontation) The probability is negligible that any adversary distinct from the tag, carrying out the protocol playing the role of the tag, can cause the reader to complete and accept the tag’s identity. Speaking about impersonation when dealing with identification does not make sense Impersonation is related to authentication. RFID Security gildas.avoine@uclouvain.be
Impersonation Reader Tag r − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − → ID ID, E K ( r ) ← − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − Danger: lightweight protocols and algorithms (wired logic instead of microprocessor), problem of key management, tags are not fully tamper-resistant, etc. Do not cut the prices by using weak algorithms or weak keys. R read the standards, hire good engineers and programmers. RFID Security gildas.avoine@uclouvain.be
Impersonation MIT Authentication System (MIT) Theory vs Real Life: authentication is sometimes done using an identification protocol! Example: The RFID-based MIT ID Card. RFID Security gildas.avoine@uclouvain.be
Impersonation KeeLoq Attack (KUL, Technion, Hebrew Inst.) � Inc., KeeLoq: Car locks and alarms, sold by Microchip R used by Chrysler, Daewoo, Honda, BMW, Jaguar, Fiat, GM, Volvo,... Attack with 2 44 . 5 crypt. op. (secure at least 2 80 , recom. 2 128 ). Two days on 50 Dual Core machines. The poor design allows to recover the master key. RFID Security gildas.avoine@uclouvain.be
Impersonation Texas Instrument (RSA Labs & Johns Hopkins) Attack against the Digital Signature Transponder manufactured by Texas Instrument, used in automobile ignition keys (there exist more than 130 millions such keys). Car Key (RFID) r E (r) k Cipher (proprietary) uses 40-bit keys: recovering a key takes less than 1 minute using a time-memory trade-offs. RFID Security gildas.avoine@uclouvain.be
Mifare Classic 1/ Cards Readers Controllers Back-end RFID Security gildas.avoine@uclouvain.be
Mifare Classic 2/ Each card shares a key with the reader. The encryption algorithm – Crypto 1 – is not public. The authentication protocol is neither public. Crypto1 uses 48 bit keys. RFID Security gildas.avoine@uclouvain.be
Mifare Classic 3/ ID , r 1 Tag Reader − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − → E k ( r 1 ) ← − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − E k ( data ) − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − → RFID Security gildas.avoine@uclouvain.be
Recommend
More recommend
