Revolutionaries and Spies on Graphs Daniel W. Cranston Virginia - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Revolutionaries and Spies on Graphs Daniel W. Cranston Virginia Commonwealth University dcranston@vcu.edu Slides available on my webpage Joint with Jane Butterfield, Greg Puleo, Doug West, and Reza Zamani NIST ACMD Seminar 12 March 2013

A Problem of Network Security Setup: r revolutionaries play against s spies on a graph G . Each rev. moves to a vertex, then each spy moves to a vertex.

A Problem of Network Security Setup: r revolutionaries play against s spies on a graph G . Each rev. moves to a vertex, then each spy moves to a vertex. Goal: Rev’s want to get m rev’s at a common vertex, with no spy.

A Problem of Network Security Setup: r revolutionaries play against s spies on a graph G . Each rev. moves to a vertex, then each spy moves to a vertex. Goal: Rev’s want to get m rev’s at a common vertex, with no spy. Each turn: Each rev. moves/stays, then each spy moves/stays.

A Problem of Network Security Setup: r revolutionaries play against s spies on a graph G . Each rev. moves to a vertex, then each spy moves to a vertex. Goal: Rev’s want to get m rev’s at a common vertex, with no spy. Each turn: Each rev. moves/stays, then each spy moves/stays. r r

A Problem of Network Security Setup: r revolutionaries play against s spies on a graph G . Each rev. moves to a vertex, then each spy moves to a vertex. Goal: Rev’s want to get m rev’s at a common vertex, with no spy. Each turn: Each rev. moves/stays, then each spy moves/stays. r r r r r r r

A Problem of Network Security Setup: r revolutionaries play against s spies on a graph G . Each rev. moves to a vertex, then each spy moves to a vertex. Goal: Rev’s want to get m rev’s at a common vertex, with no spy. Each turn: Each rev. moves/stays, then each spy moves/stays. r r sr r r rs r

A Problem of Network Security Setup: r revolutionaries play against s spies on a graph G . Each rev. moves to a vertex, then each spy moves to a vertex. Goal: Rev’s want to get m rev’s at a common vertex, with no spy. Each turn: Each rev. moves/stays, then each spy moves/stays. rr r s r rr s r

A Problem of Network Security Setup: r revolutionaries play against s spies on a graph G . Each rev. moves to a vertex, then each spy moves to a vertex. Goal: Rev’s want to get m rev’s at a common vertex, with no spy. Each turn: Each rev. moves/stays, then each spy moves/stays. rrs r r srr r

A Problem of Network Security Setup: r revolutionaries play against s spies on a graph G . Each rev. moves to a vertex, then each spy moves to a vertex. Goal: Rev’s want to get m rev’s at a common vertex, with no spy. Each turn: Each rev. moves/stays, then each spy moves/stays. rs r r srr r r

A Problem of Network Security Setup: r revolutionaries play against s spies on a graph G . Each rev. moves to a vertex, then each spy moves to a vertex. Goal: Rev’s want to get m rev’s at a common vertex, with no spy. Each turn: Each rev. moves/stays, then each spy moves/stays. r r rs srr r r

A Problem of Network Security Setup: r revolutionaries play against s spies on a graph G . Each rev. moves to a vertex, then each spy moves to a vertex. Goal: Rev’s want to get m rev’s at a common vertex, with no spy. Each turn: Each rev. moves/stays, then each spy moves/stays. r r rs srr r Obs 1: If s ≥ | V ( G ) | , then the spies win. r

A Problem of Network Security Setup: r revolutionaries play against s spies on a graph G . Each rev. moves to a vertex, then each spy moves to a vertex. Goal: Rev’s want to get m rev’s at a common vertex, with no spy. Each turn: Each rev. moves/stays, then each spy moves/stays. r r rs srr r Obs 1: If s ≥ | V ( G ) | , then the spies win. r If s < | V ( G ) | and ⌊ r / m ⌋ > s , then rev’s win. Obs 2:

A Problem of Network Security Setup: r revolutionaries play against s spies on a graph G . Each rev. moves to a vertex, then each spy moves to a vertex. Goal: Rev’s want to get m rev’s at a common vertex, with no spy. Each turn: Each rev. moves/stays, then each spy moves/stays. r r rs r r r r s s s srr r r r r r Obs 1: If s ≥ | V ( G ) | , then the spies win. r If s < | V ( G ) | and ⌊ r / m ⌋ > s , then rev’s win. Obs 2: Ex: Say m = 2, r = 8, and s = 3.

A Problem of Network Security Setup: r revolutionaries play against s spies on a graph G . Each rev. moves to a vertex, then each spy moves to a vertex. Goal: Rev’s want to get m rev’s at a common vertex, with no spy. Each turn: Each rev. moves/stays, then each spy moves/stays. r r rs r r r r s s s srr r r r r r Obs 1: If s ≥ | V ( G ) | , then the spies win. r If s < | V ( G ) | and ⌊ r / m ⌋ > s , then rev’s win. Obs 2: Ex: Say m = 2, r = 8, and s = 3. So we assume ⌊ r / m ⌋ ≤ s < | V ( G ) | .

A Problem of Network Security Setup: r revolutionaries play against s spies on a graph G . Each rev. moves to a vertex, then each spy moves to a vertex. Goal: Rev’s want to get m rev’s at a common vertex, with no spy. Each turn: Each rev. moves/stays, then each spy moves/stays. r r rs r r r r s s s srr r r r r r Obs 1: If s ≥ | V ( G ) | , then the spies win. r If s < | V ( G ) | and ⌊ r / m ⌋ > s , then rev’s win. Obs 2: Ex: Say m = 2, r = 8, and s = 3. So we assume ⌊ r / m ⌋ ≤ s < | V ( G ) | . Def: σ ( G , m , r ) is minimum number of spies needed to win on G .

Results (thresholds for spies to win) 1. ⌊ r / m ⌋ spies can win on:

Results (thresholds for spies to win) 1. ⌊ r / m ⌋ spies can win on: trees, dominated graphs, “webbed trees”

Results (thresholds for spies to win) 1. ⌊ r / m ⌋ spies can win on: spy-good graphs trees, dominated graphs, “webbed trees”

Results (thresholds for spies to win) 1. ⌊ r / m ⌋ spies can win on: spy-good graphs trees, dominated graphs, “webbed trees” 2. Random graph, hypercubes, large complete k -partite; solved completely for unicyclic graphs

Results (thresholds for spies to win) 1. ⌊ r / m ⌋ spies can win on: spy-good graphs trees, dominated graphs, “webbed trees” 2. Random graph, hypercubes, large complete k -partite; solved completely for unicyclic graphs 3. For large complete bipartite graphs:

Results (thresholds for spies to win) 1. ⌊ r / m ⌋ spies can win on: spy-good graphs trees, dominated graphs, “webbed trees” 2. Random graph, hypercubes, large complete k -partite; solved completely for unicyclic graphs 3. For large complete bipartite graphs: σ ( G , 2 , r ) = 7 10 r

Results (thresholds for spies to win) 1. ⌊ r / m ⌋ spies can win on: spy-good graphs trees, dominated graphs, “webbed trees” 2. Random graph, hypercubes, large complete k -partite; solved completely for unicyclic graphs 3. For large complete bipartite graphs: σ ( G , 2 , r ) = 7 10 r σ ( G , 3 , r ) = 1 2 r

Results (thresholds for spies to win) 1. ⌊ r / m ⌋ spies can win on: spy-good graphs trees, dominated graphs, “webbed trees” 2. Random graph, hypercubes, large complete k -partite; solved completely for unicyclic graphs 3. For large complete bipartite graphs: σ ( G , 2 , r ) = 7 10 r σ ( G , 3 , r ) = 1 2 r � r � 3 m − 2 ≤ σ ( G , m , r ) < 1 . 58 r 2 − o (1) m , for m ≥ 4

Results (thresholds for spies to win) 1. ⌊ r / m ⌋ spies can win on: spy-good graphs trees, dominated graphs, “webbed trees” 2. Random graph, hypercubes, large complete k -partite; solved completely for unicyclic graphs 3. For large complete bipartite graphs: σ ( G , 2 , r ) = 7 10 r = 7 r 5 2 σ ( G , 3 , r ) = 1 2 r = 3 r 2 3 � r � 3 m − 2 ≤ σ ( G , m , r ) < 1 . 58 r 2 − o (1) m , for m ≥ 4

Results (thresholds for spies to win) 1. ⌊ r / m ⌋ spies can win on: spy-good graphs trees, dominated graphs, “webbed trees” 2. Random graph, hypercubes, large complete k -partite; solved completely for unicyclic graphs 3. For large complete bipartite graphs: σ ( G , 2 , r ) = 7 10 r = 7 r 5 2 σ ( G , 3 , r ) = 1 2 r = 3 r 2 3 � r � 3 m − 2 ≤ σ ( G , m , r ) < 1 . 58 r 2 − o (1) m , for m ≥ 4 Conj: As m grows: σ ( G , m , r ) ∼ 3 r 2 m

Spy-good Graphs: Trees Def: A graph G is spy-good if σ ( G , m , r ) = ⌊ r / m ⌋ for all m , r .

Spy-good Graphs: Trees Def: A graph G is spy-good if σ ( G , m , r ) = ⌊ r / m ⌋ for all m , r . Ex: P 9 is spy-good. Consider m = 3, r = 13, s = 4.

Spy-good Graphs: Trees Def: A graph G is spy-good if σ ( G , m , r ) = ⌊ r / m ⌋ for all m , r . Ex: P 9 is spy-good. Consider m = 3, r = 13, s = 4. Pf: One spy follows each m th rev. When rev’s move, spies repeat.

Spy-good Graphs: Trees Def: A graph G is spy-good if σ ( G , m , r ) = ⌊ r / m ⌋ for all m , r . Ex: P 9 is spy-good. Consider m = 3, r = 13, s = 4. Pf: One spy follows each m th rev. When rev’s move, spies repeat. s s

Spy-good Graphs: Trees Def: A graph G is spy-good if σ ( G , m , r ) = ⌊ r / m ⌋ for all m , r . Ex: P 9 is spy-good. Consider m = 3, r = 13, s = 4. Pf: One spy follows each m th rev. When rev’s move, spies repeat. s r r r r r r r r r r r r r s

Spy-good Graphs: Trees Def: A graph G is spy-good if σ ( G , m , r ) = ⌊ r / m ⌋ for all m , r . Ex: P 9 is spy-good. Consider m = 3, r = 13, s = 4. Pf: One spy follows each m th rev. When rev’s move, spies repeat. s r r r r r r r r r r r r r s s