REGULATING THE TRANSPORT OF REGULATING THE TRANSPORT OF URANIUM ORE CONCENTRATE URANIUM ORE CONCENTRATE IN AUSTRALIA IN AUSTRALIA Prepared by Michal Botha, Nuclear Security Section IAEA-CN-254-88-ORA Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office D17/1457383 Presented 13-17 November 2017
FEDERAL NUCLEAR REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IN AUSTRALIA NPT Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement ARPANSA Additional Protocol to the Comprehensive Australian Radiation Safeguards Agreement Protection and Nuclear CPPNM Amended Convention on the Physical Safety Act 1988 Protection of Nuclear Materials Dept. of Industry, Innovation & Science Customs ( Prohibited Exports ) Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987 Regulations 1958 • SECURITY • SAFEGUARDS Department of • NUCLEAR COOPERATION Infrastructure and Regional Development AGREEMENTS Australian States’ and Territories’ Regulatory Controls RE REGULATING THE TRA RANSP SPORT OF UOC IN IN AUSTRALIA 2
REGULATORY REVIEW Special Associated Locations Outside Technology Facility Facilities Patents Small Research AT AT – Medium Research NM Archives Communication PERMITS PERMITS Repository 2016 Significant 2017 2015 Significant 2017 2015 + SFM UOC Agents 2016 2017 2016 Transport Laboratories Ports/ Transport Air, UOC - Sea Stevedores 2018 Establish Sea, Significant Mine Transport Surface - NM Mining Industry UOC - Road Small Air - NM Decommission Transport Radiographers Road - NM Mine AT, AE Mines/Mills RE REGULATING THE TRA RANSP SPORT OF UOC IN IN AUSTRALIA 3
PERMIT REVIEW – TRANSPORT OF UOC 15.8% 10% Australian UOC exports for 2016- 2017 ≈ 7 081 tonnes 2 • Reduce the regulatory burden on the industry 15/16 Avg. - Exploit other existing regulatory requirements • Provide clear outcome objectives by applying industry performance terminology • Include a broader consultative stakeholder participation - Mines – Consignor, generally produces transport plans for consignments - State and Territory Government requirements for transport of Class7 material - Carriers – Providing performance “tick and flick” based objectives - International best practice • Meet Australian public’s expectation for the nuclear industry REGULATING THE TRA RE RANSP SPORT OF UOC IN IN AUSTRALIA 2 ASNO Annual Report 2016-2017 4
PERMIT CONTENT RISK GOVERNANCE ASSESSMENT PERMIT SECTION MAXIMUM PERMIT MATERIAL PRE- HOLDER TRANSPORT COMPLIANCE CODE TRANSPORT PARTICULARS LIMIT INSPECTION STORAGE REQUIREMENTS EXECUTIVE LEVEL DURING ASNO / IAEA INCIDENTAL TO PERMIT PRICIPLES TRANSPORT TRANSPORT SCALABLE EMERGENCY THREAT PROCEDURES MODEL RE REGULATING THE TRA RANSP SPORT OF UOC IN IN AUSTRALIA 5
REGULATORY REVIEW ASNO Permits required for transport of UOC 1 • Permits brought in line with new Permit model - Permit Section and Compliance Code section • Consultation with stakeholders - Transport operators - Mines (generally provide transport plans) - State and Territory Government regulatory bodies • Review drew on IAEA material - Nuclear Security in the Extraction Industry IAEA-TDL-003 RE REGULATING THE TRA RANSP SPORT OF UOC IN IN AUSTRALIA 1 Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987 6
PERMIT FUNCTIONAL FORMAT Route • Container / Seal Inspection Pre – • Transport Briefing • Transport Communications Operational Test • Convoy Communication • During Predetermined stops • Transport Security and Situational Awareness • Interim Security Arrangements Interim • Approved Secure Compounds • Storage Container storage to be door-to-door • Restoring Communications Emergency • Maintaining Security • Response Training Escalated Threat Title itle of of Presentation 7
STORAGE INCIDENTAL TO UOC TRANSPORT Australian Geographical limitations • Transporting over long distances • Unsealed roads in varying condition • Limited road options • Weather influences • Limited communication options Stationary for short periods (planned and unplanned stoppages) Secure Location storage requirements for periods beyond 72 hours RE REGULATING THE TRA RANSP SPORT OF UOC IN IN AUSTRALIA 8
SCALABLE THREAT MODEL FOR THE TRANSPORT OF UOC ASNO utilizes a threat scale based on the Attack/activities is imminent or occurring CERTAIN Australian National Terrorism Threat EXPECTED Movements of UOC are to cease Advisory System 3 PROBABLE Attack/activities is assessed as likely Attack/activities is feasible and could occur POSSIBLE Mining Industry Baseline nuclear security measures to NOT EXPECTED be applied for the transport of UOC Australian Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act 2003 in keeping with ISPS 4 requires the application of maritime security levels MARSEC 3 Security incident is probable or imminent MARSEC 2 Heightened risk of a security incident MARSEC 1 Normal business operations 3 www.nationalsecurity.gov.au REGULATING THE TRA RE RANSP SPORT OF UOC IN IN AUSTRALIA 4 International Ship and Port Facility Security Code 2003 9
SOUTH AUSTRALIAN UOC TRANSPORT WORKING GROUP The majority of UOC exports are currently shipped through the Port of Adelaide in the State of South Australia South Australian UOC Transport Working Group consisting of Federal and State Government, Industry and First-Responder representatives Recent action items include: • Best practice guidance for a model Transport Plan; • determining standards and obligations for incident responses, - abilities of the broader industry to contribute to a timely response due to extensive distances of transports; • Industry expertise contributing towards establishing specific training for first responders. RE REGULATING THE TRA RANSP SPORT OF UOC IN IN AUSTRALIA 10
RE REGULATING THE TRA RANSP SPORT OF UOC IN IN AUSTRALIA 11
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