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Introduction. Results Conclusion ProNoBis Probability and Nodeterminism, Bisimulations and Security Journ ee des ARCS 01 octobre 2007 Introduction. Results Conclusion Outline Introduction. 1 Non-Deterministic Choice Only


  1. Introduction. Results Conclusion ProNoBis Probability and Nodeterminism, Bisimulations and Security Journ´ ee des ARCS — 01 octobre 2007

  2. Introduction. Results Conclusion Outline Introduction. 1 Non-Deterministic Choice Only Probabilistic Choice Only Both Cryptographic Protocols Results 2 Infinite (topological) state spaces A Probabilistic Applied π -Calculus Anonymity Conclusion 3

  3. Introduction. Results Conclusion Consortium Teams: INRIA Futurs projet SECSI projet Comete ENS Cachan LSV EPITA LRDE Queen Mary U., London Dept. of Comp. Science U. Paris VII Denis Diderot Equipe de logique PPS U. di Verona Dip. di Informatica U. of Birmingham School of Comp. Science Postdoc: Angelo T ROINA , shared between Com` ete and SECSI (01 sep. 2006–31 aug. 2007).

  4. Introduction. Results Conclusion Non-Deterministic Choice Only Outline Introduction. 1 Non-Deterministic Choice Only Probabilistic Choice Only Both Cryptographic Protocols Results 2 Infinite (topological) state spaces A Probabilistic Applied π -Calculus Anonymity Conclusion 3

  5. Introduction. Results Conclusion Non-Deterministic Choice Only Non-Deterministic Choice: Semantics Halt Bad Non−deterministic choice Flip Flip 2 1 Start

  6. Introduction. Results Conclusion Non-Deterministic Choice Only Non-Deterministic Choice: Semantics Halt Bad Non−deterministic choice Flip Flip 2 1 Start

  7. Introduction. Results Conclusion Non-Deterministic Choice Only Non-Deterministic Choice: Semantics Halt Bad Non−deterministic choice Flip Flip 2 1 Start

  8. Introduction. Results Conclusion Non-Deterministic Choice Only Non-Deterministic Choice: Semantics Halt Bad Non−deterministic choice Flip Flip 2 1 Start

  9. Introduction. Results Conclusion Non-Deterministic Choice Only Non-Deterministic Choice: Semantics Halt Bad Non−deterministic choice Flip Flip 2 1 Start

  10. Introduction. Results Conclusion Non-Deterministic Choice Only Non-Deterministic Choice: Semantics Halt Bad Non−deterministic choice Flip Flip 2 1 Start

  11. Introduction. Results Conclusion Probabilistic Choice Only Outline Introduction. 1 Non-Deterministic Choice Only Probabilistic Choice Only Both Cryptographic Protocols Results 2 Infinite (topological) state spaces A Probabilistic Applied π -Calculus Anonymity Conclusion 3

  12. Introduction. Results Conclusion Probabilistic Choice Only A (Finite) Markov Chain Halt 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.2 Biased Good 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.5 Probabilistic choice 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 Flip Flip 2 1 0.5 0.5 Start

  13. Introduction. Results Conclusion Probabilistic Choice Only Start Halt 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.2 Biased Good 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.5 Probabilistic choice 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 Flip Flip 2 1 0.5 0.5 Start

  14. Introduction. Results Conclusion Probabilistic Choice Only Flip a Coin Halt 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.2 Biased Good 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.5 Probabilistic choice 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 Flip Flip 2 1 0.5 0.5 Start

  15. Introduction. Results Conclusion Probabilistic Choice Only Advance Halt 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.2 Biased Good 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.5 Probabilistic choice 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 Flip Flip 2 1 Probability: 0.5 0.5 0.5 Start

  16. Introduction. Results Conclusion Probabilistic Choice Only Flip a Coin Halt 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.2 Biased Good 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.5 Probabilistic choice 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 Flip Flip 2 1 0.5 0.5 Start

  17. Introduction. Results Conclusion Probabilistic Choice Only Advance Halt 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.2 Biased Good 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.5 Probabilistic choice 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 Flip Flip 2 1 Probability: 0.5x0.5 = 0.25 0.5 0.5 Start

  18. Introduction. Results Conclusion Probabilistic Choice Only Advance Halt 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.2 Biased Good 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.5 Probabilistic choice 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 Flip Flip 2 1 Probability: 0.25x0.3 = 0.075 0.5 0.5 Start

  19. Introduction. Results Conclusion Both Outline Introduction. 1 Non-Deterministic Choice Only Probabilistic Choice Only Both Cryptographic Protocols Results 2 Infinite (topological) state spaces A Probabilistic Applied π -Calculus Anonymity Conclusion 3

  20. Introduction. Results Conclusion Both A Stochastic Game (Demonic Case) Halt 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.2 Biased Good 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.5 Non−deterministic (demonic) choice (by adversary) Probabilistic choice 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 (by program) Flip Flip 2 1 Start

  21. Introduction. Results Conclusion Both Start Halt 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.2 Biased Good 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.5 Non−deterministic (demonic) choice (by adversary) Probabilistic choice 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 (by program) Flip Flip 2 1 Start

  22. Introduction. Results Conclusion Both C’s Turn: Malevolently Chooses Biased Side Halt 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.2 Biased Good 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.5 Non−deterministic (demonic) choice (by adversary) Probabilistic choice 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 (by program) Flip Flip 2 1 Start

  23. Introduction. Results Conclusion Both P’s Turn: Flipping a Coin Halt 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.2 Biased Good 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.5 Non−deterministic (demonic) choice (by adversary) Probabilistic choice 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 (by program) Flip Flip 2 1 Start

  24. Introduction. Results Conclusion Both P’s Turn: Advancing Halt 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.2 Biased Good 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.5 Non−deterministic (demonic) choice (by adversary) Probabilistic choice 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 (by program) Flip Flip 2 1 Start

  25. Introduction. Results Conclusion Both C’s Turn: Picking Most Biased Side Halt 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.2 Biased Good 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.5 Non−deterministic (demonic) choice (by adversary) Probabilistic choice 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 (by program) Flip Flip 2 1 Start

  26. Introduction. Results Conclusion Both P’s Turn Halt 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.2 Biased Good 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.5 Non−deterministic (demonic) choice (by adversary) Probabilistic choice 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 (by program) Flip Flip 2 1 Start

  27. Introduction. Results Conclusion Cryptographic Protocols Outline Introduction. 1 Non-Deterministic Choice Only Probabilistic Choice Only Both Cryptographic Protocols Results 2 Infinite (topological) state spaces A Probabilistic Applied π -Calculus Anonymity Conclusion 3

  28. Introduction. Results Conclusion Cryptographic Protocols Anonymity Goal : C should not be able to link agent to her actions. � = secret! Applications: e-voting : voter identities are public, candidate names are public. . . but C should not be able to tell who voted for whom. Secret sharing, file sharing (Freenet), auctions, etc.

  29. Introduction. Results Conclusion Cryptographic Protocols Anonymization Implementations: Crowds ([ReiterRubin98], sender anonymity), Onion Routing ([SyversonGoldschlagReed97], communication anonymity), Freenet ([Clarke et al.01], anonymous data storage/retrieval). Our focus : verifying anonymity properties. Previous models are either: purely non-deterministic (CSP [SchneiderSidiropoulos96], epistemic logic [SyversonStubblebine99], views [HughesShmatikov04]); or purely probabilistic (epistemic logic [HalpernONeill04]) . . . to the exception of [CanettiCheungKaynarLiskovLynchPereiraSegala’06], where non-determinism is heavily constrainted (“task-structured”).

  30. Introduction. Results Conclusion Cryptographic Protocols Our Canonical Example: Chaum’s Dining Cryptographers [1988] Problem : N ≥ 3 cryptographers share a meal; The meal is paid either by the organization (master) or one of them. The master decides who pays. Each cryptographer is informed by the master whether he has to pay or not. Goal : The cryptographers would like to decide whether one of them or the master paid. The master cannot be involved. If one of the cryptographers paid, he should remain anonymous.

  31. Introduction. Results Conclusion Cryptographic Protocols Dining Cryptographers ( N = 3)

  32. Introduction. Results Conclusion Cryptographic Protocols Chaum’s Solution Cryptographers are organized in a ring; Two adjacent cryptographers share a coin, which they flip secretly; Each cryptographer A examines the two coins he shares with his neighbors: If A is paying, A announces “agree” if the two coins agree, “disagree” otherwise. If A is not paying, A says the opposite. Fact : One of the cryptographers is paying ⇔ the number of “disagree” announced is odd . (Think in Z / 2 Z .)

  33. Introduction. Results Conclusion Cryptographic Protocols Modelling the Dining Cryptographers ( N = 3)

  34. Introduction. Results Conclusion Cryptographic Protocols Modeling Dining Cryptographers in the Probabilistic π -Calculus

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