Power System Resilience in the Pacific Northwest Eduardo - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Power System Resilience in the Pacific Northwest Eduardo - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Power System Resilience in the Pacific Northwest Eduardo Cotilla-Sanchez, Ph.D., Assistant Professor School of Electrical Engineering & Computer Science College of Engineering, Oregon State University Corvallis, Oregon, USA Nov 28, 2017


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Power System Resilience in the Pacific Northwest

Eduardo Cotilla-Sanchez, Ph.D., Assistant Professor

School of Electrical Engineering & Computer Science College of Engineering, Oregon State University Corvallis, Oregon, USA

Nov 28, 2017

Funded by the Oregon Talent Council & Department of Energy Award Number DE-OE0000780 & Electric Power Research Institute

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Power System Protection Models Cascading Failures Clustering and Islanding as Resiliency Strategies

1 Power System Protection Models

Understanding Critical Assets Blackout Risk Models

2 Cascading Failures

Building a Dynamic Cascading Failure Model Example Simulation: Poland

3 Clustering and Islanding as Resiliency Strategies

Remedial Action Schemes Automated Planning and Policy Switching Clustering

  • E. Cotilla-Sanchez

Power System Resilience in the Pacific Northwest 2/27

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Power System Protection Models Cascading Failures Clustering and Islanding as Resiliency Strategies Understanding Critical Assets Blackout Risk Models

Western Interconnection

  • E. Cotilla-Sanchez

Power System Resilience in the Pacific Northwest 3/27

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Power System Protection Models Cascading Failures Clustering and Islanding as Resiliency Strategies Understanding Critical Assets Blackout Risk Models

Power System Models

  • E. Cotilla-Sanchez

Power System Resilience in the Pacific Northwest 4/27

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Power System Protection Models Cascading Failures Clustering and Islanding as Resiliency Strategies Understanding Critical Assets Blackout Risk Models

Topological Metrics

Average path length (L)

Number of bus failures à 1 2

  • E. Cotilla-Sanchez

Power System Resilience in the Pacific Northwest 5/27

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SLIDE 6

Power System Protection Models Cascading Failures Clustering and Islanding as Resiliency Strategies Understanding Critical Assets Blackout Risk Models

Connectivity Loss

Connectivity loss (%)

Number of bus failures à 1 2

  • E. Cotilla-Sanchez

Power System Resilience in the Pacific Northwest 6/27

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Power System Protection Models Cascading Failures Clustering and Islanding as Resiliency Strategies Understanding Critical Assets Blackout Risk Models

Simple Cascading Failure Model (dc power flow)

Blackout size (%)

Number of bus failures à 1 2

  • E. Cotilla-Sanchez

Power System Resilience in the Pacific Northwest 7/27

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Power System Protection Models Cascading Failures Clustering and Islanding as Resiliency Strategies Understanding Critical Assets Blackout Risk Models

Western Electricity Coordinating Council 1996 Blackout

  • E. Cotilla-Sanchez

Power System Resilience in the Pacific Northwest 8/27

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Power System Protection Models Cascading Failures Clustering and Islanding as Resiliency Strategies Building a Dynamic Cascading Failure Model Example Simulation: Poland

Load Models

5 10 15 20 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2

|V| time (sec.)

|V|: constant Z load

5 10 15 20 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2

|V| time (sec.)

|V|: constant I load

5 10 15 20 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2

|V| time (sec.)

|V|: constant P load

5 10 15 20 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2

|V| time (sec.)

|V|: constant E load

  • E. Cotilla-Sanchez

Power System Resilience in the Pacific Northwest 9/27

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Power System Protection Models Cascading Failures Clustering and Islanding as Resiliency Strategies Building a Dynamic Cascading Failure Model Example Simulation: Poland

Relay Models

https://github.com/ecotillasanchez/cosmic.git

  • E. Cotilla-Sanchez

Power System Resilience in the Pacific Northwest 10/27

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Power System Protection Models Cascading Failures Clustering and Islanding as Resiliency Strategies Building a Dynamic Cascading Failure Model Example Simulation: Poland

Cascading Paths

150 200 250 300 350 400 450 10 10

1

Time (sec.) Number of Branch Outages

  • E. Cotilla-Sanchez

Power System Resilience in the Pacific Northwest 11/27

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Power System Protection Models Cascading Failures Clustering and Islanding as Resiliency Strategies Remedial Action Schemes Automated Planning and Policy Switching Clustering

Load Shedding (LS)

CHARACTERISTICS Naive and Homogenous:

Affects all loads in the network. Usually triggered by under-voltage conditions.

Adaptive and Dynamic:

Ability to select loads based on a rule. (priority, severity, electrical distance, etc.) Usually triggered by multiple conditions (UV, UF, frequency, dV

dt , dF dt ).

LS BENEFITS Direct manipulation of generation/load mismatch. Can be done in real-time. LS CHALLENGES Direct customer impact. Must be done incrementally.

  • E. Cotilla-Sanchez

Power System Resilience in the Pacific Northwest 12/27

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Power System Protection Models Cascading Failures Clustering and Islanding as Resiliency Strategies Remedial Action Schemes Automated Planning and Policy Switching Clustering

Islanding

CHARACTERISTICS Intentional creation of microgrids. Typically pre-determined based on common contingencies. Usually done based on slow-coherency, electrical distance, active/reactive power balance. BENEFITS Can isolate operational sections from affected sections. Can fully utilize DER capability to decrease impact on customers. CHALLENGES Slow calculation – usually done offline. Can cause portions of the grid to fully collapse.

  • E. Cotilla-Sanchez

Power System Resilience in the Pacific Northwest 13/27

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Power System Protection Models Cascading Failures Clustering and Islanding as Resiliency Strategies Remedial Action Schemes Automated Planning and Policy Switching Clustering

Markov Decision Processes (MDP)

MDPs provide well-developed theory for computational solutions to controllable and observable systems with stochastic dynamics.

S1 S3 S2 Aij, Pij,R2 Aij, Pij,R1 Aij, Pij,R3 Aij, Pij,R1 Aij, Pij,R3 A

i j

, P

i j

, R

2

MDP COMPONENTS System States (S): Time Independent Control Actions (A): Stationary or Non-Stationary Probabilistic Transition Distributions (P): Stochastic Movement Between States Rewards (R): Function of Current State

  • E. Cotilla-Sanchez

Power System Resilience in the Pacific Northwest 14/27

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Power System Protection Models Cascading Failures Clustering and Islanding as Resiliency Strategies Remedial Action Schemes Automated Planning and Policy Switching Clustering

Solutions to MDPs What is the solution to an MDP?

Policy (π) = A mapping of States (s) to Actions (a). Optimal Policy (π∗) = Policy with max Value (V ) in any given state (s). Value: V π(s) = E ∞

  • t=0

βtR(st)

  • E. Cotilla-Sanchez

Power System Resilience in the Pacific Northwest 15/27

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Power System Protection Models Cascading Failures Clustering and Islanding as Resiliency Strategies Remedial Action Schemes Automated Planning and Policy Switching Clustering

Policy Switching

π1 π2 π1 π3 π2

...

Simulation Time Horizon πps

Formally:

πps(s) = πi∗(s) i∗ = arg max

i

Vπi(s)

Policy Switching:

Basic guarantee that V (πps) ≥ maxi V (πi)

  • E. Cotilla-Sanchez

Power System Resilience in the Pacific Northwest 16/27

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Power System Protection Models Cascading Failures Clustering and Islanding as Resiliency Strategies Remedial Action Schemes Automated Planning and Policy Switching Clustering

Implementation

1 Python/Siemens PSSe 2 Time-Domain Simulation 3 3 Different Timescales 1

1 120 s – PSSe step

2

1 10 s – Grid check

3

5 s – Emgcy. dispatch

4 Random N-2 Contingencies 5 Parallelization

  • E. Cotilla-Sanchez

Power System Resilience in the Pacific Northwest 17/27

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Power System Protection Models Cascading Failures Clustering and Islanding as Resiliency Strategies Remedial Action Schemes Automated Planning and Policy Switching Clustering

Case Study: IEEE 39-Bus

Case Topology

39 Buses 10 Generators 19 Loads 46 Branches

N-1 Secure

Flow Limits Governor Dynamics Exciter Dynamics

  • E. Cotilla-Sanchez

Power System Resilience in the Pacific Northwest 18/27

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Power System Protection Models Cascading Failures Clustering and Islanding as Resiliency Strategies Remedial Action Schemes Automated Planning and Policy Switching Clustering

Example Simulation: N − 2 (Lines 19-20 and 2-25)

  • E. Cotilla-Sanchez

Power System Resilience in the Pacific Northwest 19/27

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Power System Protection Models Cascading Failures Clustering and Islanding as Resiliency Strategies Remedial Action Schemes Automated Planning and Policy Switching Clustering

CREDC Activity: Towards Attack Resilient Data Analytics for Power Grid Operations

  • E. Cotilla-Sanchez

Power System Resilience in the Pacific Northwest 20/27

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Power System Protection Models Cascading Failures Clustering and Islanding as Resiliency Strategies Remedial Action Schemes Automated Planning and Policy Switching Clustering

Active Power Sensitivity Based Electrical Distance Ep

∆P = δP δθ

  • ∆θ +

δP δ |V |

  • ∆ |V |

(1)

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Power System Resilience in the Pacific Northwest 21/27

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Power System Protection Models Cascading Failures Clustering and Islanding as Resiliency Strategies Remedial Action Schemes Automated Planning and Policy Switching Clustering

Active Power Sensitivity Based Electrical Distance Ep

  • E. Cotilla-Sanchez

Power System Resilience in the Pacific Northwest 22/27

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Power System Protection Models Cascading Failures Clustering and Islanding as Resiliency Strategies Remedial Action Schemes Automated Planning and Policy Switching Clustering

Reactive Power Sensitivity Based Electrical Distance Eq

∆Q = δQ δθ

  • ∆θ +

δQ δ |V |

  • ∆ |V |

(2)

  • E. Cotilla-Sanchez

Power System Resilience in the Pacific Northwest 23/27

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Power System Protection Models Cascading Failures Clustering and Islanding as Resiliency Strategies Remedial Action Schemes Automated Planning and Policy Switching Clustering

Reactive Power Sensitivity Based Electrical Distance Eq

  • E. Cotilla-Sanchez

Power System Resilience in the Pacific Northwest 24/27

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Power System Protection Models Cascading Failures Clustering and Islanding as Resiliency Strategies Remedial Action Schemes Automated Planning and Policy Switching Clustering

Combined Sensitivity Based Electrical Distance Es

Es = |Ep + jEq| (3)

  • E. Cotilla-Sanchez

Power System Resilience in the Pacific Northwest 25/27

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Power System Protection Models Cascading Failures Clustering and Islanding as Resiliency Strategies Remedial Action Schemes Automated Planning and Policy Switching Clustering

Combined Sensitivity Based Electrical Distance Es

  • E. Cotilla-Sanchez

Power System Resilience in the Pacific Northwest 26/27

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THANK YOU ecs@oregonstate.edu shpeoregon.org