Air Transport Research Society San Francisco 22 nd March 2007 MIME Noise Trading for Aircraft Noise Mitigation Peter Hullah EUROCONTROL Experimental Centre Brétigny sur Orge, France
EUROCONTROL � European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation � European Air-Traffic Management organisation � Currently 37 Member States � 5 objectives � 4 activity pillars: � Heighten Safety � Co-operative network design; � Increase Capacity � Pan-European functions; � Reduce Delays � Regional ATC services; � Enhance Cost-Effectiveness � Regulatory activities and support to EC regulation. � Minimise Environmental Impact � EUROCONTROL Experimental Centre (EEC) � entrusted with executing the Agency’s research, development and validation programmes
Sustainable Air Transport Society Environment Society Environment Sustainable Sustainable Development Development Economy Economy
Noise Management ICAO Balanced Approach Noise Land-Use Noise Operating Abatement Planning and Reduction Restrictions Operational Management at Source Procedures � The last option is a last resort � In theory! � It’s generally all that’s available
Current Noise-based Restrictions USA Rest of world Total Curfew 74 154 230 Noise limits 33 60 93 Noise quotas 13 35 48 Noise abatement procedures 197 228 425 Preferential runways 190 168 358 Stage 3 restrictions 8 44 52 APU 20 85 105 Engine run - up 184 183 367 Noise budget 4 11 15 Noise surcharges 4 124 128
Growth in Airport Noise Restrictions
Internalisation of external effects � Fundamental principle of environmental economics: � Any externality should be internalised as close to its source as possible � Three major types of “incentive” for internalisation � Pricing � Penalties � For deviation from standards � Rationing � By quantity � Can be mixed
Recent Environmental Markets � Many current examples of use of market forces Name Where Date Object Lead Trading Program US 1980s phasing out lead in gasoline Emission trading US local air-quality control Water-pollution control NL & DE Water-pollution control Tradable Water Abstraction Rights N. CO / CA Regional Clean Air Incentives Market RECLAIM LA targeted two gases, SO2 and NOX Ecopoint Programme Austria ongoing limiting pollution and noise from truck traffic Zero Emission Vehicle Program CA ongoing speed up the introduction of electronic vehicles European car manufacturers (ACEA) voluntary agreement EU improve fuel efficiency of new cars by 25% relative to 1995 levels by 2008 Kyoto Protocol Greenhouse-gas emission trading World CO2 emission reduction European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) EU 2005 CO2 emission reduction
Operation of a Market-based System � Permits issued to meet desired measure of total impact across specified region � Allocated to sources of impact in region � free or paid for by polluters � Number of permits allocated to a particular company � based on previous impact, declared future impact, or by auction etc. � Reducing impact leaves surplus permits � may be traded � If impact limited, available permits will be limited � scarcity value associated with each permit � encourages trading of permits.
Advantages of Market-based Systems � Departure from standards-based regulation easier than tax- based approach � more cost effective � Can be revenue neutral � producers don’t see them as “just another tax-collection scam” � initial permitscould be freely allocated up to the predefined limits � all financial transactions are between the companies themselves � Excess permits due to reduced pollution � sold to recuperate investment in less polluting equipment � cover pollution from increased production Taxes, charges and fines restrict growth Tradable permits encourage it
Noise Trading – An Example � 2-hour Leq at a major international airport produced by ENHANCE � European Harmonised Aircraft Noise-contour Modelling Environment � Produces noise contours from 3D radar trajectories � Can be used to produce contours on a “per-airline” basis
Noise per Airline � Area of 24-hour 55dB(A) Leq Contour vs Mvts per airline 140 All flights 120 LAeq-24h 55 dBA Contour Area (km^2) 100 y = 0.0904x 80 Main “Hub” carrier R 2 = 0.9909 60 40 20 0 0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 Number of Operations � Major carrier is just less than 50% of all flights! � All other companies in bottom left sector
Noise per Airline 7 6 LAeq-24h 55 dBA Contour Area (km^2) y = 0.0904x “Heavy Metal Airlines” R 2 = 0.9909 2 mvts with noise of 65 mvts 5 4 3 “QuietAir.com” 51 mvts with noise of 2 44 mvts “Air Rightnoise” 1 22 mvts with noise of 22 mvts 0 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Number of Operations
Noise Trading vs Slot Trading � Recent Slot trading transactions Date Airline Airport Number of slots Cost (millions unless noted) 1990 UA National 14 $19.30 1990 AA LaGuardia 14 $7-14 1991 DL National 9 $5.40 1991 DL LaGuardia 7 $3.50 1991 DL Hatsfiled (Eastern) 18 $32.50 1991 UA ORD 21 slots - 3 gates $54 1991 CO LaGuardia 64 ÷ (6 A380) $85 1991 USAirways LaGuardia 62 jet - 46 commuter $61 1991 USAirways National 6 $61 1991 AA LHR ? £18 per slot 1992 AA ORD 40 + 3 gates $150 1997 BA LHR 8 $16.30 1999 BA Gatwick Cityflyer purchase £76 1999 VA Gatwick 7 £2 per slot 2000 CO LHR 119 jet + 103 commuter $215 (offer) 2001 AA TWA 173 $500 2001 VA Gatwick 2 €2.4 M 2002 BA LHR 4 £3.4 2003 BA LHR 7 £30 2003 BA LHR (Swiss) loan 8 slots £35 2003 BA LHR 4 £12 2004 Alitalia CDG 224 + Gandolf Co €7.1 M 2004 Qantas LHR 2 pair £20 2004 AirTran National & LaGuardia 14 gates + 8 slots $87.50 National - 19 slots LaGuardia 2004 SWA Chicago airports - National 6 gates + slots $89.90 and LaGuardia 2005 Republic Holdings National & LaGuardia 113 National - 24 $110 LaGuardia
Economic value � The UK’s recent £5 additional “environmental surcharge” on (economy!) passenger tickets � Average aircraft with 120 passengers = £300 = €450 � Imagine this as a noise permit value, instead of a tax � Say “QuietAir.com” has 51 movements per day, 365 days per year � Sells 7 permits per day (only needs 44) � 7 x 365 x €450 = €1,149,750 per annum additional return on investment from this airport alone � Say “HeavyMetal Airlines” has 2 flights (= 4 movements) per week � If they bought a new aircraft that produced “average” noise � Would free-up 2 x 63 = 126 permits per week � 126 x 52 x €450 = €2,948,400 per annum – just from this airport!
Permit definition � The previous example was just that – an example � Need good, usable, definition acceptable to airlines and residents � Noise contours are not easily addable - non linear � Does not take annoyance into account � More annoyance from many quiet flights than from a few loud ones � Why count noise where there aren’t any people? � What granularity is needed? � How will permits be attributed? � Sale, grandfather rights, auction etc. � How to combat restrictive practices? � How will airports know if noise rading will work for them? � What regulation is needed? � MIME will find the answers! � Market simulation � Noise technology
MIME partners � Industry: Boeing R&TE (Spain) (Co-ordinator) � R&D: SINTEF (Norway) QinetiQ (UK) � Universities: U. Leeds (UK) TU Munchen (Germany) � SMEs: ENVISA (France) � EUROCONTROL Experimental Centre (France)
MIME Thank you Peter Hullah EUROCONTROL Experimental Centre Brétigny sur Orge, France
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