International Symposium on Military Operational Research (ISMOR) Syndicate Session on Non-Lethal Weapons Concept Development & Experimentation John Nelson SAS-094 Co-Chair john.nelson@americansystems.com +1 703-441-8363
Syndicate Session Outline Insights from National and NATO NLW Activities – What Are NLW – Operational Relevance – NLW Effectiveness – Capabilities-Based Assessment (CBA) Highlights NLW Requirements Characteristics Needed in Future Capabilities Integrated NLW Experimentation Framework Desired Syndicate Feedback – Analytical Tools, Models, or Other OR Techniques to Support Concept Development and Experimentation – Applicability/Adaptability of Existing Tools, Models, etc. for Addressing Non-Lethal Weapons Concepts 2
What Are Non-Lethal Weapons? NATO Definition: NLW are explicitly designed and developed to incapacitate or repel personnel, with a low probability of fatality or permanent injury, or to disable equipment, with minimal undesired damage or impact on the environment. Fielded Conceptual Developmental 3
Types of NLW Technology Type Current and Programmed NLW Flash bang and acoustic hand grenades (including warning munitions, Acoustic thermobaric payloads, combined acoustic and blunt impact devices, and combined acoustic and light devices), loud speaker arrays, and underwater acoustic devices (with acoustic and pressure effects) Tear gas, oleoresin capsicum (OC) pepper spray, and irritants deployed using Chemical-Based Riot various means (canisters/personal dispensers, hand grenades, 12 gauge, 40mm, Control Agents (RCA) 66mm, and breaching rounds) and in some instances in combination with smoke, acoustic, optical, and/or kinetic effects Optical warning devices (laser dazzlers and non-coherent light), Human Electro- Electromagnetic Muscular Incapacitation (current Taser™ stun devices, potential 12-gauge or 40mm systems with longer range, or potential nanosecond electrical pulses with still greater range), laser induced plasma, thermal lasers, laser-based flow modulation, Radio Frequency vehicle or vessel stopping, disruptive wide-band high-power microwaves, and millimetre wave active denial technology (ADT) A wide variety of handheld batons, grenades and other hand-thrown devices, 12- Mechanical/Kinetic gauge rounds, 40mm/56mm/66mm munitions, FN-303, and Modular Crowd Control Munitions with blunt impact effects, sometimes combined with marking; water cannon; 40mm ring air foil projectile; air gun diver interdiction system; caltrops; and various counter vehicle and vessel nets and barriers. 4
Overarching NATO Lessons from Ongoing Operations Challenges to Conventional War Paradigm – Adversaries avoid overmatch by complicating engagements (operating amid the populace) and using asymmetric means – Avoiding collateral damage (especially civilian casualties) is paramount Battle for the Narrative – Adversaries use of incidents (including false reports) – Ability to influence local and international perceptions and support Civilian Casualties (CIVCAS) – Recognized as a vulnerability that adversaries exploit – “Tools gap” between visual methods for assessing intent and lethal force – Recommendation: Conduct a “deep dive” to identify non -lethal capabilities and options (Initial data showed enhanced NLW warning effectiveness of 80-90%) Sources: Draft report from Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA) and Civilian Casualty Study Update for ISAF: Quick Impact Recommendations, 26 September 2011 5
Dealing with Restricted Fire “We must balance our pursuit of the enemy with our efforts to minimize loss of innocent civilian life, and with our obligation to protect our troops." General David H. Petraus, US Army Commander, International Security Assistance Force and Commander, US Forces Afghanistan 2011 6
Needing to Isolate/Segregate “Every citizen of Afghanistan must know ISAF will continue to do all we can to reduce casualties that affect the Afghan civilian population." General John R. Allen, US Marine Corps Commander, International Security Assistance Force and Commander, US Forces Afghanistan 2012 7
Stopping Vehicles or Vessels Ability to seize the initiative Need for increased decision space/time Act while determining intent Deny an area to increase engagement range & standoff Additional options for escalation/de-escalation Delay approach and increase time to respond 8
Additional NLW Lessons from NATO Operations KosoVO Afghanistan Collateral damage concerns: Distinguish/respond to threats − Bridge over Danube, destroyed during − Limits of C4ISR and passive force 1999 NATO Air Campaign protection − Reconstruction costs − Move, separate, or isolate − Impact on Danube until 2005 combatants/non-combatants Value of non-lethal effects − Reversibility/Recovery − Complement lethal force Act when lethal force is restricted Facilitate use of lethal force by determining and isolating hostiles − Minimize regrets 9
ISAF CIVCAS Lessons Adaptive Enemy in an Ambiguous Environment – CIVCAS recognized as a vulnerability that adversaries exploit – Evolution of adversaries’ TTPs to increase CIVCAS likelihood and increase risks faced by coalition forces Limited Tools – Shortage of non-lethal options cited – “Tools gap” between visual methods for assessing hostile intent and options for lethal force – Most EOF CIVCAS incidents lacked any kind of enhanced warning – “CIVCAS resulting from EOF incidents (the second leading cause of CIVCAS behind indirect fire) continue to be a strategic issue which negatively affects host nation populations and senior leadership relations.” Recommendations – Conduct a “deep dive” to identify non -lethal capabilities and options (Initial data showed enhanced NL warning effectiveness of 80-90%) 10
Components of NLW Effectiveness • Task Accomplishment – Meet the military requirement (required target response) independent of constraints • Constraint Satisfaction vs. Target – Meeting the degree of reversibility/recovery (non-permanent effect on the intended target) • Constraint Satisfaction vs. Other – Having no effect or a relatively reversible effect on bystanders, own force, or infrastructure
NLW Effectiveness Overview System MoPs Characteristics MoRs + + MoEs Environment + Target Military Scenario Requirement 1. Mobility 1. Task b c ude gnit Ma 2. Communications N Objective A 1,1 R a d T e Onset Duration Recovery time 3. Physical Function 2. Target time c q Constraint 4. Sense and Interpret Ma gni tud e A 2,1 R N d p Onset T e Duration Recovery 5. Group Cohesion time 3. Collateral b c 6. Identification Ma gni tud Constraint e N’ A 3,1 R’ a d Onset T e Recovery 7. Motivation time 12
NATO NLW Capabilities-Based Assessment (SAS-078) Highlights Purpose: Conduct a Capabilities-Based Assessment to Determine NLW Requirements, Gaps, and Candidate Solutions, Including Associated Work on Experimentation Participants: Belgium Germany United Kingdom Canada Netherlands United States Denmark Norway ACT, ACO, and NURC France Spain 13
SAS- 078’s Analytical Approach Requirements Analysis Review of Scenario NATO/National Analysis Sources Gap Analysis Capabilities Analysis Gap Gap In-Service and Gap Gap Gap Gap Programmed NLW Gap Gap Gap Gap and Solution Analysis Potential NLW Mit. Res. Non-Materiel Options Gap Gap Gap Mit. Experimentation Res. Mit. Gap 14
NLW Requirements Counter Personnel Counter Materiel Provide warning to individuals, including operators of Tag/Mark vehicles, vessels or aircraft in an open or vehicles, vessels, and aircraft (Air/Land/Maritime) confined area (Air/Land/Maritime) Tag/mark individuals in an open or confined area Deny access to vehicles in an open or confined area (Land/Maritime) (Land) Move individual(s) out of an open area (Land) Deny access to surface and submerged vessels in an open or confined area (Maritime) Move individual(s) out of a confined area Deny the use of landing zones or airfields by aircraft (Air/Land/Maritime) (Land) Move individual(s) within or out of buildings (Land) Degrade/Disable/Stop vehicle(s) in an open or confined area (Land) Move individual(s) out of an area (Maritime) Degrade/Disable/Stop vessel(s) in an open or confined area (Maritime) Deny access to individual(s) in an open area (Land) Degrade/Disable weapons (including explosive devices), sensors, communication equipment (Air/Land/Maritime) Deny access to individual(s) in a confined area Degrade/Disable facilities (Land/Maritime) (Air/Land/Maritime) Deny access to individual(s) to facilities (Land/Maritime) Stop an aircraft on the ground (Land) Deny access to individual(s) on or underwater (Maritime) Divert aircraft in the air (Air) Degrade/Disable/Stop individual(s) in an open area (Land/Maritime) Degrade/Disable/Stop individual(s) in a confined area (Air/Land/Maritime) Degrade/Disable/Stop individual(s) in a building (Land) 15
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