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Mergers Discussion Commerce Commission, Auckland and Wellington 25 and 30 October 2018 Commission vision 2 What were going to talk about Who we are and what we do How we analyse mergers Interesting statistics outcomes


  1. Mergers Discussion Commerce Commission, Auckland and Wellington 25 and 30 October 2018

  2. Commission vision 2

  3. What we’re going to talk about • Who we are and what we do • How we analyse mergers • Interesting statistics – outcomes and timeframes • Global trends, and where does NZ fit • Challenges • Process review 3

  4. NZ’s merger control regime • Section 47 prohibits mergers that would be likely to substantially lessen competition (SLC) • Voluntary clearance or authorisation Effect is to immunise from enforcement proceedings o by Commission or third parties under s 47 • We proactively monitor market for mergers that raise concerns 4

  5. Who’s involved at the Commission • Dedicated Mergers Investigations team • Assesses clearances, authorisations, and s 47 investigations • Each case has an investigation team Investigators o Economist o Lawyer o • Oversight by Steering Group: Head of Competition, Mergers Manager, Chief Economist, Deputy General Counsel (Competition) • Division of Members: decides clearances/authorisations o decides whether to issue proceedings under s 47 o 5

  6. Clearances – steps and timing FY10/11 to FY17/18 Pre- Application Letter of LOUI Decline notification registered Issues Day 79 Day 117 3-4 weeks Day 0 Day 40 40 days 89 days 116 days Clearances 6

  7. Our approach to analysing mergers • Mergers can harm competition by: directly eliminating competition between two o competitors (horizontal unilateral effects) making coordination more likely between the remaining o competitors in the market (horizontal coordinated effects) foreclosing competitors: o – Vertical effects – Conglomerate effects • See: Mergers and Acquisitions Guidelines at https://comcom.govt.nz/business/merging-or-acquiring-a- company 7

  8. Interesting statistics • Around 100 M&A transactions a year in NZ • 8-12 clearances a year (authorisations are relatively rare – 8 since 2000 compared to 297 clearances) • Second least number of reviews of any agency Because we have a voluntary clearance regime, most o mergers proceed without us reviewing them Lower regulatory burden than compulsory o notification jurisdictions • Published stats: https://comcom.govt.nz/about- us/strategic-planning-and-accountability- reporting/mergers-and-trade-practices-statistics 8

  9. Clearances – what’s the pass rate? * FY10/11 – FY17/18 Application Letter of Issues LOUI Decline 82 30 19 10 10 8 50 (1 divestment ) (2 divestment ) (6 divestments) Clearances 68 9

  10. Clearance timeframe Average working days to decision 90 82 77 80 67 70 Working Days 64 64 60 60 60 50 40 32 30 2010/2011 2011/2012 2012/2013 2013/2014 2014/2015 2015/2016 2016/2017 2017/2018 Financial years 10

  11. Priority area: non-notified mergers • Commission priorities for 2018/19 now public • In the last two years we have seen an increase in non-notified mergers that we need to investigate further 5 investigations completed in 2017/18 o Filed proceedings in 2 cases (Platinum; Wilson Parking) o Fulton Hogan/Stevenson – carved assets out of deal in o response to CC concerns • Commitment to act quickly to prevent any harm from non- notified mergers which may SLC • Significant differences to clearance process – unlikely to be LOI/LOUI 11

  12. International trends • Increased focus on competition law; concern about market concentration • Mergers raising vertical effects issues, involving dynamic markets and big data • Number of mergers subject to remedies • Increased review times for complex mergers 12

  13. International trends Source: Financial Times 13

  14. International trends • Last 15-20 years have been dominated by horizontal/unilateral effects concerns, with particular focus on price effects • We are seeing a broader range of theories of harm: Vertical/conglomerate (AT&T/Time Warner; Trade o Me/Motorcentral) Coordinated effects (Tronox/Cristal; Vero/Tower) o Common ownership (Dow/Dupont – “element of context”) o Non-price effects – quality (NZME/Fairfax) and innovation o (Dow/Dupont) Buyer power o 14

  15. International trends • Internationally, timeframes for complex/contentious mergers tend to be getting longer ACCC: “I think you will now see some lengthening of our o timelines on contentious mergers, but we will continue to have regard to commercial timing pressures” US DoJ: “we will try to close most investigations within six o months of filing – provided the merging companies cooperate” EC: review of Dow/DuPont – 6 months pre-notification; o 15 months total 15

  16. How does NZ fit into this? • Merger reviews decided on facts of each case Increased concentration, eg NZME/Fairfax, Vero/Tower o • We are faster than the average globally, taking 71 WDs compared to the average of 92 WDs. • But subject to same pressures re complex mergers increased levels of 3 rd party interest; requests for disclosure o under OIA complexity of analysis – recent cases have involved two-sided o markets, fast evolving tech markets, vertical and conglomerate theories, multiple distribution channels, price discrimination, data 16

  17. Challenges • Being quicker for simple, straightforward mergers • Transparency – interaction of OIA regime with our investigations • No behavioural remedies 17

  18. Process review • We have started a project to: update the process part of the Mergers and Acquisitions o Guidelines (focus on chapter 6) review the clearance application form to ensure it is fit o for purpose • Consultation late 2018/early 2019 18

  19. Questions? 19

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