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Jan 15, 2023 •600 likes •882 views

Malware analysis Carberp Ralph Dolmans Wouter Katz Research questions What kind of anti-forensics techniques are being used by the latest version of Carberp? What behavior does the latest version of Carberp show? Installation

  1. Malware analysis Carberp Ralph Dolmans Wouter Katz

  2. Research questions ● What kind of anti-forensics techniques are being used by the latest version of Carberp? ● What behavior does the latest version of Carberp show? – Installation – Run-time – C&C 2

  3. E-banking malware ● Steals your money ● Fake forms (HTML injection), Key logging, browser API hooks, … ● Big players: Citadel, ZeuS, SpyEye, Carberp 3

  4. Carberp - General behavior ● MITB for e-banking 4 http://malware-security-dinesh.blogspot.nl

  5. Carberp - General behavior ● VNC ● Video recording ● Extra plugins (passw.plug, stopav.plug, miniav.plug) 5

  6. Installation ● Startup folder ● Windows service (svchost.exe) ● Contacts C&C server for updates/instructions 6

  7. Anti-forensics ● Techniques used as countermeasures to forensic analysis ● In our malware sample, data hiding by means of: – Packing of the executable – Encryption of network traffic – Encryption of config files 7

  8. Executable packing ● Uses small loader to unpack the 'real' executable 8

  9. Executable packing ● How to obtain unpacked code? ● Run the executable, dump unpacked code from memory. ● Unpacked code contains references to Russian e-banking websites, VNC, password grabber, ... 9

  10. API hooks ● GMER showed 4 hooks in ntdll.dll: – ntdll.dll!NtResumeThread – ntdll.dll!NtQueryDirectoryFile – ntdll.dll!NtClose – ntdll.dll!NtDeviceIoControlFile 10

  11. API hook behavior ● How to determine what it does? 11

  12. API hook behavior ● How to determine what it does? 12

  13. Memory injection Explorer.exe Notepad.exe 1. Explorer.exe spawns notepad.exe 13

  14. Memory injection Explorer.exe Notepad.exe 1. Explorer.exe spawns notepad.exe 2. Loads ntdll.dll 3. Returns control to parent process 14

  15. Memory injection Explorer.exe Notepad.exe 1. Explorer.exe spawns notepad.exe 2. Loads ntdll.dll 3. Returns control to parent process 4. Calls NtResumeThread: Map memory region in notepad.exe Copy malicious code to notepad.exe Queue malicious code for execution Call 'real' NtResumeThread 15

  16. Memory injection Explorer.exe Notepad.exe 1. Explorer.exe spawns notepad.exe 2. Loads ntdll.dll 3. Returns control to parent process 4. Calls NtResumeThread: Map memory region in notepad.exe Copy malicious code to notepad.exe Queue malicious code for execution Call 'real' NtResumeThread 5. Run while being infected. 16

  17. Hiding files ● ntdll.dll!NtQueryDirectoryFile ● Debugger made clear this hook is for hiding files ● Hidden directory in C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Application Data 17

  18. Config file encryption ● mnhslst32.dat in hidden directory ● Assembly decryption routine found, implemented in python script ● Key found while debugging decryption routine: HJGsdlk873d 18

  19. Config file encryption ● XOR each plaintext byte with every key byte ● Before each XOR operation: – XOR input = Previous XOR output + (XOR round * plaintext byte position in line) 1st byte: normal 2nd byte input: +1 for round 2, +2 for round 3, … 3rd byte input: +2 for round 2, +4 for round 3, … …. 19

  20. Config file encryption ● Strings in config file: – 696301E9F82608F7EC3CB37D2F44663C – 696301E9F82608F7EC3CB37D30046D2DA9 – 696301E9F82608F7EC3CB37D33046D2DA9 ● Plaintext: – defeatswirly.net – defeatswirly1.net – defeatswirly2.net 20

  21. Network encryption ● Trojan sends HTTP requests to C&C ● All POST-data is encrypted ● Use debugging of the exe to find out how... 21

  22. Network encryption ● Step through the code to find encryption algorithm ● Encrypted network traffic: – 8 byte IV, split into 2 x 4 bytes – 1st part IV+base64(RC2(plaintext))+2nd part IV – '=' or '==' in base64 always at the end ● RC2 encryption key = CD5ztnj3W1wgSH2M 22

  23. Network encryption, example ● HylFFl7RmWrgu4r40KdlP4t53IoM3AEGzKJiTa obwr4ex8WAfW59Oh6yNzlcn4RKSWCwT68Ih PRPMJmEqm0NhqbGFAIDcu== – IV = HylFIDcu ● Plaintext: – uid=a022A7D5C91DCED15F&av=&md5=a574fc3d 97149bcbf8bdccd5a8a73951 23

  24. Data theft ● Several Russian banks targeted ● Browser API hooks to check if bank site is accessed ● Send CAB file with screenshot and keylog-file to C&C – Network traffic unencrypted 24

  25. CAB file 25

  26. Conclusions ● Hiding files ● Memory injection ● Encryption ● Tries to steal information 26

  27. Questions? 27

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