making visions and divisions prospects for a
play

Making Visions and Divisions: Prospects for a Reorientation in - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Irans Foreign Policy Decision Making Visions and Divisions: Prospects for a Reorientation in Irans Foreign Policy Normalizers: Integration of Iran into the International Community Principalists: No Change in Irans


  1. Iran’s Foreign Policy Decision Making

  2. Visions and Divisions: Prospects for a Reorientation in Iran’s Foreign Policy • Normalizers: Integration of Iran into the International Community • Principalists: No Change in Iran’s International Posture

  3. Why we cannot make a conclusive statement on the interplay of these groups? Iran is not like any other states in terms of political system. Higher Level Greater Measure of Power & Control Normal political Struggle with systems have a finding a proper hierarchical definition for Islamofascism Democratic structures, similar Theocracy the Iranian to this pyramid political system Small Amount of Power & Control

  4. Negotiated Political Order • State • President • Government & Bureaucracy • Revolutionary Guards • Parastatals • Basij • Foundations (Bonyads) • Supreme • Rahbar’s Office • Quds Force Leader

  5. Negotiated Political Order State Parastatals • Suprem e Leader • Iran’s Foreign Policy

  6. The Position of the Various Groups Ideological Normalizers Pragmatic Principalists Normalizers Tentative normalizers

  7. What Drives Iran’s Regional Policies Five Core Factors Shiite Imperial Legacy Islam Anti Imperialis m Paranoia Domestic & Politics Regime Security

  8. Policy of Exporting Revolution What did Khomeini mean by revolutionary export? Khomeini was • Protecting Shiites Iranian equivalent of • Gaining Hegemony in the Middle East Trotsky

  9. A nti-Trotsky Camp Formed Idealist in the regime committed Pragmatists who said to exporting the it’s really too much & revolution too soon

  10. How did they want to export the revolution and to dominate over the middle east? We don’t fight ourselves The Center for plan was Borderless Security Doctrinal simple Analysis We use proxies

  11. The ideal end run and their image of the ideal expansion of the revolution and hegemony

  12. Engaging the Masses in the ME Shiite Crescent Building Ideological belt of sympathetic Expanding Shiite governments Regional & political factions in Iraq, Syria, Role&Power Lebanon, and Gulf States

  13. It happened because of a number of fortuitous breaks Israel Invasion of Lebanon 1982 U.S. Arab invasion Spring of Iraq 2011 2003

  14. To dismantle the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 1 st Break: IDF pulled back/ Yasser Arafat & IRGC organized Israel Invasion Shiites militants PLO fighters fled under one of Lebanon to Tunisia. roof&form 1982 Hezbollah. Global Condemnation (Christian fighters massacred hundreds of Palestinian civilians and the Israeli army stood by)

  15. Second Break: U.S. invasion of Iraq 2003 • Destabilize Iraq & the entire ME • The post-Saddam authority would face a deeply divided society Invading Iraq will: • Significant chance that domestic groups would engage in violent conflict with each other Will give the IRGC • Expand its influence the opportunity • Recruit extremists to increase its • Strengthen reliable, pro-Iran Shiite militants effort to: • To establish a friendlier Shiite-led regime in Baghdad.

  16. Third Break: Arab Spring and Iran’s Strategy • Supporting the oppositions in the countries which were allies of Saudi Arabia • Exerting full support to its own allies which were on the brink of collapse • Shiites in KSA Eastern provinces • Bahrain: Pro-democracy protests were staged against the Sunni monarchy of Al Khalifa in Manama to push the island into the Iranian sphere of interest. • Yemen: financial & military aid for the Houthi rebels. • Syria: Military (Some 8,000 to 10,000 fighters) and Financial aid ($15 to 20 billion). • Iraq: Creating Strong Shiite paramilitary forces, Forming Pro-Iranian political factions

  17. Implementing the JCPOA Limiting The Meaning Terror/ Human of Regional Rights Involvemen Normalization t Bank Reforms

  18. Implementing the JCPOA ❖ Both the Normalizers and the their opponents apparently agree that loyalty to the JCPOA in the realm of enrichment, and weaponization is the core of the normalization project. Any violation would lead to snap-back sanctions. ❖ The JCPOA did not cover ballistics missile program. UNSC Resolution 2231 of July 20, 2015 created a loophole by complicating the definition of what kind of missiles are capable of carrying a nuclear payload.

  19. Limiting Terror and Military Actions: Revolutionary Guards and Quds Force • Regional Conflicts • Terror Ops in the • The Persian Gulf Middle East • Bab al Mandab • Syria • Assisting Terror • Yemen Groups in the Middle East • Revolution • Naval ary Export Conflicts

  20. Policy of provocations in the waters of the Gulf by the IRGC-NEDSA (the IRGC Navy Special Force) 75 incidents since December 2015 22 30 16 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

  21. Reforming the Iranian Economy (Domestic Aspect) ❖ President Rouhani promised to reform the economy by focusing on the banking system. ❖ The Banking Overhaul Plan ❖ Accessing Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)

  22. Reforming the Iranian Economy (International Aspects) ❖ Iran’s economy is in dire needs of FDI. ❖ International banking and investment laws have been tightened to reflect terror/ security considerations. ❖ In June 2016 Iran has joined the Eurasian Group, a TFC-style regional body, which is expected to provide assistance with implementation of the anti-money laundering laws. ❖ In August 2016 the Majlis passed a legislation to join the TFC. ❖ The IRGC position?

  23. The Revolutionary Guards Banking Dilemma • Desperately needs FDI (South Pars, • Banking laws require telecommunication, transparency (a third or transportation more of Guards projects companies operate behind front

  24. Owning companies that seem to be private but run by IRGC veterans. IRGC Pyramid Ownership Company A is a subsidiary of company B which itself is a subsidiary of company C

  25. The Normalizers Tactics Against Guards • “Clean banks,” (Melli, Sepah) • Criticize business • Revolution practices ary Guards Companie s • Cancel contracts

  26. Improving the Human Rights Records ❖ The poor human rights record of the Islamic Republic has concerned the international community for decades! ❖ Iran has been accused of a wide range of violations such as minority rights, gender rights, religious rights, civil rights, and political rights! One of the major concerns of the international community is the excessive use of capital punishment. ❖ Over the years, Iran has been censured for its poor human rights record by a variety of international bodies including the United Nations, the EU and individual countries such as the United States.

  27. The Human Rights Problematique ❖ The Islamic Republic enforces the Sharia- based life style that pertains to many facet of personnel behavior both in private and public. Enforcing life style edicts are under the control of parastatals such as the Basij and some vigilante groups. ❖ Certain course, such as Revolutionary Court are outside the realm of state and are presided over by hard-core judges. Revolutionary Courts have handed down harsh sentences for a verity of offense, including what is described as sedition. ❖ Intelligence services have arrested a number of dual-nationals Iranian – American, Iranian-Canadian and Iranian-British citizens. (e.e, Siamak Namazi and Reza “Robin” Shahini). Because of their dual nationality, these cases have been covered in the West. ❖ Executed Shahram Amiri, a former nuclear expert who defected to the United States and returned to Iran, where he was initially sentenced to 15 years in prison. Amiri’s execution was extensively covered by international press.

  28. The Normalizers Dilemma: How to Improve the Human Rights Record ? • Courts: Special Courts are expected to • Intelligence defy the Services : Little normalizers state influence. • Majlis: eliminated death sentence on drug offense, will reduce by 80 percent the death penalty

  29. Normalizers and Opponents on Regional Issues • Saudi • Syria Arabia • Israel • Turkey

  30. Negotiated Political Order & Regional Issues: Decision Makers • President • Hossein • Supreme Rouhani Salami Leader

  31. Saudi Arabia Normalizers Opponents • Avoid direct provocations, • Verbal confrontation, avoid try detente with Saudi Arabia kinetic actions • Increase support for the • Withdraw from Yemen Huthis in Yemen • Continue mobilization of Shiit • Don’t Meddle In the Gulf minorities & other proxies States

  32. Syria Normalizers Opponents • Syria is Iran’s outpost • Rational • Don’t squander limited Choice • Assad is essential to prevent Approac economic resources a Saudi – Sunni Syria h • • Reduce support for Assad • Support for Assad regardless of cost

  33. Israel Normalizers Opponents • Use offensive rhetoric, i.e. • Symbol • Eliminate offensive • Symbol Holocaust denial, “wiping s declarations s off Israel from the map • Action • Keep Hezbollah and • Action • Restrain Hezbollah, s Islamic Jihad on a Leash s Hamas

  34. Turkey (Normalizers and Opponents Share the View ) Mutual • Syria Mosul Benefits • Assad Operation and Economy • Kurds beyond • ISIS • Iraq

Recommend


More recommend