Make For Yourself No Idol Spencer A. McWilliams Paper Presented at - PDF document

Make For Yourself No Idol Spencer A. McWilliams Paper Presented at the Ninth International Congress on Personal Construct Psychology Albany, New York August, 1991 Abstract From a constructivist perspective, knowledge is indeterminate. Human beliefs bear no necessary direct relationship to reality, yet we tend to objectify them and treat them as though they are real. This tendency may be metaphorically likened to idolatry, in which a created image is worshipped as though it is the ultimate. Idolatry commits the arrogance of believing that it is possible to know final truth. The implications of this metaphor for constructivist thought is discussed in terms of Barfield's argument that originally hypotheses served only to "save the appearances" but with the success of modern science came to be treated as though they were true. Transcendence of idolatry requires active recognition that constructs that are human inventions, and that human participation is central to our understanding of reality. Make for Yourself No Idol How do we understand the relationship between what we might think of as "reality" and our ideas and beliefs about it? Kelly (1955) assumed that there is not necessarily a direct correspondence between our ideas, which we have constructed, and the universe, to which we suppose our ideas refer. It is useful to take the position that knowledge remains indeterminate. However, because of our desire for certainty we have a powerful tendency to accept our constructs as objective representations of what is actually there (Kelly, 1977). We endow our beliefs with the power of reality itself, and forget that they are our inventions. In doing so, we "forget" that what we know is rooted in our own assumptions. This is particularly the case with our most familiar beliefs, whether idiosyncratic or culturally shared, which we tend to accept as "givens." The Psychology of Personal Constructs rests upon the assumption that all ideas about the universe are human inventions and are subject to revision and replacement. Although he presumed that the universe is real and that we are coming to know it, to encourage appropriate humility Kelly (1977) proposed that the correspondence between our constructs and reality is best thought of as occurring at some infinitely distant time in the future. He also warned that current "truths" are likely to look much different in the light of new reconstructions. Thus, the development of knowledge and the quest for deeper understanding requires awareness of the ad interim nature of constructs and acknowledgement that final understanding always lies beyond the horizon. It is useful to recognize that our knowledge is necessarily incomplete, and may

even be mistaken. In order to avoid the tendency to accept prematurely a particular belief, seekers of knowledge must find a way to embrace this awareness and work comfortably with it. Concern about the relation between beliefs and reality has been raised by a variety of philosophers and historians of science who have also contended that scientific knowing does not yield ultimate truths. Popper's (1963) criteria of falsifiability, Bartley's (1962) comprehensively critical rationalism, and Feyerabend's (1978) epistemological anarchy are some notable examples of epistemological theories emphasizing our inability to prove knowledge as true. Mahoney (1976) summarized the non justificatory nature of scientific rationality in his call for psychologists to study scientists and the process of science. Kuhn (1962) described the emergence and revision of scientific paradigms, and the wholesale revolutions in world view that accompany them, documenting how our construction of reality changes with these revolutions. A major contribution to this philosophical discussion is Michael Polanyi's (1958; 1965; 1969) theory of Personal Knowledge. There is great compatibility between the theories of Polanyi and Kelly (McWilliams, 1991). Both describe knowledge as derived from the awareness of coherence (themes, patterns) among particular elements that were previously seen as independent or uncomprehended. Discovery originates from an awareness that something that was hidden may be potentially available to understanding. It is an active process relying on the knower's experience and skill, and involving a commitment, based on faith, to the pursuit and articulation of the hidden entity. Elements that originally held focal awareness come to be subsumed within more comprehensive constructs (McWilliams, 1988b) and are then experienced subsidiarily within the focal awareness of the new entity. Belief that the entity is universally valid, rather than a figment of personal phenomenal experience, drives the commitment toward elaborating and articulating it in a way that can be compelling to others. These beliefs are often tacitly held in the context of unarticulated assumptions and faith. Polanyi viewed the personal commitment to knowledge as inherently hazardous. Since a comprehensive entity is presumed to be real it is likely to reveal itself to us in a number of unpredictable ways. Like Kelly, he suggested that we might define reality as that which we actively expect to reveal itself in indeterminate ways as our knowledge evolves (Polanyi, 1964). We are likely to find that as we elaborate our understanding events prove to be radically different than what we originally anticipated. This outcome should be expected if we recognize that the original construction may be based on a small a set of elements. Further investigation may reveal a wide variety of additional elements and lead to constructs whose implications range far beyond the initial anticipation. Thus, constructs, and their superordinate and subordinate systems, whether tacitly understood or well elaborated and articulated, are not the "truth." Knowledge of reality must, inevitably, remain indeterminate. Although these arguments clearly suggest that we should be humble about our beliefs we continue to have the tendency to behave, in ordinary as well as "professional" life, as though the universe truly is what we think it is. I would like to elaborate on this theme by proposing that the concept of idolatry, borrowed, in a propositional mood (Kelly, 1964), from religion, provides a useful metaphor for addressing the tendency to reify constructs, and the danger of believing that a particular understanding directly represents reality.