Jorge Londoo Azer Bestavros and ShangHua Teng Computer Science - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Jorge Londoño Azer Bestavros and Shang‐Hua Teng Computer Science Department Boston University USENIX HotCloud’09

 In the Infrastructure as a Service market, providers offer fixed‐sized instances  Provider’s profit = number of instances sold; no incenRve to colocate customers  VirtualizaRon enables customers to colocate to reduce costs without QoS compromises  Customers’ selfishness reduces colocaRon to a strategic game

$ P $ P I/O I/O A B CPU CPU

Customers’ Strategic AcRons $ P $ P I/O I/O $ (1‐f)P $ f’P $P $ (1‐f’)P A C B $ fP CPU CPU

 General Coloca+on Game: MulRple resources over mulRple processes per customer – No guarantee of Nash Equilibrium (NE)  Process Coloca+on Game: MulRple resources over a single process (e.g., VM) per customer – Converges to a NE – Price of Anarchy = 3/2 (if homogeneous resources) 2 (otherwise)

Median over all experiments Worst‐case experiment

Median over all experiments Worst‐case experiment

 Strategic Services: To facilitate colocaRons, e.g., allowing users to find each other, compute strategic responses, …  OperaRonal Services: To enforce outcomes of colocaRon game, e.g., reconfiguraRon, accounRng, …