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Interacting Mindreaders s.butterfill@warwick.ac.uk challenge - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Joint Action and the Emergence of Mindreading Interacting Mindreaders s.butterfill@warwick.ac.uk challenge Explain the emergence, in evolution or development, of sophisticated forms of mindreading. conjecture The existence of abilities to


  1. Joint Action and the Emergence of Mindreading Interacting Mindreaders s.butterfill@warwick.ac.uk

  2. challenge Explain the emergence, in evolution or development, of sophisticated forms of mindreading. conjecture The existence of abilities to engage in joint action partially explains how sophisticated forms of mindreading emerge in evolution or development (or both)

  3. challenge Explain the emergence, in evolution or development, of sophisticated forms of mindreading. conjecture The existence of abilities to engage in joint action partially explains how sophisticated forms of mindreading emerge in evolution or development (or both) 3 rd objection But how does could it work?

  4. 4 months: categorical 3-4 years: phoneme perception of phonemes judgements /r/ /p/

  5. a question

  6. reciprocity

  7. She thinks I think ... reciprocity He thinks ...

  8. She thinks I think ... He thinks reciprocity I think he thinks ... He thinks ...

  9. She thinks I think ... She thinks I think she thinks I think ... He thinks reciprocity I think he thinks ... He thinks ...

  10. She thinks I think ... She thinks I think she thinks I think ... He thinks reciprocity I think he without escalation? thinks ... He thinks ...

  11. goal ascription

  12. ‘an action can be explained by a goal state if, and only if, it is seen as the most justifiable action towards that goal state that is available within the constraints of reality.’ (Csibra & Gergely 1998)

  13. ‘an action can 1. action a is directed to some goal; be explained by a goal state if, and only if, it is seen as the most justifiable action towards that goal state that is available within the constraints of reality.’ (Csibra & Gergely 1998)

  14. ‘an action can 1. action a is directed to some goal; be explained 2. actions of a ’s type are normally by a goal state means of realising outcomes of G ’s if, and only if, it type; is seen as the most justifiable action towards that goal state that is available within the constraints of reality.’ (Csibra & Gergely 1998)

  15. ‘an action can 1. action a is directed to some goal; be explained 2. actions of a ’s type are normally by a goal state means of realising outcomes of G ’s if, and only if, it type; is seen as the 3. no available alternative action is a most justifiable significantly better* means of realising action towards outcome G ; that goal state that is available within the constraints of reality.’ (Csibra & Gergely 1998)

  16. ‘an action can 1. action a is directed to some goal; be explained 2. actions of a ’s type are normally by a goal state means of realising outcomes of G ’s if, and only if, it type; is seen as the 3. no available alternative action is a most justifiable significantly better* means of realising action towards outcome G ; that goal state that is available 4. the occurrence of outcome G is within the desirable; constraints of reality.’ (Csibra & Gergely 1998)

  17. ‘an action can 1. action a is directed to some goal; be explained 2. actions of a ’s type are normally by a goal state means of realising outcomes of G ’s if, and only if, it type; is seen as the 3. no available alternative action is a most justifiable significantly better* means of realising action towards outcome G ; that goal state that is available 4. the occurrence of outcome G is within the desirable; constraints of 5. there is no other outcome, G ′ , the reality.’ occurrence of which would be at least (Csibra & comparably desirable and where (2) Gergely 1998) and (3) both hold of G ′ and a

  18. ‘an action can 1. action a is directed to some goal; be explained 2. actions of a ’s type are normally by a goal state means of realising outcomes of G ’s if, and only if, it type; is seen as the 3. no available alternative action is a most justifiable significantly better* means of realising action towards outcome G ; that goal state that is available 4. the occurrence of outcome G is within the desirable; constraints of 5. there is no other outcome, G ′ , the reality.’ occurrence of which would be at least (Csibra & comparably desirable and where (2) Gergely 1998) and (3) both hold of G ′ and a Therefore: 6. G is a goal to which action a is directed.

  19. ‘an action can 1. action a is directed to some goal; be explained 2. actions of a ’s type are normally by a goal state means of realising outcomes of G ’s if, and only if, it type; is seen as the 3. no available alternative action is a most justifiable significantly better* means of realising action towards outcome G ; that goal state that is available 4. the occurrence of outcome G is within the desirable; constraints of 5. there is no other outcome, G ′ , the reality.’ occurrence of which would be at least (Csibra & comparably desirable and where (2) Gergely 1998) and (3) both hold of G ′ and a Therefore: 6. G is a goal to which action a is directed.

  20. The problem of opaque means

  21. failed reach point source: Hare & Tomasello (2004)

  22. your-goal-is-my-goal

  23. your-goal-is-my-goal 1. You are willing to engage in some joint action* or other with me 2. I am not about to change the single goal to which my actions will be directed. Therefore: 3. A goal of your actions will be the goal I now envisage my actions being directed to. [*in at least the minimal sense associated with distributive goals]

  24. Your-goal-is-my-goal Applications - pram 1. You are willing to engage in some joint action* or other with me 2. I am not about to change the single goal to which my actions will be directed. Therefore: 3. A goal of your actions will be the goal I now envisage my actions being directed to. [*in at least the minimal sense associated with distributive goals]

  25. Your-goal-is-my-goal Applications - pram 1. You are willing to engage in some joint action* or other with me - tools 2. I am not about to change the single goal to which my actions will be directed. Therefore: 3. A goal of your actions will be the goal I now envisage my actions being directed to. [*in at least the minimal sense associated with distributive goals]

  26. Your-goal-is-my-goal Applications - pram 1. You are willing to engage in some joint action* or other with me - tools 2. I am not about to change the - communication single goal to which my actions will be directed. Therefore: 3. A goal of your actions will be the goal I now envisage my actions being directed to. [*in at least the minimal sense associated with distributive goals]

  27. failed reach point source: Hare & Tomasello (2004)

  28. failed reach point source: Hare & Tomasello (2004) “to understand pointing, the subject needs to understand more than the individual goal-directed behaviour. She needs to understand that ... the other attempts to communicate to her ... and ... the communicative intention behind the gesture” (Moll & Tomsello 2007)

  29. failed reach point source: Hare & Tomasello (2004) “to understand pointing, the subject needs to understand more than the individual goal-directed behaviour. She needs to understand that ... the other attempts to communicate to her ... and ... the communicative intention behind the gesture” (Moll & Tomsello 2007)

  30. failed reach point source: Hare & Tomasello (2004) “to understand pointing, the subject needs to understand more than the individual goal-directed behaviour. She needs to understand that ... the other attempts to communicate to her ... and ... the communicative intention behind the gesture” (Moll & Tomsello 2007)

  31. Csibra’s ‘two stances’: Teleological and referential action interpretation ‘rely on different kinds of action understanding’ These are initially two distinct ‘action interpretation systems’ and they come together later in development Csibra (2003, p. 456)

  32. The problem of false belief

  33. contents actual believed cat owl North cat owl South

  34. challenge Explain the emergence, in evolution or development, of sophisticated forms of theory of mind cognition. conjecture The existence of abilities to engage in joint action partially explains how sophisticated forms of theory of mind cognition emerge in evolution or development (or both) 3 rd objection But how does could it work?

  35. minimal theory of joint action (ability mind cognition to share goals) other stuff communication by language other stuff s o p h i s t i c a t e d t h e o r y o f m i n d c o g n i t i o n

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