I mpacts and Actions Resulting from the August 14, 2003 Blackout David W. Hilt P.E. July 29, 2006 Illinois Society of Professional Engineers
August 14, 2003 What Happened? O ttawa Montreal Toronto Buffalo Detroit Toledo Cleveland Akron Canton New York Pittsburg Voltage DC 765kV 3:45:33 to 4:08:58 p.m. 4:10:00 to 4:10:38 p.m. 4:08:58 to 4:10:27 p.m. 4:10:44 to 4:13:00 p.m. 3:05:41 to 3:41:33 p.m. 4:10:40 to 4:10:44 p.m. 1:31:34 p.m. 1:31:34 p.m. 2:02 p.m.
Summary of August 14 Blackout ● I mpacts � 8 states/2 provinces � Over 50 million people � 60-65,000 MW � 30 hours to restore � Manufacturing disrupted � 531 generators tripped − 19 nuclear generators at 10 plants ● Statistics � Line trips began at 3:05 PM � Cascading began at 4:06 PM − Lasted approximately 12 seconds � Thousands of discrete events
Every Blackout has Impacts ● November 9, 1965 – NY Blackout � 30,000,000 people and over 20,000 MW of demand – up to 13 hours ● July 13, 1977 - New York City � 9,000,000 people and 6,000 MW of demand – up to 26 hours ● July 2, 1996 – Western US � 2,000,000 customers (10 % of the Western Interconnection) and 11,850 MW of demand for up to several hours ● August 10, 1996 – Western US � 7,500,000 customers; 28,000 MW of demand for up to 9 hours
August 14, 2003 Warm But Not Unusual for August
Situational Awareness ● 2:14 PM – First Energy Alarm logger fails and operators are not aware of any line outages � S. Canton - Star 345 kV line trip and reclose at 2:27 PM ● FirstEnergy IT staff reboots system when paged – did not communicate with operators ● No contingency analysis by FirstEnergy of events during the day ● Midwest ISO – Failure of part of monitoring system due to data error
What happened on August 14 At 1:31 pm, FirstEnergy lost the Eastlake 5 power plant, an important source of reactive power for the Cleveland-Akron area Starting at 3:05 pm EDT, three 345 kV lines in FE’s system failed – within normal operating load limits -- due to contacts with overgrown trees
East Lake 5 Exciter Failure Causes Trip
Hanna - Juniper Tree Contact poor ground clearance = premature failures
Dale-W.Canton 138 kV 16:05:55 EDT W.Akron 138 kV Breaker Chamberlin-W.Akron 138 kV Sammis-Star E.Lima-N.Finlay 138 kV 15:51:41 EDT What Happened - Ohio Canton Central Transformer W.Akron-Pleasant Valley 138 kV Babb-W.Akron 138 kV E.Lima-New Liberty 138 kV Cloverdale-Torrey 138 kV Star-S.Canton 15:41:35 EDT Hanna- Juniper 15:32:03 EDT Harding- Chamberlin 15:05:41 EDT 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 % of Normal Ratings 138 kV Cascade This line begins overload of the Contributes to the spread of Sammis-Star beyond Ohio the cascade the ultimate 345 kV line.
Dale-W.Canton 16:05:55 EDT W.Akron Breaker Chamberlin-W.Akron E.Lima-N.Finlay 15:51:41 EDT Canton Central Transformer W Akron-Pleasant Valley Babb-W Akron What Happened -- Ohio E Lima-New Liberty Cloverdale-Torrey 15:41:35 Star-S.Canton EDT 345 kV 15:32:03 EDT Hanna - Juniper 345 kV 15:05:41 Harding-Chamberlin EDT 345 kV 200 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 % of Normal Ratings at 3:39 pm FE’s overloaded and lines were lost, After the 345 kV tripped out of around Akron overload and 138 kV lines began to fail; 16 service
Communications Phone Calls to Control Area (FE) ● CA receives calls from MISO, AEP, and PJM but did not recognize evolving emergency � 2:32 AEP calls regarding trip & reclose of Star-S. Canton � 3:19 AEP calls confirming Star-S. Canton trip & reclose � 3:36 MISO calls regarding contingency overload on Star- Juniper for loss of Hanna-Juniper � 3:45 tree trimming crew calls in regarding Hanna-Juniper flashover to a tree � PJM calls MISO at 3:48 and FE at 3:56 regarding overloads on FE system
What Happened -- Ohio At 4:05 pm, FirstEnergy’s Sammis-Star 345 kV line failed due to overload. Sammis-Star 345kV @ Sammis 1606:03 110 100 80 ( ) 60 Im ZBC x ( ) Im Z1 l 40 20 40 20 0 20 40 60 − 10 ( ) Re Z1 l ( ) − , 40 Re ZBC x 70
Actual Loading on Critical Lines Harding - Chamberlin Hanna - Juniper 1600 Star - South Canton Sammis - Star Line Trip Sammis - Star Star - South Canton Line Trip Hanna - Juniper Line Trip 1200 East Lake 5 Trip Flows (MW) 800 400 Harding - Chamberlin Line Trip 0 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 Time - EDT
Actual Voltages Leading to Sammis-Star 370 Harding - Chamberlain Hanna - Juniper 345 kV Line Trip 345 kV line Trip 100% Voltage 350 95% Voltage 330 Voltage (kV) 90% Voltage 310 Star 290 Star - South Canton Hanna 345 kV Line Trip Sammis - Star 345 kV Line Trip Beaver 270 Perry 250 15:00 16:00 Time - EDT
What Happened -- Cascade 4) 4:10:38.6 2) 4:08:57 3) 4:10:37 1) 4:06
NY to Ontario 345kV Line Flows at Niagara Progressively Worsening Stability Conditions New York to Ontario 345 kV Line Flow at Niagara (does not include 230 kV line flow) 2000.00 380.0 Niagara KV 1800.00 360.0 1600.00 340.0 East Lima - Fostoria Thetford-Jewel, Hampton Pontiac, 1400.00 320.0 & Perry - Ashtabula 345kV lines trip Central 345 trip 1200.00 Argenta - Battle Creek 300.0 MW double circuit 345 trip KV 1000.00 Sammis-Star 345 trip 280.0 800.00 ONTARIO 260.0 600.00 PA301&2 MW 240.0 400.00 220.0 200.00 Transmission Lines Transmission Lines 765 kV 765 kV 500 kV 500 kV 345 kV 345 kV 230 kV 230 kV 0.00 200.0 16:10:31 16:10:37 16:10:42 16:10:48 16:05:43 16:05:49 16:05:54 16:06:00 16:06:05 16:06:11 16:06:16 16:06:22 16:06:27 16:06:33 16:06:38 16:06:44 16:06:49 16:06:55 16:08:55 16:09:00 16:09:06 16:09:11 16:09:17 16:09:23 16:09:28 16:09:33 16:09:39 16:09:45 16:09:50 16:09:56 16:10:01 16:10:20 16:10:26
What Happened -- Cascade 8) 4:13 6) 4:10:44 7) 4:10:45 5) 4:10:39
Detroit Units Slip Poles Keith-Waterman (J5D) 230 kV - Tie Line 800 Keith-Waterman Trips at 16:10:43.2 600 Classical Stability 400 200 #4 V 0 P 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 Q -200 #1 #2 #3 -400 Severe Voltage Depression in Downtown and Southern Detroit Region -600 Toledo/Cleveland Island Detroit Area Generation Pulls Separates from Detoit Significant Generation Loss and/or Out of Synch and Slips 2 Poles Remaining Detroit Generation Transmission Seperation in Detroit as Frequency Increases to ~62 hz Slips 2 Poles as Frequency Fallsat -800 Seconds from 16:10
Severe Under Frequency Condition
View Into Detroit from Lambton
Frequency in Ontario and New York
Generation The blackout shut down 263 power plants (531 units) in the US and Canada, most from the cascade after 4:10:44 pm – but none suffered significant damage Generation outages did not initiate this cascading blackout On-line units in the Cleveland area were running at maximum MVAR
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Trips Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Generation Data (Reconstructed) 1400 64 63.0 Hz 63.1 Hz 60.3 Hz 1200 60 1000 56 Generatino Net Output MWe Disturbance 800 52 Begins System Frequency 600 48 Unit 2 Accelerates Breakers Open Unit 2 During Frequency Accelerates Increase Excitation System 400 44 Tripped Governor 200 40 Runback Reactor Trip on Low Turbine 0 36 Control Hydraulic Pressure Governor Runback -200 32 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 Seconds from 16:10 August 14, 2003
Power System High Level Sequence ● Premature failure of three 345kV lines � first trip and reclose at 2:27 PM due to ground fault � starting at 3:05 PM, three permanent outages within 40 minutes due to ground faults � ampere loading less than Emergency long time rating � failure of ground clearance management (trees) ● Northeast Ohio 138kV cascade began 3:39 PM ● Northern Ohio 345kV high speed cascade of three overloaded lines 4:05:57 - 4:09:07 PM ● Eastern Interconnection Separates by 4:11PM ● Blackout Complete by 4:13 PM
When the Cascade Was Over � 50+ million people 8 states and 2 provinces � 60-65,000 MW of load initially interrupted − Approximately 11% of Eastern I nterconnection � Sammis – Star trip at 4:06 PM – Blackout essentially complete by 4:13 PM � High speed cascading lasted approximately 12 seconds � Thousands of discrete events to evaluate − Time stamping - critical
Investigation Organization Overview U.S – Canada Steering Group Task Force Investigation Team Lead – D. Hilt Root Cause Analysis Investigation Vegetation/ROW Project Planning and Cooper Systems Process Review Management Support Transmission System MAAC/ECAR/NPCC NERC & Regional Performance, Coordinating Group Standards/Procedures Sequence of Events Protection, Control & Compliance Maintenance & Damage Operations - Tools, Generator Performance, MAAC SCADA/EMS Protection, Controls Restoration Communications Op Maintenance & Damage Planning ECAR Data Requests and Frequency/ACE Management NPCC System Modeling and System Planning, MEN Study Simulation Analysis Design, & Studies Group
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