Florida International University ECO 4932 Topics in Theory Spring - PDF document

Florida International University ECO 4932 Topics in Theory – Spring 2015 List of References for In-Class Presentation 1. Alesina, A. 1987. “Macroeconomic policy in a two-party system as a repeated game. ” Quarterly Journal of Economics 102: 651 – 78. 2. Alesina, A., Londregan, J., and Rosenthal, H. 1993. “ A model of the political economy of the United States. ” American Political Science Review 87: 12 – 33. 3. Alesina, A., Ozler, S., Roubini, N., and Swagel, P. 1996. “Political Instability and economic growth. ” Journal of Economic Growth 1: 189 – 212. 4. Alesina, A., and Perotti, R. 1995. “The political economy of budget deficits. ” IMF Staff Papers (March): 1 – 37. 5. Alesina, A., and Rodrik, D. 1994. “Distri butive politics and economic growth. ” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109: 465 – 90. 6. Alesina, A., and Spolaore, E. 1997. “On the number and size of nations. ” Quarterly Journal of Economics 112: 1027 – 56. 7. Alesina, A., and Tabellini, G. 1990. “ A positive theory of fiscal deficits and government debt. ” Review of Economic Studies 57: 403 – 14. 8. Alesina, A., and Wacziarg, R. 1998. “Openness, country size and government. ” Journal of Public Economics 69: 305 – 21. 9. Austen-Smith, D. 1987. “Interest groups, campaign contributions and probabilistic voting. ” Public Choice 54: 123 – 39. 10. Austen-Smith, D. 1997. “Interest groups: Money, information, and influence. ” In D. C. Mueller, ed., Perspectives on Public Choice, 296 – 321. New York: Cambridge University Press. 11. Austen-Smith, D., and Wright, J. R. 1992. “Competit ive lobbying for a legislator ’ s vote. ” Social Choice and Welfare 9: 229 – 57. 12. Baron, D. 1993. “ A theory of collective choice for government programs. ” Research paper no. 1240, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif. 13. Baron, D. 1994. “Electoral competition with informed and uninformed voters. ” American Political Science Review88: 33 – 47. 14. Barro, R. 1973. “The control of politicians: An economic model. ” Public Choice 14: 19 – 42. 15. Barro, R. 1986. “Reputation in a model of monetary policy with incomplete information. ” Journal of Monetary Economics 17: 1 – 20. 16. Barro, R., and Gordon, D. 1983. “Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy. ” Journal of Monetary Economics 12: 101 – 21. 17. Becker, G. S. 1983. “ A theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence. ” Quarterly Journal of Economics 98: 371 – 400. 18. Becker, G. S. 1985. “Public policies, pressure groups and deadweight costs. ” Journal of Public Economics 28: 330 – 47. 19. Bergstrom, T. C., and Goodman, R. P. 1973. “Pr ivate demands for public goods. ” American Economic Review 63: 280 – 96. 20. Besley, T., and Coate, S. 1997. “ An economic model of representative democracy. ” Quarterly Journal of Economics112: 85 – 114. 21. Besley, T., and Coate, S. 1998. “Sources of inefficiency in a representative democracy: A dynamic analysis. ” American Economic Review 88: 139 – 56. 22. Besley, T., and Coate, S. 1999. “Lobbying and welfare in a representative democracy. ” London School of Eco- nomics. Mimeographed. Forthcoming, Review of Economic Studies . 23. Blomberg, B. S., and Hess, G. 1998. “Is the political business cycle for real?” Ohio State University. Mimeographed. Boadway, R., and Wildasin, D. 1989. “ A median voter model of social security. ” International Economic Review 30: 307 – 28. 24. Bolton, P., and Roland, G. 1997. “The breakup of nations: A political economy analysis. ” Quarterly Journal of Economics 112: 1057 – 90. 25. Caplin, A., and Nalebuff, B. 1991. “ Aggregation and social choice: A mean voter theorem. ” Econometrica 59: 1 – 23. 26. Chari, V., and Cole, H. 1993. “ Why are representative democracies fiscally irresponsible? ” Staff report no. 163, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. 27. Coughlin, P., and Nitzan, S. 1981. “Electoral outcomes with probabilistic voting and Nash social welfare maxima. ” 1

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59. Stigler, G. J. 1971. “The theory of economic regulation. ” Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2: 3 – 21. 60. Stigler, G. J. 1972. “Economic performance and political competition. ” Public Choice 13: 91 – 106. 61. Terrones, M. 1989. “ Macroeconomic policy choices under alternative electoral structures. ” Persson, Torsten and Tabellini, Guido, Handbook of Macroeconomics, Volume 1, Part C, Elsevier, 1991. 62. Tullock, G. 1959. “Some problems of majority voting. ” Journal of Political Economy 67: 571 – 79. 63. Wittman, D. 1977. “Candidates with policy preferences: A dynamic model. ” Journal of Economic Theory 14:180 – 89. 3