Education and Religion: The Second Demographic Transition in Utah, 1850-2000 Ashley Larsen Gibby, Pennsylvania State University*, agl132@psu.edu Jane Lankes, Pennsylvania State University*, jlankes@psu.edu David Baker, Ph.D., Pennsylvania State University * indicates equal contribution Abstract : Education and religion are often conceptualized as competing forces in the second demographic transition (SDT), with education driving the trends and religiosity slowing them. However, this assumption has not been effectively tested. Utah, with high levels of education and religiosity, offers a useful case to examine this assumption. Using census data across 150 years, we find that the rates of fertility and marital status for Utah parallel national trends, but are consistently higher for fertility and marriage and lower for divorce and proportion never married. Therefore, the repeated explanation that Utah is merely lagged in the SDT, meaning, that while it has not participated in the SDT yet, it will in the future, is incomplete. Rather, our findings suggest that Utah has been an active participate in the SDT. Further, neither religiosity nor education dominated demographic trends in Utah. Instead, our findings support the conclusion that religion and education are not necessarily in conflict but, rather, may work together to provide values, frameworks, and resources that contribute to family processes. DRAFT PAPER – DO NOT CITE OR CIRCUALTE WITHOUT THE AUTHORS’ PERMISSION Acknowledgements: The authors acknowledge support from the Population Research Institute at Penn State, which receives funding from the National Center of Child Health and Human Development (R24-DH041025) as well as the NICHD Pre-Doctoral Training Grant in Family Demography (T-32HD007514).
1 INTRODUCTION Both education and religion are highly cited influences on the second demographic transition (SDT); however, empirical tests of their influence remain minimal. Highly religious populations generally exhibit lower rates of participation in the second demographic transition (SDT) (Surkyn and Lesthaeghe 2004; Bystrov 2012). Therefore, religion has often been cited as a deterrent to the SDT. Conversely, education is regarded as a catalyst in demographic transitions, increasing economic resources (Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa 1986; Lesthaeghe and Lopez-Gay 2013; Lesthaeghe and Neidert 2006) and serving as a source of ideation change (Hernandez et al. forthcoming). As such, religion and education are often pitted against each other as competing forces in the SDT, with religion slowing the trends and education accelerating them. Furthermore, researchers have often explained exceptions to the SDT trends as “lags , ” meaning, while these populations have not undergone the SDT yet, they will follow a similar trajectory at some time in the future. Religion, or “traditional ideation” is often cited as an explanation for this perceived lag in participation (Kirk 1996; Lesthaeghe 1983, Carlson 2005; Surkyn and Lesthaeghe 2004). Utah is one of these exceptions. It appears that Utah has yet to participate in the SDT according to cross-sectional data that demonstrate Utah's high fertility and marriage rates as well as low divorce and cohabitation rates (Surkyn and Lesthaeghe 2004). While Utah has been identified as a lagging state, no formal test of this lag or historical examination of Utah's progress in the SDT has been conducted. Using census data from 1850-2000, we examine trends in the second demographic transition in Utah longitudinally. Utah has high rates of both religiosity and education, making it a particularly apt case to examine the influence of both education and religion on the SDT. Further, Utah is highly comparable to the United States at large in terms of wealth disparities, health differences, etc., eliminating competing explanations and sources of endogeneity. We find that Utah has not been lagging in the SDT but, instead, followed the trends of the United States at large at a higher or lower mean (depending on the indicator). We also postulate that religion does not necessarily slow the SDT while education propels it. Rather, religion and education can act synergistically to help individuals negotiate choices regarding family formation. These findings, as well as this discussion, are important to consider. While previous studies have examined the relationships between religion and education with the second demographic transition, these studies are largely cross-sectional. To our knowledge, none have considered religion and education in conjunction longitudinally. By ignoring or oversimplifying religion’s influence, or by explaining away exceptions to the SDT without testing these explanations, we may miss important nuance and incorrectly estimate future trends. Further, these explanations have implications beyond those of Utah, and can be applicable internationally to populations, especially highly religious areas, who are currently not participating in the SDT. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT The second demographic transition (SDT) includes increased cohabitation and divorce along with decreased fertility, marriage, non-marital childbearing and the postponement of marriage and childbearing (Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa 1986). Evidence of this transition is found in all but a small group of countries in the world and every state in the United States (Lesthaeghe and Neidert 2006b). Essentially, the SDT involves decisions regarding family formation and
2 family structure that are deeply personal and moral. Therefore, it is no surprise that these types of decisions are influenced heavily by an individual’s religion and educational attainment. An in-depth body of literature exists on the significant relationships between religion and demographic processes. In general, religion is associated with more traditional family forms such as higher fertility (Frejka and Westoff 2008), higher likelihood of marriage (Thornton, Axinn, and Hill 1992), and lower rates of divorce (Larson and Golz 1989). Lower religiosity, on the other hand, predicts non-traditional union formation (Thornton, Axinn, and Hill 1992) and lower fertility (Surkyn and Lesthaeghe 2004). While not all religious groups are associated with these trends, religion as a whole is painted as a deterrent to the SDT. Lesthaeghe and Neidert (2006a) find that percent Evangelical/Mormon is associated lower SDT score, and reiterate Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa's 1986 SDT paper stating that new living arrangements, cohabitation in particular, are a reflection of secular, anti-authoritarian, and better educated new birth cohorts. This is not surprising, as conservative religion discourages several behaviors associated with the SDT such as divorce, postponing marriage and fertility, and non-marital childbearing. Further, Bystrov (2012) found that more highly religious areas in Israel were less likely to participate in the SDT with certain aspects of the SDT such as childlessness, non-marital cohabitation, and non-marital childbearing, almost nonexistent. Religion is often cited as a primary distinguishing factor between American and European SDT progression. It is the United States’ high religious adherence, Carlson argues (20 05), which is a partial explanation for the United States’ fertility levels never falling to below replacement. To explain these types of community differences, Lesthaeghe attributes differences in fertility levels and speeds of change to a shift from community needs toward individual wants, calling it an “emancipation process” from religious control (1983). He posits that demographic change is a result of ideation shift intertwined with religious institutions. Therefore, societies are progressing in the SDT due to the distance they are gaining from religious control. But religion is still active in certain populations. Religious institutions shape attitudes about both fertility (McQuillan 2004) and family formation (Ellison, Wolfinger, and Ramos-Wada 2012), creating demographic divides between the religious and the secular. In general, however, this literature on religion and demographic transitions tends to be cross-sectional, limiting our scope of the second demographic transition. While some studies have examined trends longitudinally (Kane 2013; Glass 2014; Lesthaeghe 2010), by examining this over a much longer period, we hope to gain a clearer picture of how these trends have evolved. While religion has been viewed as a deterrent, education has been cited as a catalyst or driver of the second demographic transition worldwide (Hernandez et al. forthcoming). The highly educated have historically been on the vanguard of demographic behaviors associated with the second demographic transition. For example, highly educated women were the first to experience vast increases in divorce (Norton and Moorman 1987). Most literature considering education's impact on the SDT considers education's economic advantages. First, education increases economic resources, providing individuals with more power to negotiate their preferred family form (Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa 1986; Lesthaeghe and Lopez-Gay 2013; Lesthaeghe and Neidert 2006). Second, education improves the labor market for women, providing them more bargaining power and more opportunity costs (Lesthaeghe and Lopez-Gay 2013; Lesthaeghe and Neidert 2006). However, a new line of research argues that education, like religion, provides more than just economic advantage. Instead, education provides a framework from which to view the world, values, and ideologies. Thus, education is similar to religion in its impact not only on resources, but on human thoughts and values (Baker forthcoming). Therefore, education’s large association
Recommend
More recommend
