DEMOCRACY & DISINFORMATION: A TURN IN THE CURRENT DEBATE Anja Bechmann, Professor – Media Studies, Aarhus University, Denmark Ben O’Loughlin, Professor – International Relations, Royal Holloway University of London, UK #battleforthetruth & @_KV AB 11 OCTOBER 2019
PRESENTATION Why a turn in the debate? Conceptual discussion u n Evaluation of existing recommendations u ), Recommendations for academics and platforms u Flandern particularities u t Recommendations for political leaders and journalists u 11 OCTOBER 2019
A TURN IN THE DISINFORMATION DEBATE? Conceptual turn 1. n Combat strategic turn – already taking place ), 2. Data Access strategic turn 3. t 11 OCTOBER 2019
DISINFORMATION “false, inaccurate, or misleading information designed, presented and promoted to n intentionally cause public harm or for profit” (EU Commission report, 2018) ), To a broader notion covering information disorders focusing on impact including: t Misinformation (e.g. vaccine, immigration and climate change debate), hostile sentiments, ”fake news”, and disinformaiton disregarding intentionality 11 OCTOBER 2019
OBJECTIVES OF THE REPORT it seeks to establish what we know and what we do not know about disinformation. 1) n it identifies what from a research point of view specifically it is important to pursue in future ), 2) studies. it identifies policies and actions that should follow from the existing knowledge that could 3) t address the current dilemmas faced by democracies. 11 OCTOBER 2019
#1 ENHANCE TRANSPARENCY OF THE DIGITAL INFORMATION ECOSYSTEM Most conflicting discussion point due to conflicting values such as privacy vs. Safeguarding democracy, freedom - of expression/mechanical neutrality vs. Censorship n ), Good faith research soft law solution has been negotiated through HLEG work within EU - This has resulted in e.g. social science one (good faith access), ad transparency archive and new call including - t CrowdTangle access Lack of scalable solutions for the whole community - Lack of freedom of science with Social Science One as intermediary instead of complying to EU regulation and - ethical conduct – do platforms pose questions through available data structures? Lack of focus on end-to-end encryption versus ”community” communication space knowledge as central for - democracy and societal values (compliant to regulation) 11 OCTOBER 2019
#2 PROMOTE MEDIA AND INFORMATION LITERACY n ), Everyone can agree on this but stakeholders do not agree on what it is Data access and evidence-based research are prerequisites to make solid media literacy t ”data literacy is power for social change”? 11 OCTOBER 2019
#3 DEVELOP TOOL TO ENHANCE THE EMPOWERMENT OF USERS AND JOURNALISTS AND FOSTER POSITIVE ENGAGEMENT Huge disagreement of specific initiatives in this field. Research-driven perspectives: E.g. n ), reactance theory suggests that interfacing flagging would create more circulation, 1. transparency in code of practice create negotiation ground in participatory democracy ideals 2. concept and degrees of disinformation to whom in what context? -> partisan content, should we make a t 3. space for optimizing user time an elightment project? Or focus on EU/national supported media with must- carry obligations? International/regional Standardized data models open sourced for research/fact-checking 4. Fact-checking a moving target due to socio-technological (tech+skills) developments and network structure 5. e.g. outlier/disinformation detection and automation and/or crowdsourced biases – good enough signals to justify censorship? 11 OCTOBER 2019
#4 SAFEGUARD THE DIVERSITY AND SUSTAINABILITY OF THE EUROPEAN NEWS MEDIA ECOSYSTEM How sustainable is the economy of content providers in a long-term perspective? Existing n studies suggest a steap decline going from analogue-digital-mobile ), Is this forcing media to produce more clickbait/bad journalism in third party spaces in proprietary spaces? Should we ”safe/factcheck” those spaces if business model is not aligned t with democratic values and basic democratic goals of enlightment? How do we make a sustainable EU solution to create alternatives to US and China based solutions? That are not acquired by non-EU companies – big fives? 11 OCTOBER 2019
#5 CONTINUOUS RESEARCH ON THE IMPACT OF DISINFORMATION IN EUROPE In order not to be vulnerable to political influence - n Access to (good) data is a prerequisite for evidence-based research ), - Lacking studies at scale and across platforms and across physical and digital spaces t - (contextual analysis) Lacking coordinated and standardized deeplink lists instead of source coding with - conflicting data models in order to compute at scale 11 OCTOBER 2019
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PLATFORMS Short-term: n Implement a scalable data access solution that favor data access control rather than limit ), u amount of data units and data types Develop high ethical standards applying to the European context in collaboration with u t European research communities Making data available in a format that allows for academic researchers to pose own u research questions in the belief of academic freedom 11 OCTOBER 2019
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PLATFORMS Medium-term: Provide specific and differentiated APIs for (i) journalists and NGOs, and (ii) university-based academics u n in order to meet different GDPR concerns and societal interests ), Long-term: Provide researchers with stable access to social media data in safe, controlled spaces that reduce u t privacy risks to users whose data is analysed, preferably outside platforms and across platforms. Making internal research with a focus on to what extent social media data can be made non- u identifiable from the beginning without compromising the need for opening up to academic researchers to pose research questions in the interest of society and with legal and ethical clearance 11 OCTOBER 2019
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACADEMICS Short-term: n The academic community needs to push for data exchange solutions that acknowledge different kinds of research ), u questions in the support for academic and scientific freedom for the benefit of society Academic communities and national foundations should support and encourage this topic to be conducted in u collaboration across fields and across countries in order to recognize this as an international challenge t Medium-term: More research is needed in order to move away from a content-centric research agenda in the context of disinformation u and instead move towards circulation at scale and across platforms More experimental research is needed in order to measure effects of fact-checking, media literacy, reconfigurations of u algorithms as well as networks in order to slow down or prevent circulation of disinformation and hostile sentiments More work is needed in order to understand effects between disinformation exposure and voting behavior u 11 OCTOBER 2019
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACADEMICS More research is needed in order to connect research on disinformation with larger u n questions of polarization and trust as such causal connections are sparse in existing studies ), – we need more studies to back this up and especially outside UK and US in small countries with high education level such as the Flemish region. t Long-term: Negotiating solutions for data access, processing and storage that cuts across individual u academic incentives for the benefit of the general knowledge level and skillsets in our research communities for researchers at all levels both within small countries and larger regions 11 OCTOBER 2019
16 SEPTEMBER 2019
THE FLANDERS CONTEXT Mainstream media = high trust, renewed revenue and agenda-setting online n ), But anxieties: Ø success of Vlaams Belang – and journalists give a platform to winners t Ø fear of polarisation between paying / non-paying news consumers Ø worries about ‘normalisation’ – should Sceptre.be and Doorbraak.be be reported? 11 OCTOBER 2019
A FRAGILE ELECTORATE Vaccari (2017): High trust means high susceptibility to disinformation n ), EU Commission research shows: Ø Belgian citizens least likely across whole EU to say false news is a problem in their country t Ø Belgian citizens express very low confidence in their ability to spot false news Ø They say: leave it to the government or news editors to stop false news … social fragility? 11 OCTOBER 2019
FLANDERS POLICYMAKERS’ VIEWS Must now perform fact-checking in real-time to satisfy journalists n ), Feel the Flanders public is more patient and will trust they will verify facts eventually t Policymakers expressed no sense of being in an ‘information war’ – digital is an opportunity to promote Flanders and Belgium. Journalists and think tank staff – No: Brussels is a symbolic target! Diplomats a resource overseas to spot conspiracies and false news about Belgium 11 OCTOBER 2019
Recommend
More recommend
