VLSI Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications (IAIK) – VLSI & Security Contact-based Fault Injections and Power Analysis on RFID Tags Michael Hutter, Jörn-Marc Schmidt, Thomas Plos ECCTD 2009 Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications (IAIK), Graz University of Technology TU Graz/Computer Science/IAIK/VLSI/SCA Antalya, 2009 ECCTD 2009 1
VLSI Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications (IAIK) – VLSI & Security Presentation Outline Introduction Implementation attacks on RFID Related work Contact-based measurement setup Fault injection setup and results Power analysis setup and results Conclusions and future work http://www.iaik.tugraz.at TU Graz/Computer Science/IAIK/VLSI/SCA Antalya, 2009 ECCTD 2009 2
VLSI Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications (IAIK) – VLSI & Security Introduction RFID … R adio F requency Id entification Small microchip attached to an antenna Reader field is used for Communication Power supply (Clock signal) Reader http://www.iaik.tugraz.at TU Graz/Computer Science/IAIK/VLSI/SCA Antalya, 2009 ECCTD 2009 3
VLSI Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications (IAIK) – VLSI & Security Implementation Attacks on RFID Active attacks Fault attacks Passive attacks Physical probing Side-channel attacks Power consumption Electromagnetic radiation Timing analysis http://www.iaik.tugraz.at TU Graz/Computer Science/IAIK/VLSI/SCA Antalya, 2009 ECCTD 2009 4
VLSI Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications (IAIK) – VLSI & Security Recent Work Oren and Shamir 2006 Simple power analysis attacks on UHF tags Hutter et al. 2007 Differential electromagnetic analysis on HF tags Plos 2008 Differential electromagnetic analysis on UHF tags Hutter et al. 2008 Fault attacks on HF and UHF tags This work Differential power analysis and fault attacks on UHF and HF tags http://www.iaik.tugraz.at TU Graz/Computer Science/IAIK/VLSI/SCA Antalya, 2009 ECCTD 2009 5
VLSI Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications (IAIK) – VLSI & Security Our Analysis Performed fault attacks and power-analysis attacks on different RFID tags We induced over-voltage spikes into the chip-antenna connections Analyzed HF and UHF tags ISO 15693 and ISO 18000-6C (EPC Gen2) Focus on write operation Critical in terms of power consumption and execution time Used a contact-based measurement setup http://www.iaik.tugraz.at TU Graz/Computer Science/IAIK/VLSI/SCA Antalya, 2009 ECCTD 2009 6
VLSI Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications (IAIK) – VLSI & Security Contact-based Measurement Setup The chip of the tag is separated from its antenna Chip and reader are directly connected by 2 wires No air interface (no inductive/electromagnetic coupling) The setup allows… PC … contact-based fault injections … power-consumption measurements of the chip Reader control RFID Tag R series R term reader chip http://www.iaik.tugraz.at TU Graz/Computer Science/IAIK/VLSI/SCA Antalya, 2009 ECCTD 2009 7
VLSI Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications (IAIK) – VLSI & Security Basic Communication Process Reader request Response time Tag response http://www.iaik.tugraz.at TU Graz/Computer Science/IAIK/VLSI/SCA Antalya, 2009 ECCTD 2009 8
VLSI Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications (IAIK) – VLSI & Security Fault-Injection Setup Two high-speed multiplexers connect the chip to a DC voltage (over-voltage injection) Trigger device PC FPGA board Trigger µC Switch control Reader control RFID Tag R Term reader chip DC supply http://www.iaik.tugraz.at TU Graz/Computer Science/IAIK/VLSI/SCA Antalya, 2009 ECCTD 2009 9
VLSI Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications (IAIK) – VLSI & Security Trigger Signal Trigger device SASEBO board used to control the trigger delay and duration A microcontroller is used to listen to the reader communication and to provide a trigger signal after a write command Fault injections during the response time of the chip (a few milliseconds) Trigger device was programmed to sweep across the response time (automatic sweep) Injected spikes in steps of 9ns Over-voltage was induced for at least 80ns http://www.iaik.tugraz.at TU Graz/Computer Science/IAIK/VLSI/SCA Antalya, 2009 ECCTD 2009 10
VLSI Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications (IAIK) – VLSI & Security Results Faults cause the chip to write faulty values into the memory Tags perform a reset during the writing of data The faulty value depends on the trigger delay Different tags have a different writing time Allows fingerprinting of RFID tags http://www.iaik.tugraz.at TU Graz/Computer Science/IAIK/VLSI/SCA Antalya, 2009 ECCTD 2009 11
VLSI Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications (IAIK) – VLSI & Security Power-Analysis Setup For HF tags Power is measured over a 100 Ohm resistor For UHF tags Power is measured over the internal capacity (0.1pF) of the differential probe (no resistor used) PC Oscilloscope control Digital-storage oscilloscope Trigger Reader Differential µC control probe RFID Tag R Meas R Term reader chip http://www.iaik.tugraz.at TU Graz/Computer Science/IAIK/VLSI/SCA Antalya, 2009 ECCTD 2009 12
VLSI Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications (IAIK) – VLSI & Security Power-Analysis Attacks Trace acquisition 1000 traces for UHF tags and 10000 traces for HF tags were measured Sampling rate: 100 MS/s Post-processing techniques Calculated the envelope signal (absolute values + 2 MHz low- pass filter Horizontal and vertical trace alignment Target of the attack 8-bit value that was written into memory Different Power models applied http://www.iaik.tugraz.at TU Graz/Computer Science/IAIK/VLSI/SCA Antalya, 2009 ECCTD 2009 13
VLSI Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications (IAIK) – VLSI & Security Results All attacks have been successful ISO 15693 HF tag ISO 18006C UHF tag http://www.iaik.tugraz.at TU Graz/Computer Science/IAIK/VLSI/SCA Antalya, 2009 ECCTD 2009 14
VLSI Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications (IAIK) – VLSI & Security Summary Performed fault and power-analysis attacks on RFID Analyzed HF and UHF RFID tags Contact-based measurement setup used All attacks have been performed successfully Security-enabled RFID devices have to include countermeasures to thwart these attacks http://www.iaik.tugraz.at TU Graz/Computer Science/IAIK/VLSI/SCA Antalya, 2009 ECCTD 2009 15
VLSI Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications (IAIK) – VLSI & Security Thank you for your attention. Questions? Michael.Hutter@iaik.tugraz.at Jörn-Marc.Schmidt@iaik.tugraz.at Thomas.Plos@iaik.tugraz.at http://www.iaik.tugraz.at/content/research/implementation_attacks/ http://www.iaik.tugraz.at TU Graz/Computer Science/IAIK/VLSI/SCA Antalya, 2009 ECCTD 2009 16
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