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VLSI Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications (IAIK) VLSI & Security Contact-based Fault Injections and Power Analysis on RFID Tags Michael Hutter, Jrn-Marc Schmidt, Thomas Plos ECCTD 2009 Institute for Applied


  1. VLSI Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications (IAIK) – VLSI & Security Contact-based Fault Injections and Power Analysis on RFID Tags Michael Hutter, Jörn-Marc Schmidt, Thomas Plos ECCTD 2009 Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications (IAIK), Graz University of Technology TU Graz/Computer Science/IAIK/VLSI/SCA Antalya, 2009 ECCTD 2009 1

  2. VLSI Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications (IAIK) – VLSI & Security Presentation Outline  Introduction  Implementation attacks on RFID  Related work  Contact-based measurement setup  Fault injection setup and results  Power analysis setup and results  Conclusions and future work http://www.iaik.tugraz.at TU Graz/Computer Science/IAIK/VLSI/SCA Antalya, 2009 ECCTD 2009 2

  3. VLSI Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications (IAIK) – VLSI & Security Introduction  RFID … R adio F requency Id entification  Small microchip attached to an antenna  Reader field is used for  Communication  Power supply  (Clock signal) Reader http://www.iaik.tugraz.at TU Graz/Computer Science/IAIK/VLSI/SCA Antalya, 2009 ECCTD 2009 3

  4. VLSI Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications (IAIK) – VLSI & Security Implementation Attacks on RFID  Active attacks  Fault attacks  Passive attacks  Physical probing  Side-channel attacks  Power consumption  Electromagnetic radiation  Timing analysis http://www.iaik.tugraz.at TU Graz/Computer Science/IAIK/VLSI/SCA Antalya, 2009 ECCTD 2009 4

  5. VLSI Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications (IAIK) – VLSI & Security Recent Work  Oren and Shamir 2006  Simple power analysis attacks on UHF tags  Hutter et al. 2007  Differential electromagnetic analysis on HF tags  Plos 2008  Differential electromagnetic analysis on UHF tags  Hutter et al. 2008  Fault attacks on HF and UHF tags  This work  Differential power analysis and fault attacks on UHF and HF tags http://www.iaik.tugraz.at TU Graz/Computer Science/IAIK/VLSI/SCA Antalya, 2009 ECCTD 2009 5

  6. VLSI Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications (IAIK) – VLSI & Security Our Analysis  Performed fault attacks and power-analysis attacks on different RFID tags  We induced over-voltage spikes into the chip-antenna connections  Analyzed HF and UHF tags  ISO 15693 and ISO 18000-6C (EPC Gen2)  Focus on write operation  Critical in terms of power consumption and execution time  Used a contact-based measurement setup http://www.iaik.tugraz.at TU Graz/Computer Science/IAIK/VLSI/SCA Antalya, 2009 ECCTD 2009 6

  7. VLSI Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications (IAIK) – VLSI & Security Contact-based Measurement Setup  The chip of the tag is separated from its antenna  Chip and reader are directly connected by 2 wires  No air interface (no inductive/electromagnetic coupling)  The setup allows… PC  … contact-based fault injections  … power-consumption measurements of the chip Reader control RFID Tag R series R term reader chip http://www.iaik.tugraz.at TU Graz/Computer Science/IAIK/VLSI/SCA Antalya, 2009 ECCTD 2009 7

  8. VLSI Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications (IAIK) – VLSI & Security Basic Communication Process Reader request Response time Tag response http://www.iaik.tugraz.at TU Graz/Computer Science/IAIK/VLSI/SCA Antalya, 2009 ECCTD 2009 8

  9. VLSI Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications (IAIK) – VLSI & Security Fault-Injection Setup  Two high-speed multiplexers connect the chip to a DC voltage (over-voltage injection)  Trigger device PC FPGA board Trigger µC Switch control Reader control RFID Tag R Term reader chip DC supply http://www.iaik.tugraz.at TU Graz/Computer Science/IAIK/VLSI/SCA Antalya, 2009 ECCTD 2009 9

  10. VLSI Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications (IAIK) – VLSI & Security Trigger Signal  Trigger device  SASEBO board used to control the trigger delay and duration  A microcontroller is used to listen to the reader communication and to provide a trigger signal after a write command  Fault injections during the response time of the chip (a few milliseconds)  Trigger device was programmed to sweep across the response time (automatic sweep)  Injected spikes in steps of 9ns  Over-voltage was induced for at least 80ns http://www.iaik.tugraz.at TU Graz/Computer Science/IAIK/VLSI/SCA Antalya, 2009 ECCTD 2009 10

  11. VLSI Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications (IAIK) – VLSI & Security Results  Faults cause the chip to write faulty values into the memory  Tags perform a reset during the writing of data  The faulty value depends on the trigger delay  Different tags have a different writing time  Allows fingerprinting of RFID tags http://www.iaik.tugraz.at TU Graz/Computer Science/IAIK/VLSI/SCA Antalya, 2009 ECCTD 2009 11

  12. VLSI Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications (IAIK) – VLSI & Security Power-Analysis Setup  For HF tags  Power is measured over a 100 Ohm resistor  For UHF tags  Power is measured over the internal capacity (0.1pF) of the differential probe (no resistor used) PC Oscilloscope control Digital-storage oscilloscope Trigger Reader Differential µC control probe RFID Tag R Meas R Term reader chip http://www.iaik.tugraz.at TU Graz/Computer Science/IAIK/VLSI/SCA Antalya, 2009 ECCTD 2009 12

  13. VLSI Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications (IAIK) – VLSI & Security Power-Analysis Attacks  Trace acquisition  1000 traces for UHF tags and 10000 traces for HF tags were measured  Sampling rate: 100 MS/s  Post-processing techniques  Calculated the envelope signal (absolute values + 2 MHz low- pass filter  Horizontal and vertical trace alignment  Target of the attack  8-bit value that was written into memory  Different Power models applied http://www.iaik.tugraz.at TU Graz/Computer Science/IAIK/VLSI/SCA Antalya, 2009 ECCTD 2009 13

  14. VLSI Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications (IAIK) – VLSI & Security Results  All attacks have been successful ISO 15693 HF tag ISO 18006C UHF tag http://www.iaik.tugraz.at TU Graz/Computer Science/IAIK/VLSI/SCA Antalya, 2009 ECCTD 2009 14

  15. VLSI Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications (IAIK) – VLSI & Security Summary  Performed fault and power-analysis attacks on RFID  Analyzed HF and UHF RFID tags  Contact-based measurement setup used  All attacks have been performed successfully  Security-enabled RFID devices have to include countermeasures to thwart these attacks http://www.iaik.tugraz.at TU Graz/Computer Science/IAIK/VLSI/SCA Antalya, 2009 ECCTD 2009 15

  16. VLSI Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications (IAIK) – VLSI & Security Thank you for your attention. Questions? Michael.Hutter@iaik.tugraz.at Jörn-Marc.Schmidt@iaik.tugraz.at Thomas.Plos@iaik.tugraz.at http://www.iaik.tugraz.at/content/research/implementation_attacks/ http://www.iaik.tugraz.at TU Graz/Computer Science/IAIK/VLSI/SCA Antalya, 2009 ECCTD 2009 16

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