Carol McAusland & Nouri Naj j ar University of British Columbia Conference In Honour of Dr. Colin Clark: Conference In Honour of Dr. Colin Clark: Developments and Challenges in Fisheries Economics
Climate Change concerns Climate Change concerns Policies commonly considered Cap & Trade (for manufacturers and utilities) Emission Taxes based on emissions generated Fuel Taxes Fuel Taxes levied on fuels e.g. BC’s “ carbon tax”
Good U produced using one unit of numeraire Good U produced using one unit of numeraire input G (for Generic) and e U units of emissions. Denote Home’s carbon tax by t e Assume firms engage in marginal cost pricing e u identical across countries ROW’s carbon tax is zero ROW s carbon tax is zero
Can’ t force trade partners to levy similar Can t force trade partners to levy similar taxes on own producers leakage disadvantage domestically produced goods vis-à- vis imports Using our simple model Using our simple model Home producers of U will charge p u =1+t e e u ROW producers charge p u * =1 < p u
A.k.a. Border Carbon Adj ustments (BCAs) A.k.a. Border Carbon Adj ustments (BCAs) In theory: Calculate the carbon content of imported goods (e u ) Multiply by Canadian carbon price (t e ) S S ubtract carbon taxes already paid by producer ubtract carbon taxes already paid by producer Charge the difference as a “ border carbon adj ustment” (BCA=t e e u )
Need to calculate the carbon content of Need to calculate the carbon content of imported goods Need to calculate footprints e u may vary across countries/ producers
What if the trade partner regulates carbon What if the trade partner regulates carbon via command and control regulation? How would we calculate the implicit carbon tax paid abroad? id b d? What if foreign firms are regulated via marketable permits and their permit price marketable permits and their permit price drops? Do we impose a higher BCA on their goods?
Exempt countries/ overseas sectors that have active, comparable climate policy and/ or lower emission intensity than domestic competitors Complications Violate MFN rules? Vi l MFN l ?
If Canada goes the cap & trade (and BCA) route g p ( ) instead Will likely grandfather some permits Do we need to grant equivalent concessions to Do we need to grant equivalent concessions to imported goods? Using average-tax-paid by Canadian competitors will be inefficient Marginal carbon tax will be lower for imports than for domestically produced goods Charging full tax will likely violate National Treatment rules l S imilarly, requiring importers to purchase Canadian permits for each tonne of embodied carbon will likely violate National Treatment as well as raise price of p Canadian permits.
levied on every good consumed in Canada levied on every good consumed in Canada regardless of where the good is produced based on carbon footprint of the good you buy intermediate goods are CCT-free (rebated) If ROW producers pay emission taxes in own country, the onus is on them to get rebates before exporting before exporting
No tax on carbon emitted means every No tax on carbon emitted means every * =1 producer charges p u =p u Canadian consumers pay p u +t e e u regardless of where U was produced Canadian producers can sell U in ROW market at p u =1 t 1 Observations Observations Canadian producers on even footing with imports and export-competition p p no need to “ rebate” pollution taxes to exporters
S S uppose there’s a downstream product D uppose there s a downstream product D produced using a D units of G (generic input) and U Assume D-production itself doesn’ t generate any emissions
In Canada, tax-inclusive price of U input is In Canada, tax inclusive price of U input is 1+t e e u D-producers who use U as an input are rebated CCT-taxes paid p D =p U +a D =1+a D Price of D for Canadian consumers = p D +t e e u regardless of where the good was produced
Price of Canadian-produced D in ROW Price of Canadian produced D in ROW * =p D =1+a D =p D Implication: Canadian producers are on level- playing field with ROW-produced goods both i C in Canadian market and abroad di k t d b d
In Canada, p U = 1+t e e u while p U * = 1+t e e u In Canada, p U 1 t e u while p U 1 t e u assumes BCA charged on imports of U p D = 1+t e e u +a D D u D In order to put Canadian D-exporters on even-footing with ROW producers in ROW market, would need to “ rebate” them taxes k t ld d t “ b t ” th t paid by suppliers of upstream good r= t e e r t e u
“ rebate” is only paid to exporters of D rebate is only paid to exporters of D “ rebate” is for taxes paid by a different firm Hard to imagine this not being construed as an export subsidy Export subsidies prohibited by Agreement on S b idi S ubsidies and Countervailing Measures d C ili M (AS CM)
relative to pollution taxes or cap & trade w/ relative to pollution taxes or cap & trade w/ BCAs don’ t need to know how/ whether carbon is regulated in trade partner l d i d follows destination principle precedents re Value-Added Taxation (VAT) suggest precedents re Value Added Taxation (VAT) suggest exempting intermediate goods from CCT will not run afoul of WTO in contrast emission taxes follow origin principle in contrast , emission taxes follow origin principle rebates on upstream pollution-taxes paid will likely be construed as an export subsidy
Most analyses motivated by provisions for BTAs in US policy proposals e.g. 2009 Waxman-Markey bill contained a provision for the use of “ carbon tariffs” on imports, but not exports (S p p ( heldon, 2011, p. 1) p )
Usual political economy story? Usual political economy story? import competing industries get all the attention US is net importer of carbon
1997 1997 carbon embodied in Canadian imports = 101 Mt carbon embodied in Canadian exports = 155 Mt 2001 carbon embodied in Canadian imports = 158 Mt carbon embodied in Canadian exports = 174 Mt b b di d i C di 174 M
have to do it for BCAs too have to do it for BCAs too IS O 14067 (in development) “ Requirements for the quantification and communication of the carbon footprint of products”
Probably can’ t force ROW producers to get Probably can t force ROW producers to get IS O 14067 certified S olution: use baselines and exemptions? B for product X E.g. posit baseline footprint e X B All producers assigned same baseline footprint e X unless are certified as having a smaller footprint unless are certified as having a smaller footprint Choice of baseline important e.g. if use Canadian average, then high emission ROW products won’ t be sufficiently penalized products won’ t be sufficiently penalized if use international worst practices, then small green producers get punished excessively
Upstream Firm p gets IS O-14067 certified calculates own footprint e U submits footprint e U to taxation authority submits footprint e U to taxation authority Downstream Firm buys upstream product at p U +t e e U submits receipts to tax authority for reimbursement of b it i t t t th it f i b t f t e e U gets IS O-14067 certified calculates in house footprint e calculates in-house footprint e D submits sum of footprints e D +e U to taxation authority Consumer pays p D +t e [e D +e U ]
Upstream Firm p Fixed costs may be prohibitive for gets IS O-14067 certified small firms calculates own footprint e U submits footprint e U to taxation authority submits footprint e U to taxation authority Downstream Firm buys upstream product at p U +t e e U submits receipts to tax authority for reimbursement of b it i t t t th it f i b t f t e e U gets IS O-14067 certified calculates in house footprint e calculates in-house footprint e D submits sum of footprints e D +e U to taxation authority Consumer pays p D +t e [e D +e U ]
Upstream Firm p gets IS O-14067 certified Fixed cost per product line calculates own footprint e U submits footprint e U to taxation authority submits footprint e U to taxation authority Downstream Firm buys upstream product at p U +t e e U submits receipts to tax authority for reimbursement of b it i t t t th it f i b t f t e e U gets IS O-14067 certified calculates in house footprint e calculates in-house footprint e D submits sum of footprints e D +e U to taxation authority Consumer pays p D +t e [e D +e U ]
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