COMMUNITIES AS VICTIMS AND SURVIVORS OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES KERRY - PDF document

COMMUNITIES AS VICTIMS AND SURVIVORS OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES KERRY BRINKERT DIRECTOR ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT UNIT PRESENTATION TO THE COLLOQUIUM: THE OTTAWA CONVENTION – THE FIRST STEP TOWARDS HUMANITARIAN DISARMAMENT BRUSSELS, 28 MARCH 2013 I would like to thank the Royal Higher Institute for Defence for inviting me to participate in this colloquium and to congratulate the Institute and its partners for staging this important event. It has now been sixteen years sinc e Belgium’s government, its parliamentarians and its civil society organizations – perhaps most prominently, Handicap International – played such a central in realizing a Convention banning anti-personnel mines – the Ottawa Convention. The world owes a debt of gratitude to Belgium for that original effort, for is ongoing persistence in ensuring that the Convention makes a difference on the ground, and in keeping the spirit of the Ottawa Convention alive, including by organizing events like this one. The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention was ground-breaking in becoming the first multilateral arms control or arms control treaty to incorporate provisions that obliged States to act to address the needs of those who had fallen victim to weapons covered by the treaty. The States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention broke ground again by defining “mine victim” broadly. In fact , following entry into force in 1999 “one of the early steps taken by the States Parties (…) was to clarify terms that are central to fulfilment of the aim of providing assistance to landmine victims, particularly the terms victim and victim assistance. ” As a result, by the time of the Convention’s First Review Conference – the Nairobi Summit on a Mine- Free World – in 2004, it was “ generally accepted that victims include those who either individually or collectively have suffered physical or psychological injury, economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental rights through acts or omissions related to mine utilization. ” The States Parties noted at the time that “a broad approach to what is considered a landmine victim has served a purpose in drawing attention to the full breadth of victimisation caused by landmines and unexploded ordnance. ” The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention became the model for how victim assistance is now treated in the United Nations’ Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, or CCW. As concerns the breadth of what is consider a victim, the Plan of Action on Victim Assistance , which was adopted in 2008 by the High Contracting Parties to Protocol V of the CCW, explicitly acknowledges that “explosive remnants of war may not only affect the persons directly impacted by them, but also have broader social and economic consequences.” In addition, the evolution of understanding on victim assistance that resulted from almost a decade to implement the Convention was ultimately embraced during the 2008 negotiations on the Convention on Cluster Munitions, or CCM. On the particular matter of how the States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention have accepted a broad approach to what is considered a “landmine victim,” the legal text of the CCM defines “cluster munition victim” as including “those persons directly impacted by cluster munitions as well as their affected families and communities.” The full body of international law that concerns itself with addressing the suffering caused by mines and other explosive remnants of war now is coherent with respect to an approach to victim 1

assistance, including through common acceptance and full understanding and appreciation for both individual and collective suffering. Credit for getting to this point goes to those non-governmental activists, with colleagues from Handicap International at the forefront, who first issued a call to action to address both the full breadth of suffering, and to those States such as Belgium that heeded the call. Even though we are well into the second decade of the implementation of the Convention, we know full well from the information provided by mine-affected States themselves that communities continue to suffer the adverse impacts of mines and other explosive remnants of war. We know this in large part as a result of the realism possessed by the Convention’s negotiato rs who in 1997 understood that mine-affected States may need more than ten years to clear all mined areas, that if they did, they would be required to ask for more time do so, and that in requesting more time, they would be required to spell out the social and economic consequences. While it may be unfortunate that so many States Parties have been unable to clear all mined areas in a ten-year period, we have benefitted from the wealth of information they have provided in their extension requests concerning the ongoing social and economic consequences of mine contamination. For example, in its 2010 request, Cambodia recorded that a 2005 needs assessment suggested that presence of landmines was a key cause of poverty rural, mine affected areas, especially in communities bordering Thailand. Cambodia’s request went on to speak how mine contamination can lead to “ a spiral of e conomic and social implications,” in that the lack of opportunities leads to community members engaging in risk-taking behaviour, such as farming or foraging for food in suspected hazardous areas or scavenging for scrap metal derived from explosive remnants of war for sale. Cambodia’s extension request went on to note that risk taking behaviour may lead to “ perpetual poverty ,” for example, with the costs related to medical care forcing families into debt, which in turn can lead to landlessness. In addition, Cambodia suggested that the spiral of economic and social implications may have generational consequences, with the request recording that a survey of mine survivors in a the most mine-affected provinces of Cambodia indicated that 46 percent of the children of survivors were not attending school, presumably because, in the words of Cambodia itself, “f or the child of a mine casualty, the impact on the economic situation of the family often results in children losing the opportunity to gain an education, and forcing a child to look for employment to support the family. ” The economic consequences of mines to communities and societies have been well documented by other States Parties in their requests to extend their mine clearance deadlines. Croatia, for instance, in 2008 reported that “ mined agricultural areas and forest areas represent the biggest problem for the economy” wit h the total loss because of mined agricultural areas estimated at € 44.0 million and the value of wood wealth that could not be used because of mines valued at € 178.0 million. Croatia also noted that there was another economic cost in terms of its inability to maintain and renew forests. Another case highlighting the societal impact and economic costs of mines and other explosive remnants of war is Afghanistan, which, in its extension request submitted in 2012, stated that most, that is, 83 percent, of the remaining contamination was obstructing agricultural areas, including grazing land. Afghanistan went on to state that “t his can be considered a major blockage in a country where approximately seventy percent of the labour force is involved in agriculture-related activities. ” Afghanistan, in its mine clearance extension request, also recalled how the presence or suspected presence of mines affects the development of the Afghan nation. Afghanistan’s request recorded 43 “ major infrastructure, economic development and archaeological projects that (were) planned to be 2