Introduction Introduction Communal Entrances Communal Entrances Building Regs AD Building Regs AD Part Q – Unauthorised Access Part Q – Unauthorised Access
Secured by Design Company Profile • Formed in June 2011 Official Police Security Initiative • Team have vast experience in chosen field – incl Blast and Ballistic Protection • SBD critical to our growth • Leading UK Company -1 st’s • Website – www.neosprotect.com
Presentation Objectives • 1) To get a consistent interpretation of the SBD Standards to be used Nationally by ALL DOCO’s, ALO’s, CPO’s etc. At present some regions accept one standard and other regions have a different approach – confusing for all. • 2) To stress the importance of long term reliability and to apply the most appropriate performance Standard for high usage doors. • CONSISTENT approach • APPROPRIATE application • = LONG TERM SECURITY ASSURED
Communal Entrances / Common Doors Communal Entrances / Common Doors Communal Doors are not “just doors” . As our first focal point of contact with a building, they are integral to its architecture and appearance. They are a building's first protection against the outside world plus the first impression of the community spirit within – a damaged entrance can detract from the intended community spirit designers aimed to build. A communal door must be seen as - and be - a key point in the security and aesthetics of a building – however the many uses of these doors set them apart from “JUST DOORS”
The following is an extract from AD Part Q This shows the main references covering security doors – very brief and nondescript . It however clearly shows that PAS24 standard is referring to doors with letterplates, door veiwers etc – ie doors into the house or apartment
Extract from AD Part Q
SBD Involvement This is the important insertion that SBD managed to get included within the document. It advises that there are better tter (or more e appropr ropriate iate) standards that should be considered. SBD can advise further
Why PAS 24 as Headline Standard ? Building Regs due to legal reasons can only include National Standards (BS/EN) within their documents as a cross reference to performance standards. • However there is no BS/EN standard covering doorsets and PAS standards occupy an intellectual space between National and Test house standa rds .
Wikipedia • A Publicly Available Specification or PAS is a standardization document that closely resembles a formal standard in structure and format but which has a different development model • The objective of a Publicly Available Specification is to speed up standardization. PASs are often produced in response to an urgent market need
Why were further standards added ? • PAS24 unfortunately is a limited Standard which had been used extensively covering ALL types of doorsets and in many instances is not appropriate – use, risk, opportunity etc. • However SBD were consulted during the writing of the document and they were able to have further Test House Standards to be also referenced - STS202 BR2 and LPS1175 SR2 - though unable to be elaborated upon to fully explain their significance. • Critically “ Further advice is available in Secured by Design “ Homes 2014 ” was also inserted and this should guide Specifiers to you to help them through the appropriate
STS202 BR2 or LPS1175 SR2 • STS202 • LPS1175 BR2 is a SR2 is a Test House Test House Standard Standard where the where the physical physical attack attack tests are tests are carried out carried out at EXOVA at BRE Ltd (UK) Ltd (LPCB)
Aide Memoir to Standards Gene neral ral rule of thumb mb PAS 24 4 = = Private vate and Sing ngle le Doors rs ST STS202 02 = = Severa eral l Tenants nants or LPS 1175 5 = = Lots ts of People ple (
“HOMES 2016” DESIGN GUIDE Communal Doorsets with a separate control panel (not a key) Section 2A Clause 27.2.2 and 27.3 Photograph courtesy of NEOS Protect Ltd
HOMES 2016 Design Guide This clearly rly deals ls with h the high gh usage ge issue e that t these e doors sustain in and nd the ne need d to sp specify cify a hi a high gher er perfor formance mance to withs hstand tand the robust st usage ge and nd offer er a long ng term m solution tion over r the expected ected li life fespan span of f these se doors s = 20 = 20ye years ars plu lus
DOCO’s Discretion There may be instances – rural areas, tenancy, low crime neighbour-hood etc – that a more sympathetic approach may be applied and reduced security levels / designs are applied. However it is important to remember that security levels are constantly increased due to migration, changing economics etc and it may be prudent to plan ahead
INVITATION TO TENDER COMMUNAL ENTRANCE DOORSETS AND ASSOCIATED PRODUCTS – CED1 • A National tender has been issued by LHC following consultation with SBD and it is important that any regional queries reflect the guidance contained within the Tender Doc • > 4 dwellings PAS 24 Main Entrances allowable • 4 dwellings > STS202 BR2/ LPS1175 SR2 • Internal compartmental doors PAS24*
Internal Compartment Doors • The general guidelines indicate, as these are 2 nd line defence, a lower security specification of PAS24 is allowable. • NEOS disagree on this – these doors will also be subject to high footfall, aggressive usage etc and as before if the “compartment” contains more than 4 flats it should be as the main entrance. • Lower security can be achieved by using P1A laminated glazing not STS tested double glazing. • It is the assurance that these doors will not fail or breakdown in a relatively short period of time that we feel is critical.
Other External /Internal Common Doors • There are many associated external or internal common doors that also require consideration against robust use, high risk (theft or arson), or alternative routes into the building core. • Access controlled to allow monitoring of who, and when. • Fob entry reduces key replacement costs, change of locks etc – fob simply deleted from system
Internal Lobby Doors • If the mail delivery is located with a foyer area the internal Lobby Door should be the same construction as the Outer Door – STS202 BR2 or LPS1175 SR2
Louvre Design Doorsets Louvre Panels are very weak (not really designed • Louvred Doorsets for doors) however they protecting high value may house expensive bicycle sheds – louvre bicycles / equipment and blades very weak, easily a target for theft. • Refuse Stores – risk of arson • Louvred. PAS24 tested doors would not truly test the robustness of the louvre blade inserts .
Refuse Stores • Refuse Store doors are another optional route into the building cores – tenants access from inside the building. • Risk of arson
UG Car Park Doors • Alternative entry point into building cores. • Car theft from sheltered car parks • Fire Resistant performance from car fire
Internal Compartmental Doors • High usage – robust construction • Fire Performance – fire containment • 2 nd Line of Defence – P1A glazing in lieu of STS202 BR2 Glazing
Door Construction • It is important that due consideration is made when procuring high usage Doorsets. The new SBD Standards will ensure that a true “fit for purpose” product is installed and will eliminate the risk of obtaining a lower cost product which is claimed to be suitable, only to find, that in practice, this is not the case • If End Clients, Designers and Developers apply these Performance Specifications they will be assured of meeting all their responsibilities to provide a safe and secure environment for the tenants who will be inhabiting their Housing Schemes. • All door components have been carefully selected to ensure that the needs of all stakeholders are fully catered for and the doors will perform reliably for many years to come .
Manufacturers problems
NEOS Listing on SBD Website We are re ke keen en to show the ful ull ra range e and opt ptions ons that we can pr provid ide e – the po potential ntial varia riation ion of door r designs igns howeve ever r are re never ver ending ing
Common sense approach • We have completed 10No tests at between £10k - £20k per test and yet we are still unable to meet every project design requirement. • No sooner had we tested a 3m high doorset the very next enquiry asked for a 3.5m high doorset. • The 3m high door was secured on mechanical locks to add to our portfolio but is not permissible with maglocks !!!
Why Maglocks ?? Instant release – user friendly Fast, Efficient - No Moving parts – Reliable – Fail safe – (emergency escape) 750kg holding force per maglock NEOS unique attention to detail based upon experiences:- armature plate
Mechanical Locks • Moving parts – so not instant release = damage occurs by people pulling door when lock snib has not fully retracted • Electric locks require armoured loops for cables at hinge side which can get jammed or easily vandalised • Electric strikes are often visible externally and easily overcome • Locks and keeps can be easily tampered with.
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