Commitment to comply: what kind of an intention? Giovanni Sartor CIRSFID - Faculty of law, University of Bologna EUI - European University Institute of Florence July 14, 2012 Giovanni Sartor G. Sartor (CIRSFID-EUI) Compliance 1 / 26
Purpose of the presentation introduce the notion of a normative systems introduce the idea of compliance with it discuss motivations to comply and intentions to comply Giovanni Sartor G. Sartor (CIRSFID-EUI) Compliance 2 / 26
Actions Actions and omissions ( E logic) E j S means “ j brings it about that S ”. ¬ E j S means “ j omits to bring about that S ”. For instance E John Damaged ( Tom ) ¬ E John Damaged ( Tom ) Giovanni Sartor G. Sartor (CIRSFID-EUI) Compliance 3 / 26
Obligations and prohibitions OE j S means “it is obligatory that j brings it about that S ”. O ¬ E j S means “it is obligatory that j does not bring about that S ", or “it is forbidden that j brings about that S ”. For instance OE John Compensated ( Tom ) O ¬ E John Damaged ( Tom ) Giovanni Sartor G. Sartor (CIRSFID-EUI) Compliance 4 / 26
Norms n I represent norms as conditionals, where = ⇒ allows for defeasible modus ponens (no need to go into logical details). For instance: E x Injured ( y ) n = ⇒ E x Damaged ( y ) E x Damaged ( y ) n = ⇒ OE x Compensated ( y ) } Giovanni Sartor G. Sartor (CIRSFID-EUI) Compliance 5 / 26
A normative systems, factual circumstances and their entailments Circumstances C 1 = { E John Injured ( Tom ) } Normative system { [ E x Injured ( y ) n N 1 = = ⇒ E x Damaged ( y )]; [ O ¬ E x Damaged ( y )]; [ E x Damaged ( y ) n ⇒ OE x Compensated ( y )] } = Normative entailments ( C 1 ∪ N 1 ) | ∼ E John Damaged ( Tom ) ( C 1 ∪ N 1 ) | ∼ OE John Compensated ( Tom ) Norms constitute normative outcomes, a normative system links circumstances to normative outcomes Giovanni Sartor G. Sartor (CIRSFID-EUI) Compliance 6 / 26
Relativised obligation Definition A normative system N entails a consequence φ in circumstances C if N ∪ C entails φ but C does not: ∼ n φ def N ∪ C | = N ∪ C | ∼ φ and C | �∼ φ Giovanni Sartor G. Sartor (CIRSFID-EUI) Compliance 7 / 26
Relativised obligation A relativised obligation sentence does not express a norm, but it expresses an assertion about the implications of norms (normative systems) and circumstances. Definition (Relativised sentences and obligations) We say that any sentence φ holds relatively to normative system N and circumstances C , and write [ φ ] N , C iff N ∪ C | ∼ n B def [ B ] N , C = N ∪ C | ∼ n B In particular when the sentence B is an obligation sentence O A x , we say that it is obligatory relatively to N in C that x does A , and write O N , C A x (rather than [ O A x ] N , C ), to express that N ∪ C | ∼ n O A x : def O N , C A x = N ∪ C | ∼ n O A x Giovanni Sartor G. Sartor (CIRSFID-EUI) Compliance 8 / 26
An example Example C 1 = { E John Injured ( Tom ) } { E x Injured ( y ) n N 1 = = ⇒ E x Damaged ( y ) O ¬ E x Damaged ( y ) E x Damaged ( y ) n ⇒ OE x Compensated ( y ) } = The following inferences holds on the basis of the example: ( C 1 ∪ N 1 ) | ∼ E John Damaged ( Tom ) ( C 1 ∪ N 1 ) | ∼ OE John Compensated ( Tom ) Therefore, we can say that: O N 1 , C 1 ¬ E John Damaged ( Tom ); O N 1 , C 1 E John Compensated ( Tom ) We can express the idea that different obligations hold relatively to Giovanni Sartor different normative systems. G. Sartor (CIRSFID-EUI) Compliance 9 / 26
An abbreviation Let us write O N 1 A j to mean that it is is obligatory, according to N 1 that j does A in the current circumstances Φ def O N 1 A j = O N 1 , Φ A j ∧ Φ where Φ either is a complete description of the current state of affairs, or at least includes all relevant circumstances, i.e., those circumstance supporting arguments for O A j , plus circumstances supporting defeaters of such arguments. For instance we may say O N 1 E John Compensated ( Tom ) iff O N 1 , E John Damaged ( Tom ) E John Compensated ( Tom ) ∧ E John Damaged ( Tom ) Giovanni Sartor G. Sartor (CIRSFID-EUI) Compliance 10 / 26
An alternative characterisation It is obligatory in possible world w i that j does A def w i � O N 1 A j = N 1 ∪ Φ | ∼ n A j and w i � Φ It is currently obligatory that j does A def w 0 � O N 1 A j = N 1 ∪ Φ | ∼ n A j and w 0 � Φ where w o is the present world. NB: if | ∼ n is nonmonotonic def w i � O N 1 A j = N 1 ∪ Φ | ∼ n A j and w i � Φ and there is no Φ 1 such that Φ ⊂ Φ 1 and N 1 ∪ Φ 1 | �∼ n A j Giovanni Sartor G. Sartor (CIRSFID-EUI) Compliance 11 / 26
Compliance Mary is appointed to a professorship. She signs a contract stating her commitment to comply with the University regulations. John enters a PhD program. He is directed to the booklet containing the regulations he has to comply with. Linda is appointed as a judge. She takes an oath to respect the Constitution and the laws of her country. Adolf Eichman enters the SS. He takes an oath of obedience to death to Adolph Hitler and the superiors he has designated. Antony enters the Franciscan order. He promises to respect “The Rule of St. Francis” as well as the law of the Catholic Church. Mary, a shop-owner, receives a threats by gangsters belonging to a mafia organisation. She chooses to comply with all rules imposed by that organisation (monthly protection money, code of silence, etc.) to avoid problems with the bad guys. A digital agent enters and electronic marketplace. It commits to respect all rules of the marketplace. Giovanni Sartor G. Sartor (CIRSFID-EUI) Compliance 12 / 26
Policy-based intention to comply Definition (Policy-based intention to comply) An agent j ’s commitment to comply with normative system N can be understood as the agent’s j conditioned intention to do any action A j that is obligatory according to N in a possible factual situation Φ , whenever Φ is actualised (is the case): Int j ( A j | ( O N 1 , Φ A j ∧ Φ)) Int j ( � ( A j | Ob N 1 A j )) Note that in the schema N 1 is a constant (denoting the particular normative system the agent intended to comply with), j is a constant (denoting a particular individual) while A is a variable over possible actions, and Φ is a variable over possible states of affairs (conjunctions of formulas describing factual situations), � is over possible factual worlds. Giovanni Sartor G. Sartor (CIRSFID-EUI) Compliance 13 / 26
Inference of intention to comply Premise 1 : John has the obligation to compensate Tom according to normative systems N 1 in factual situation C 1 = E Tom damagedJohn , which is the case: O N 1 , C 1 ( ¬ E John Compensated ( Tom )) ∧ C 1 Premise 2 : John has the intention comply with N 1 Int j ( � ( A j | Ob N 1 A j )) Conclusion : Int Tom ( E John compensated ( Tom ))) Giovanni Sartor G. Sartor (CIRSFID-EUI) Compliance 14 / 26
Intention not to comply Indifferent agent: � ( ¬ Int j ( A j | O N 1 A j )) Diabolic agent: Int j � ( A j | O N 1 A j ) Giovanni Sartor G. Sartor (CIRSFID-EUI) Compliance 15 / 26
Motivation for adopting the intention to comply Consequential self-interest altruism common good Deontological reciprocity sense of duty, etc. Is it a collective intention? Giovanni Sartor G. Sartor (CIRSFID-EUI) Compliance 16 / 26
Consequentialist chooser Definition (Consequentialist chooser) A consequentialist chooser x will intend to do an action A x whenever x believes that the expected utility of (the consequences of) doing that action is superior to the utility of not doing it: Bel x ( u x ( A x ) > u x ( A x )) → Int x A x From the internal perspective, a consequentialist chooser will adopt the policy Int x ( A x | ( u x ( A x ) > u x ( A x )) Giovanni Sartor G. Sartor (CIRSFID-EUI) Compliance 17 / 26
Utility What is utility (Sen 2007) self-centered welfare (x only cares about his consumption, indifferent to others) self-welfare goal (x’s only aim is to satisfy his welfare, which may depend on the other people’s welfare though sympathy) self-goal choice (x’s acts in order to satisfy his goals, which may be altruistic, communitarian, etc.) commitment (x’s choice of goals is governed by x’s commitments, meta-level goals or constraints on goals) Giovanni Sartor G. Sartor (CIRSFID-EUI) Compliance 18 / 26
A simplified framework Distinguish the behaviour’s impact on the agent’s welfare, from the utility given all the relevant impacts that behaviour has in the goals that matter to him, there included the values the person has adopted. w i ( A j ) denotes the welfare of agent i produced by action A i w e i ( A j ) denotes the self-centred welfare of agent i w s i ( A j ) denotes the sympathetic welfare of agent i u i ( A i ) denotes the utility that agent i attributes to its action A i Giovanni Sartor G. Sartor (CIRSFID-EUI) Compliance 19 / 26
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