Climate, Food Security and Conflicts in Africa Jean-François Maystadt Lancaster University Management School 10 February 2015 Conference ““Food insecurity: what role in African conflicts?” Center for Security and Defense Studies, Royal Higher Institute for Defense Email: j.maystadt@lancaster.ac.uk Twitter: @jfmaystadt
Global Hunger Index, IFPRI, 2014
Conflicts in 2012
Correlation is not causation
Food insecurity is certainly a consequence of conflict The economic and social costs of conflict are high More than 1.5 billion people live in fragile and conflict- affected countries and many of them are poor/food insecure (World Bank 2011) For each year of conflict, economic growth may fall by 2.3 percent and that it may take a total of 17 years before the country catches up with its preconflict position (Collier, 2007) Conflict has a severe impacts on human health, education, and nutrition (Chamarbagwala and Moran, 2011; Akresh and de Walque, 2008; Shemyakina, 2011; Dagnelie et al. 2014) But could food security also be a determinant of conflict?
Under the increasing threat of climate change
Outline of the talk Food Climate Conflict Security 1. How is climate likely to affect food security in Africa? 2. Is food security likely to affect conflicts in Africa? 3. The rise of climate-induced conflicts: Food security as a channel? 4. What can be done to beak the conflict trap?
1. How is climate likely to affect food security in Africa? Food Climate Security
A note on food security Food Security is a situation that exists when all people at all times have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life (FAO 2001) 3 components: availability, accessibility, and utilization – Availability : a measure of food that is, and will be, physically available in the relevant vicinity of a population during a given period – Accessibility : a measure of the population’s ability to acquire available food during a given period; – Utilization : a measure of whether a population will be able to derive sufficient nutrition during a given period. Stability: Vulnerability ( the likelihood of experiencing future loss of welfare, generally weighted by the magnitude of expected welfare loss ) and resilience (ability to recover from such a welfare loss)
Climate change threatens food availability and accessibility, through decreased crop yields Negative effect of 22% (maize), 17-18% (sorghum, millet, groundnuts), and 8% (Cassava) by 2050 in SSA (Lobell et al., 2011) and extended by others (Blanc 2012; Roudier et al., 2011; Berg et al., 2013, …). Negative effect on economic growth in SSA (Barrios et al. 2010, REStat) Particularly among poor countries (Dell et al. 2012, 2014, JEL) Source: Burke and Lobell (2010), chap. 2
Climate change threatens food accessibility , through the effect on food prices 300 Food Price Index Dairy Price Index Booming demand 250 Cereals Price Index 200 (population growth, 150 income, diet change, 100 biofuels) 50 Limited supply 0 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (slowdown in agricultural productivity due to lack of investment) Food prices are expected to increase. Source: FAO & IFPRI
Increased food prices: Is it a bad news? Source: Burke and Lobell, 2010, chap. 2
In particular since adaptation has been (so far) limited … and even more among the poor Source: Burke and Lobell, 2010, chap. 8. Trade is also key. On migration, see e.g. Marchiori, Maystadt, and Schumacher (2012, JEEM)
2. Is food security likely to affect conflicts in Africa? Income & price effects Food Conflict Security
A note on the economics of conflict Likelihood of conflict • Opportunity cost to participate to violence depends on alternative income, the potential loss and rewards (poverty, youth, etc.) • Looting/rapacity effect Fighting is costly (illegal trade, rents, diasporas support) The bigger the price at stake, the higher the potential loot (natural resources, etc) • Coordination costs & Motivation (ethnicity, inequality, etc) • State capacity & Polity : Government support (“hearts and minds”), lack of political voice
Income channel: the usual suspect Source: Blattman and Miguel (2010, JEL)
Income channel Methodological channel: Simultaneity • Exogeneous shocks (rainfall shocks, commodity price shocks) in FE2SLS used to assess how economic shocks affect the likelihood of conflict in SSA • Miguel et al. (2004, JPE): 1979-1999, a 5% decrease in income growth increases conflict by 12.5% (mean at 27) • Bruckner and Ciccone (2010, EJ): 1981-2006, a 5% decrease in income growth increases conflict by 10% • Debate on these papers but main conclusion remains that poverty is the most robust predictor of conflict
Price channel? Source: Lagi, Bertrand and Bar-Yam (2011)
Price-induced food insecurity is a cause of conflict Particularly in food import dependent countries with a large share of net food consumers, such as the Arab world, are highly vulnerable Arab countries between 1960 and 2010: Arab league, incl. North Sudan, Somalia 2SLS-FE model points to the vulnerability of food net importers to changes in food international prices for food insecurity and in turn, to the risk of conflict A price-induced increase by one standard deviation of the child stunting, the mortality rate, and the macroeconomic food insecurity index increase the risk of conflict by 10.19%, 11.02%, and 0.04% points. Food prices and the subsequent deterioration on food insecurity are a driver of conflict in the Arab world (Maystadt et al. 2012) Source: Maystadt, J.-F., J.-F. Trinh Tan and C. Breisinger. 2014. Does Food Security Matter for Transition in Arab Countries. Food Policy 46: 106-115.
Higher food prices is a cause of social unrest Similar study for SSA? But an established link with food riots Using monthly data between 1990 and 2011. OLS and 2SLS (using natural disasters) Food prices (not volatility) increase social unrest Source: Bellemare, M. 2014. Rising Food prices, price Volatility, and Social Unrest. Am. J. Agr. Economics 97(1): 1-21
3. The rise of climate-induced conflicts: Food security as a channel? Weather shocks ≠ climate change Food Climate Conflict Security
Growing evidence that weather shocks fuel conflicts • Burke et al. (2009, PNAS) : A 1 % increase in temperature (not rainfall) leads to 4.5 % increase in civil war. Using IPCC predictions, 54% increase in armed conflict incidence by 2030. • Globally, intergroup conflicts (such as civil war) rose by 13.6 percent with each one standard deviation change in climate toward higher temperatures or more extreme rainfall (Hsiang et al. 2013, Science) • Contested by H. Buhaug et al.
Weather shocks and conflict But reduced-formed nature of analysis means that – No clear channel – No context-specific recommendations for national policy and development support on conflict prevention Focus on within-country variations allows to look at one particular channel (e.g. livestock markets) : – Maystadt and Ecker. 2014. Extreme Weather and Civil War: Does Drought Fuel Conflict in Somalia through Livestock Price Shocks? American Journal of Agricultural Economics 96(4): 1157-1182. – Maystadt, Calderone and You (2013) Local Warming and Violent Conflict in North and South Sudan. Journal of Economic Geography
Food insecurity and conflict in Somalia Vicious cycle of violence? Estimated food security conditions, 9/2011 Violence in Somalia, 1997-2009 Source: DFID(2012). Source: Maystadt and Ecker (2014), based on ACLED (2012).
What is the role of droughts for conflict? Vicious cycle in Somalia Source: Maystadt and Ecker (2014) Extreme Weather and Civil War: Does Drought Fuel Conflict in Somalia through Livestock Price Shocks? American Journal of Agricultural Economics 96(4): 1157-1182
Drought and Violence in Somalia Quotes from practitioners “with the frequency of droughts increasing over the last decade, it’s become increasingly difficult for people to recover from one shock before one strikes. Such shocks drive conflict over land and water, disrupt economic activity and leave young people vulnerable to unemployment and recruitment into extremist groups, like Al-Shabaab ”, Paul Weisenfeld (USAID) “This [the drought] has been a boon for Al - Shabab’s recruitment campaign because when you don’t have purchasing power to buy the food, you will be encouraged to be recruited because then you will be saved, and you can use that salary or you could be given food”, Bruno Geddo (UNHCR Somalia Representative)
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