Chinese government (Picture credit: Reuters.) is under attack from terrorists in Hong Kong. How to manipulate standards Daniel J. Bernstein University of Illinois at Chicago & Technische Universiteit Eindhoven
Chinese government (Picture credit: Reuters.) is under attack from terrorists in Hong Kong. How to manipulate standards Goal of this talk: Daniel J. Bernstein Help the government University of Illinois at Chicago & decrypt the terrorists’ Technische Universiteit Eindhoven encrypted communications.
Intercept (Also exploit How does relate to Chinese government (Picture credit: Reuters.) is under attack from terrorists in Hong Kong. to manipulate standards Goal of this talk: J. Bernstein Help the government University of Illinois at Chicago & decrypt the terrorists’ echnische Universiteit Eindhoven encrypted communications.
Intercept the ciphertext. (Also exploit metadata How does the ciphertext relate to the plaintext? Chinese government Reuters.) is under attack from terrorists in Hong Kong. manipulate standards Goal of this talk: Bernstein Help the government Illinois at Chicago & decrypt the terrorists’ Universiteit Eindhoven encrypted communications.
Intercept the ciphertext. (Also exploit metadata etc.) How does the ciphertext relate to the plaintext? Chinese government is under attack from terrorists in Hong Kong. rds Goal of this talk: Help the government Chicago & decrypt the terrorists’ Eindhoven encrypted communications.
Intercept the ciphertext. (Also exploit metadata etc.) How does the ciphertext relate to the plaintext? Chinese government is under attack from terrorists in Hong Kong. Goal of this talk: Help the government decrypt the terrorists’ encrypted communications.
Intercept the ciphertext. (Also exploit metadata etc.) How does the ciphertext relate to the plaintext? Maybe 56-bit DES. Feasible to search all 2 56 possible keys, check plaintext plausibility. Chinese government is under attack from terrorists in Hong Kong. Goal of this talk: Help the government decrypt the terrorists’ encrypted communications.
Intercept the ciphertext. (Also exploit metadata etc.) How does the ciphertext relate to the plaintext? Maybe 56-bit DES. Feasible to search all 2 56 possible keys, check plaintext plausibility. Chinese government is under attack from Maybe 128-bit AES. terrorists in Hong Kong. Feasible search is unlikely to find this target’s key. Goal of this talk: (But can improve probability Help the government by batching many targets.) decrypt the terrorists’ encrypted communications.
Intercept the ciphertext. Are there (Also exploit metadata etc.) to find plain given AES How does the ciphertext relate to the plaintext? Extensively in public Maybe 56-bit DES. Doesn’t Feasible to search all 2 56 possible keys, check plaintext plausibility. Chinese government under attack from Maybe 128-bit AES. rists in Hong Kong. Feasible search is unlikely to find this target’s key. of this talk: (But can improve probability the government by batching many targets.) decrypt the terrorists’ encrypted communications.
Intercept the ciphertext. Are there better w (Also exploit metadata etc.) to find plaintext given AES ciphertext? How does the ciphertext relate to the plaintext? Extensively studied in public literature. Maybe 56-bit DES. Doesn’t look good Feasible to search all 2 56 possible keys, check plaintext plausibility. government from Maybe 128-bit AES. Hong Kong. Feasible search is unlikely to find this target’s key. talk: (But can improve probability government by batching many targets.) rists’ unications.
Intercept the ciphertext. Are there better ways (Also exploit metadata etc.) to find plaintext given AES ciphertext? How does the ciphertext relate to the plaintext? Extensively studied in public literature. Maybe 56-bit DES. Doesn’t look good for us. Feasible to search all 2 56 possible keys, check plaintext plausibility. Maybe 128-bit AES. Feasible search is unlikely to find this target’s key. (But can improve probability by batching many targets.) nications.
Intercept the ciphertext. Are there better ways (Also exploit metadata etc.) to find plaintext given AES ciphertext? How does the ciphertext relate to the plaintext? Extensively studied in public literature. Maybe 56-bit DES. Doesn’t look good for us. Feasible to search all 2 56 possible keys, check plaintext plausibility. Maybe 128-bit AES. Feasible search is unlikely to find this target’s key. (But can improve probability by batching many targets.)
Intercept the ciphertext. Are there better ways (Also exploit metadata etc.) to find plaintext given AES ciphertext? How does the ciphertext relate to the plaintext? Extensively studied in public literature. Maybe 56-bit DES. Doesn’t look good for us. Feasible to search all 2 56 possible keys, Maybe we’re smarter and check plaintext plausibility. can find something better than what’s in the literature. Maybe 128-bit AES. Feasible search is unlikely to find this target’s key. (But can improve probability by batching many targets.)
Intercept the ciphertext. Are there better ways (Also exploit metadata etc.) to find plaintext given AES ciphertext? How does the ciphertext relate to the plaintext? Extensively studied in public literature. Maybe 56-bit DES. Doesn’t look good for us. Feasible to search all 2 56 possible keys, Maybe we’re smarter and check plaintext plausibility. can find something better than what’s in the literature. Maybe 128-bit AES. Feasible search is unlikely Maybe there are other to find this target’s key. parts of the system (But can improve probability that have been less studied, by batching many targets.) are easier for us to break.
Intercept the ciphertext. Are there better ways Standard exploit metadata etc.) to find plaintext terrorists given AES ciphertext? we see cipher does the ciphertext to the plaintext? Extensively studied Maybe terro in public literature. compute 56-bit DES. Doesn’t look good for us. Unintentionally: easible to search With our possible keys, Maybe we’re smarter and plaintext plausibility. can find something better than what’s in the literature. 128-bit AES. easible search is unlikely Maybe there are other this target’s key. parts of the system can improve probability that have been less studied, tching many targets.) are easier for us to break.
ciphertext. Are there better ways Standard security mo metadata etc.) to find plaintext terrorists compute given AES ciphertext? we see cipher output. ciphertext plaintext? Extensively studied Maybe terrorists o in public literature. compute somethin DES. Doesn’t look good for us. Unintentionally: “bugs”. rch With our help: “faults”. eys, Maybe we’re smarter and plausibility. can find something better than what’s in the literature. AES. is unlikely Maybe there are other rget’s key. parts of the system rove probability that have been less studied, many targets.) are easier for us to break.
Are there better ways Standard security model says: etc.) to find plaintext terrorists compute cipher; given AES ciphertext? we see cipher output. Extensively studied Maybe terrorists occasionally in public literature. compute something different. Doesn’t look good for us. Unintentionally: “bugs”. With our help: “faults”. Maybe we’re smarter and . can find something better than what’s in the literature. Maybe there are other parts of the system robability that have been less studied, rgets.) are easier for us to break.
Are there better ways Standard security model says: to find plaintext terrorists compute cipher; given AES ciphertext? we see cipher output. Extensively studied Maybe terrorists occasionally in public literature. compute something different. Doesn’t look good for us. Unintentionally: “bugs”. With our help: “faults”. Maybe we’re smarter and can find something better than what’s in the literature. Maybe there are other parts of the system that have been less studied, are easier for us to break.
Are there better ways Standard security model says: to find plaintext terrorists compute cipher; given AES ciphertext? we see cipher output. Extensively studied Maybe terrorists occasionally in public literature. compute something different. Doesn’t look good for us. Unintentionally: “bugs”. With our help: “faults”. Maybe we’re smarter and can find something better Maybe we actually see than what’s in the literature. more than cipher output. “Side channels”: e.g., Maybe there are other plaintext or key is visible parts of the system through power consumption that have been less studied, or electromagnetic radiation. are easier for us to break.
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