Abstract of Thesis Governing the Misgoverned: Understanding the Failure of Governance Instruments to Address Groundwater Extraction in Maharashtra Eshwer Kale, PhD Guide: Prof. Subodh Wagle The groundwater, rightly described as India’s current water lifeline, is under serious threat of over-exploitation and depletion (Thakkar 2012). Various national and state level policy instruments (laws, acts, bills, and policies) proposed and implemented in the last four decades to address the issue have failed to deliver. In the state of Maharashtra, the number of “ overexploited ” and “ critical ” “ groundwater blocks ” has increased fast during the last decade (GSDA 2014), despite enactment of two laws since 1993. This indicates that there are major lacunae in the design of the governance and policy instruments and/or in their implementation by governing agencies. In the background of this policy-failure, this study analyses the following three existing and proposed policy instruments (PIs) aimed at reducing groundwater extraction: (a) Maharashtra Groundwater [Regulation for Drinking Water Purposes] Act 1993 (MGDWA 1993), (b) Maharashtra Groundwater [Development and Management] Act 2009 (MGDWA 2009), (c) National Model Bill for The Conservation, Protection and Regulation of Groundwater 2011 (NBCPR 2011). This study carries significant relevance, in view of the critical importance and urgency of effective implementation of the recently deployed MGDWA 2009, especially in the background of the serious failure of earlier law, MGDWA 1993. The study follows the case study design with the mix method approach. The Governance Dynamics Framework (GDF) developed by Prof. Subodh Wagle serves as the overarching analytical tool for this study. The GDF proposes that the policy problems are rooted in the ‘problematic’ behaviours of some actors, which are in contradiction with the relevant policy goals. This problematic behaviour is seen by GDF as emanating from certain factors acting on the actor (from within or without), which are called as Preparedness Determinants (PDs) of the actor. These problematic behaviours are to be remedied by the Core Policy Remedies (CPRs) articulated in the policy instruments (PIs) (i.e. laws and rules). These CPRs are to be implemented by the governing agencies (GAs) created (or empowered) by these PIs by defining key structural elements (SEs) of the GAs. However, the policy problem and the problematic behaviour often persist due to the absence, inappropriateness, and/or inadequacy of the CPRs in PIs and/or of the SEs of GAs. The data for this study is collected from different types of 1
documents as well as through unstructured, in-depth interviews of representative of different stake-holding groups, primarily the farmer groups. This was supplemented by data collected through Focused Group Discussions with members of Gram Panchayats, Village Water supply and Sanitation Committees, Village Watershed Committees, and women representatives in selected villages. The GD Framework is first used in this research to analyse the three PIs. This analysis identifies the Core Policy Remedies (CPRs) deployed through these PIs and the key Structural Elements (SEs) of the different GAs involved in this deployment. Then, the GDF is used to study and explicate the grass-roots level dynamics of groundwater extraction in eight villages from different agro-climatic and socio-political regions in Maharashtra (viz., Marathwada and Western Maharashtra). This helps uncover the Preparedness Determinants (PDs) that shape the problematic behaviour of the key actors, which, in turn, create the problem of excessive extraction of the groundwater. Then, using the framework, the study assesses the appropriateness and adequacy of CPRs (provided by the three PIs) and SEs (of GAs involved) to effectively deal with the PDs that shape the problematic behaviour and create the problem of depletion of groundwater. The findings of study highlight that there is a wide divergence between the policy goal of groundwater conservation and behavior of different actors involved in groundwater extraction. Many practices of farmers using groundwater, such as adoption of high water intensive cash crops, lead to groundwater depletion. Equally problematic are the practice of the drilling agencies involved in drilling deep bore-wells. The study traces the roots of this problematic behavior to different PDs of the respective actors, such as the ‘Norms,’ ‘Interests,’ ‘Lack of Resources and Capacities,’ and ‘Lack of Knowledge and Information’ of actors. For example, the imperatives of their (economic) ‘Interests’ drive the farmers to use groundwater for cultivating highly water intensive ‘cash’ crops, because they have assured market and carry high market prices. The failure of citizens, farmers, and functionaries in village-level governing agencies in objecting to, protesting, or reporting to authorities, and the problematic behavior involving over-extraction of groundwater is traced to the widely accepted norm that the person owning the land has an unfettered right to extract groundwater from under his land, even at the cost of others. Incidentally, this norm is sanctified by the current statute. 2
The analysis indicated that many CPRs in the three policy instruments are inappropriate and/or inadequate to deal effectively with the PDs driving problematic behaviors. For example, the CPR requiring the mandatory permission from the governing agency for drilling wells in notified areas is resisted and flouted by farmers as it brings restriction on what is, as per their above-mentioned norm, their ‘ unfettered right ’ of using the groundwater lying below their land. This CPR is also seen as unfair by ‘potential’ groundwater users (who are yet to drill wells and draw water from their land) because it restricts their access to groundwater but allows access to existing groundwater users. Thus, this simplistic, command and control style CPR is grossly inappropriate to deal with this complex situation around the problematic behavior of the groundwater users. The three policy instruments studied, in order to deploy the CPRs, empower the existing institution of Gram Panchayat and create various village-level governing agencies by defining their structural elements (SEs) such as their composition, functions and responsibilities, powers and jurisdiction, resources and capabilities. However, the study identifies many internal inconsistencies in the definition of these SEs. For example, while these village-level agencies are given significant responsibilities of regulation and control of the problematic behavior of actors, these agencies do not have adequate powers and resources to discharge these responsibilities effectively. Most importantly, the analysis also indicates that it is not sufficient to delegate commensurate powers to village-level agencies. A CPR in MGDWA 1993 delegated powers to Gram Panchayats to report the violation of the legal provision banning the drilling of a well in the radius of 500 meters from a public drinking water source. This power was never invoked by any Panchayat in any of the eight villages studied, despite the frequent violation of the legal provision. In this situation, there is no flaw in the SE of the Gram Panchayat. The GDF helps interpret this failure as the result of the pressures exerted by dominant groups in the village on functionaries of Gram Panchayat, which is one of the PDs as per the GFD. Thus, the study suggests the need to go beyond simplistic command and control remedies or token provisions for local participation. It suggests some ways to make the CPRs appropriate and adequate and to make the SEs of GAs internally consistent and commensurate with the demands posed by the CPR as well as the by the ground situation. For example, it suggests combination of different types of CPRs to effectively deal with the norm (supported by law) about the unfettered right to draw water from the owned land. @@@@@@@@@@@@@ 3
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