Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion About Face! Jason Quinley, Christopher Ahern University of T¨ ubingen, University of Pennsylvania October 5, 2012 Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 1 / 47
Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Goals Apply game-theoretic reasoning to politeness Requests and Proposals Payoffs vs. Preferences Face and Sympathy Norms vs. Conventions Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 2 / 47
Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Talk Outline Introduction 1 Politeness Theory 2 Game Theory 3 Trust and Modals 4 Conclusion 5 Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 3 / 47
Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Consider the following... Questions Will/Would you lend me a dollar? Will/Would you open the door? Will/Would you turn that music down? Will/Would you marry me? Answers Would seems more appropriate for the first three, whereas will is better in the last. Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 4 / 47
Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Why be polite? Scarcity Resources are limited, life requires cooperation. Ambiguity Information regarding the intentions of other is not always abundant. Politeness Offers a strategic solution for these two problems and increasing the range of interactions between individuals with other-regarding preferences. Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 5 / 47
Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion What politeness gets us Humor(/Cruelty) A: Would you marry me? B: I would if you were rich/handsome/x! (A: Well I was just asking hypothetically.) We commit ourselves to actions by our words. The ways in which this plays out reveals the underlying structure of the games being played. Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 6 / 47
Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Crucial points for politeness theory Face Face-threatening acts Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 7 / 47
Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Face What is face? Consider your reaction to... Asking a favor of a friend (stranger) Being asked a favor by a friend (stranger). Being Embarrassed. Seeing someone you know (and like) embarrassed. Seeing someone you don’t know embarrassed. Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 8 / 47
Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Face What is face? Brown and Levinson (1978) Face (Goffman, 1982) consists of an individual’s basic needs: Negative face (Autonomy): the basic claim to territories, personal preserves, right to non-distraction, i.e. to freedom of action and freedom from imposition. Positive face (Affiliation): the positive consistent self-image or ’personality’ (including the approval by others of this self-image) claimed by interactants. Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 9 / 47
Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Face-threatening acts Face-threatening acts When situations call for it... Speakers must commit a face-threatening act ( FTA ). In order to mitigate the weight of a FTA, speakers may use several strategies. Don’t Redress On Record Positive Politeness Do FTA Redress Negative Politeness Intention Off Record Don’t do FTA Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 10 / 47
Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Face-threatening acts Threats at Lunch!!! What to do if you forget your wallet at lunch: Don’t do FTA: Don’t ask for money. Off Record: “Oh no! I forgot my wallet in my office!” Negative Politeness: “You don’t have to, but would you mind lending me a bit of money?” Positive Politeness: “I would sure appreciate if you would lend me some money.” Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 11 / 47
Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Face-threatening acts Goldilocks Too much “Please, if you could, move out of the way of that speeding car,” “Excuse me Sir/Ma’am, if it’s not too much trouble could tell me the time.” Too little “Could you give me a thousand dollars?” “Tell me the time!” Just right (Excuse me,) could you tell me the time? Could you find it in your magnificent heart to loan me a thousand dollars? I’d be forever in your debt! Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 12 / 47
Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Crucial points for game theory Sequential Games Cooperation vs. Coordination Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 13 / 47
Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Sequential Games Sequential Games Signaling Game: � N , O , A j , U i � N is the set of players in the game O is a sequence over N that determines the order of play For j ∈ O , A j is the set of actions available to the j th player in the order of play U i is a preference for player i over the set of possible paths of play. The payoffs are represented as numeric values, where higher values are more preferred outcomes. Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 14 / 47
Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Sequential Games Cooperation: Prisoner’s Dilemma X C D Y Y C D C D (2,2) (0,3) (3,0) (1,1) Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 15 / 47
Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Sequential Games Coordination: Pure Coordination Game X B A Y Y A B A B (1,1) (0,0) (0,0) (1,1) Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 16 / 47
Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Crucial points for our analysis Trust Games Other-regarding preferences Self-enforcing equilibria Mechanisms for enforcing cooperation Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 17 / 47
Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Trust Games Trust Games Consist of... An Investor and a Trustee. Investor begins with an Initial endowment, which he can keep or invest. If he invests the endowment with the Trustee it grows by some amount/ The Trustee must then decide what amount, if any, to return to the Investor. Cooperation Trustee does best when he keeps all money invested. Knowing this, Investor should never invest. Everyone does worse than they could by cooperating. Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 18 / 47
Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Trust Games Requests as Trust Games Quinley (2012) Asymmetries in abilities lead to requests. Requests involve a loss of face on the part of the requester, and carry a risk that the request will be denied. X can ask ( A ) or not ask Y ( ¬ A ) to grant a request. Y can grant ( G ) or not grant ( ¬ G ) the request. Main Results Repetition and observation increase cooperativity (trust). Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 19 / 47
Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Trust Games Requests as Extended Trust Games More Structure X can ask ( A ) or not ask Y ( ¬ A ) to grant a request. Y can grant ( G ) or not grant ( ¬ G ) the request. X can thank ( T ) Y for granting the request, or not ( ¬ T ). Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 20 / 47
Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Trust Games Self-Regard and Self-Preservation How do we process face? 2D4D: Testosterone and Testiness Ultimatum Game and Refusals Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 21 / 47
Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Trust Games Game Structure Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 22 / 47
Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Trust Games Payoff Structure Costs c x is the cost to X to achieve desired outcome. c y is cost to Y . ( c y < c x ) b x is the benefit to X of Y granting request. ( b x < c x ) Face A requires face “payment” f r by X . Y receives m r f r from A . ( m r > 1) T requires face “payment” f t by X . Y receives m t f t from T . ( m t > 1) Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 23 / 47
Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Trust Games Payoff Structure Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 24 / 47
Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Trust Games What to expect Rollback Equilibrium X prefers ¬ T to T Y prefers ¬ G to ¬ T X prefers ¬ A to ¬ G Result No one should ever make requests because they will never be granted. Yet we can, and do, make polite requests of strangers we will never interact with again. Why is this possible? Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 25 / 47
Recommend
More recommend
