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2009 National Oil & Gas Safety Conference Improving Industry Health & Safety Performance Simon Schubach Acting CEO, NOPSA Aug 2009 NOPSAs functions 2 Balanced judgment is required for these functions Investigate Advise


  1. 2009 National Oil & Gas Safety Conference Improving Industry Health & Safety Performance Simon Schubach Acting CEO, NOPSA Aug 2009

  2. NOPSA’s functions 2 Balanced judgment is required for these functions Investigate Advise Co-operate Promote Monitor & Enforce

  3. NOPSA Activities 2 0 0 8 -0 9 Proactive 27 OHS Inspectors ► 89 Inspections 163 Facilities (68 pipelines) Reactive Assessments ~ 220 Accident & DO Notifications ~ 400 Complaints ~ 25 Enforcement Improvement Notices ~ 40 ~ 10 Prohibition Notices 3 (Based on current data Jul 2008 – Jun 2009)

  4. NOPSA focus areas: 2 0 0 9 -2 0 1 0 • Industry safety leadership • Asset integrity • Emergency preparedness • Contractors 4

  5. Safety Leadership & Asset I ntegrity What is a Themed themed audit? Audits Company-wide critical examination of operator systems and facilities To be conducted this year: • 5 safety leadership audits • 5 asset integrity audits 5

  6. Them ed Audits Elem ents Safety Leadership Audits - draw on Baker Panel & Buncefield reports and consider: - Process safety expectations, - Communications & visibility, - Involvement in process safety audits, - Employee empowerment, - Resources & positioning, - Process safety in decision-making Asset Integrity Audits - draw on NOPSA FI results and sources such as OGP Asset Integrity question set: - Facility major incidents & barriers - Critical equipment - People & processes - Projects - Culture 6

  7. 7 so be VI GI LANT 21st Anniversary of the Piper Alpha tragedy 6 July 1988 W e are VULNERABLE …

  8. 1 5 Fatalities – March 2 0 0 5 Texas City Refinery 8 Victim Compensation $US ~1 Billion $US ~1 Billion Renewal Plan

  9. US Chem ical Safety Board • Mistakes made in Texas City have their roots in decisions made by managers, sometimes years earlier • Safety culture is first and foremost about how managerial decisions are made • Are production and cost control being rewarded at the expense of safety and risk management? • Recommended BP set up independent panel 9

  10. Major Accident Prevention – US CSB Ask yourself these questions: • Is it an engineering problem? • Is it a problem of employee compliance? • Is it a matter of corporate policy and behaviors? 10

  11. Baker Report Findings Pre ve nting pro c e ss Jan 2 0 0 7 ac c idents requires vigilanc e… Pe o ple c an fo rge t to be afraid! Corporate safety culture • effective process safety leadership • operating discipline: no toleration of deviations from safe operating practice Process safety management systems • process safety standards & good engineering practices • translate corporate expectations into process safety criteria Performance evaluation, corrective action and oversight • effective root cause analysis of incidents & audits to ensure performance • senior management oversight of process safety 11

  12. Buncefield Oil Storage Depot United Kingdom Dec 2 0 0 5 ₤ 1 Billion Economic Impact 12

  13. Buncefield I nvestigation Findings - Leadership and Culture • Collate and communicate data - high potential incidents - solutions and control measures • Undertake thorough root cause investigation • Share lessons learned and best practices 13

  14. Offshore Petroleum I ndustry Health & Safety Perform ance Collected since NOPSA commenced • Accidents and Dangerous Occurrences • Planned Inspections • National Programmes 14

  15. MAJOR Accidents & Dangerous Occurrences MAJOR A + DOs include: 100 Major Incidents - rolling 12-month totals 90 80 Death/serious injury 70 Could cause death/serious injury 60 50 Fires or explosions 40 Collision marine vessel & facility 30 20 Hydrocarbon gas release >300 kg 10 Petroleum liquid release >12 500 L 0 Jan05- Jul05- Jan06- Jul06- Jan07- Jul07- Jan08- Jul08- Dec05 Jun06 Dec06 Jun07 Dec07 Jun08 Dec08 Jun09 The International Regulators Forum (IRF) has devised a severity rating. ‘ Major ’ is considered more serious, followed by ‘ Significant ’. 15

  16. SIGNIFICANT Accident & Dangerous Occurrences SIGNIFICANT A + DOs include: 350 Significant Incidents - rolling 12-month totals Incapacitation LTI ≥ 3 days Could cause an LTI ≥ 3 days 300 250 Other kind needing immediate investigation 200 Damage to Safety-critical Equipment 150 HC gas release >1-300 kg 100 PL release >80 -12 500 L 50 Well kick >50 barrels 0 Unplanned Event - Implement ERP Jan05- Jul05- Jan06- Jul06- Jan07- Jul07- Jan08- Jul08- Dec05 Jun06 Dec06 Jun07 Dec07 Jun08 Dec08 Jun09 The International Regulators Forum (IRF) has devised a severity rating. ‘ Major ’ is considered more serious, followed by ‘ Significant ’. 16

  17. Accidents & Dangerous Occurrences Top 5 Root Causes 12 10 8 Per cent 6 4 2 0 Preventive Procedures - Not Design Specs Design Review Procedures - Wrong Maintenance Followed Data from Jul 2008 – Jun 2009 17

  18. Root Causes Com parison w ith previous years 2005 2006 2007 2008 YTD 2009 Procedures - Not Preventive Preventive Preventive Procedures - Wrong Followed Maintenance Maintenance Maintenance Preventive Procedures - Not Procedures - Not Design Specs Design Specs Maintenance Followed Followed Human Engineering - Procedures - Not Preventive Design Specs Design Specs Machine Interface Followed Maintenance Work Direction - Equipment / Parts Equipment - Design Design Specs Procedures - Wrong Preparation Defective - Handling Review Work Direction - Equipment - Design Procedures - Followed Procedures - Not Other Preparation Review Incorrectly Followed 18

  19. Accidents Top 5 Root Causes Top 5 most common Root Causes of Accidents (LTIs and Major Injuries) 18 16 14 12 Per cent 10 8 6 4 2 0 Procedures - Procedures - Not Procedures - Work Direction - Human Followed Followed Wrong Preparation Engineering - Work Incorrectly Environment Data from Jul 2008 – Jun 2009 19

  20. Comparison with IRF injury rates (ADI + LTI) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Rate ≥ 1 day 4.94 6.99 8.35 7.81 Australian Rate IRF Average Rate 3.28 3.74 3.68 3.19 (Benchmark)* 2.93 2.23 2.75 2.06 IRF Best Rate US Netherlands Netherlands US 20

  21. Hydrocarbon Gas Releases Num ber per year Gas Releases 12-month totals 25 Major (>300 kg) Significant (>1 - 300 kg) 20 Number 15 10 5 0 Jul05-Jun06 Jul06-Jun07 Jul07- Jun08 Jul08- Jun09 21

  22. Even taking into account higher levels of activity … Gas Release Rates 4.0 (per 100 Production Facilities per month) 3.5 3.0 2.5 Rate 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 Jan05- Jul05- Jan06- Jul06- Jan07- Jul07- Jan08- Jul08- Dec05 Jun06 Dec06 Jun07 Dec07 Jun08 Dec08 Jun09 As per IRF guidelines – process-related releases only. i.e. NOPSA Gas Release Rates only include data from the 22 following facility types: Platforms, FPSOs, FSOs, MOPUs

  23. Com parison w ith I RF gas release rates Australia International Benchmark Total Rate Total Rate 2005 1.85 3.08 2006 2.73 3.46 2007 3.27 5.16 not yet 2008 3.02 available 23

  24. Hydrocarbon Gas Releases Root Causes Top 5 most common Root Causes of Gas Releases 20 (Jan 2005 - Jun 2009) 15 Per cent 10 5 0 Preventive Design Specs Procedures - Design Quality Maintenance Not Followed Review Control 24

  25. Production Operators Gas releases per Facility per Operator 12 Gas Releases per Facility for Production Operators Jan 2005 - Jun 2009 10 8 Number 6 4 2 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 25

  26. Production Operator # 2 Root Causes Top 5 Root Causes per Operator #2 for Gas Releases 40 30 Per cent 20 10 0 Quality Control Design Review Preventive Design Specs Procedures - Maintenance Not Followed 26

  27. Production Operator # 3 Root Causes Top 5 Root Causes for Operator #3 for Gas Releases 20 15 Per cent 10 5 0 Preventive Procedures - Design Specs Procedures - Management Maintenance Not Followed Wrong System 27

  28. Facility I ntegrity Overall Proportion of FI Releases Jan 2005 - Jun 2009 National Program m es 100% % FI Incidents 80% • NOPSA Inspections (FI Prompt sheets) 60% % Other • Analysis of Accident Incidents 40% & Dangerous Occurrences 20% 0% 28

  29. FI : I nspection Results by Focus Areas Does not meet FI Expectations Percentage Facilities at each FI Expectation Level Partially meets FI Expectations Meets FI Expectations at Jun 2009 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% Facility Topsides Topsides Topsides Topsides Topsides Topsides SmallBore Integrity Mgmt Maintenance Maintenance Process Pressure Corrosion and Structures Piping/Tubing, System - System - System - Integrity Integrity Erosion Flexible Hoses Onshore Onshore Offshore 29

  30. FI : Focus Area Elem ents that require attention Audit & Compliance with System Review Field Installation Performance Stds Test of SCE 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% Facility Integrity Topsides Topsides SmallBore Mgmt System - Maintenance Maintenance Piping/Tubing, Onshore System - System - Flexible Hoses Does not meet FI Expectations Onshore Offshore Partially meets FI Expectations Meets FI Expectations 8 areas, also; process pressure corrosion structures 30

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