What is driving Europe’s political change? The role of Inequality of Opportunity Hugo del Valle-Incl´ an Cruces RGEA, ECOBAS CELSI research visit, March 2018 H. del Valle-Incl´ an Cruces Political change and IOP CELSI, March 2018 1 / 25
We are going to talk about... What political change? 1 Why is it happening? 2 What is inequality of Opportunity? 3 Political change and inequality of Opportunity 4 H. del Valle-Incl´ an Cruces Political change and IOP CELSI, March 2018 2 / 25
What political change? H. del Valle-Incl´ an Cruces Political change and IOP CELSI, March 2018 3 / 25
What political change? H. del Valle-Incl´ an Cruces Political change and IOP CELSI, March 2018 4 / 25
What political change? H. del Valle-Incl´ an Cruces Political change and IOP CELSI, March 2018 5 / 25
What political change? The perspective of ’establishment’ parties We propose a measure that quali fi es parties as members of the ’establishment’ if they have hold power frequently during the last three decades. � 1 if η ( party ik ) > µ k establishment i = 0 otherwise where: η ( party ik ) is the number of times party ik has been in cabinet µ k is the average times all parties have been in cabinet in country k since 1988 H. del Valle-Incl´ an Cruces Political change and IOP CELSI, March 2018 6 / 25
What political change? The perspective of ’establishment’ parties H. del Valle-Incl´ an Cruces Political change and IOP CELSI, March 2018 7 / 25
What political change? H. del Valle-Incl´ an Cruces Political change and IOP CELSI, March 2018 8 / 25
Why is it happening? Three main explanations have been proposed: - Cultural backslash hypothesis : “the spread of progressive values [such as environmental protection, increased acceptance of gender and racial equality, and equal rights for the LGBT community] has provoked a backlash from people who feel threatened by this development. Less educated and older citizens, especially white men, who were once the privileged majority culture in Western societies, [may] have come to feel that they are being marginalized within their own countries” (Inglehart and Norris, 2016) - Loosers of globalization hypothesis : global economic dynamics during last decades ( fi nancial crisis, o ff -shoring, automatization of routine jobs...) are responsible for the stagnation of incomes among median earners and the rise of income inequality within advanced economies (Milanovic, 2016) - Brahmin left vs. Merchant right : “in the 1950s-60s, the vote for left-wing (socialist) parties in France and the Democratic Party in the US used to be associated with lower education and lower income voters. [The left] has gradually become associated since 1970s-80s with higher education voters, giving rise to a multiple-elite party system: high-education elites vote for the left, while high-income/high-wealth elites for the right, i.e., intellectual elite (Brahmin left) vs business elite (merchant right)” (Piketty, 2018) H. del Valle-Incl´ an Cruces Political change and IOP CELSI, March 2018 9 / 25
Why is it happening? Three main explanations have been proposed: - Cultural backslash hypothesis : “the spread of progressive values [such as environmental protection, increased acceptance of gender and racial equality, and equal rights for the LGBT community] has provoked a backlash from people who feel threatened by this development. Less educated and older citizens, especially white men, who were once the privileged majority culture in Western societies, [may] have come to feel that they are being marginalized within their own countries” (Inglehart and Norris, 2016) - Loosers of globalization hypothesis : global economic dynamics during last decades ( fi nancial crisis, o ff -shoring, automatization of routine jobs...) are responsible for the stagnation of incomes among median earners and the rise of income inequality within advanced economies (Milanovic, 2016) - Brahmin left vs. Merchant right : “in the 1950s-60s, the vote for left-wing (socialist) parties in France and the Democratic Party in the US used to be associated with lower education and lower income voters. [The left] has gradually become associated since 1970s-80s with higher education voters, giving rise to a multiple-elite party system: high-education elites vote for the left, while high-income/high-wealth elites for the right, i.e., intellectual elite (Brahmin left) vs business elite (merchant right)” (Piketty, 2018) H. del Valle-Incl´ an Cruces Political change and IOP CELSI, March 2018 9 / 25
Why is it happening? Three main explanations have been proposed: - Cultural backslash hypothesis : “the spread of progressive values [such as environmental protection, increased acceptance of gender and racial equality, and equal rights for the LGBT community] has provoked a backlash from people who feel threatened by this development. Less educated and older citizens, especially white men, who were once the privileged majority culture in Western societies, [may] have come to feel that they are being marginalized within their own countries” (Inglehart and Norris, 2016) - Loosers of globalization hypothesis : global economic dynamics during last decades ( fi nancial crisis, o ff -shoring, automatization of routine jobs...) are responsible for the stagnation of incomes among median earners and the rise of income inequality within advanced economies (Milanovic, 2016) - Brahmin left vs. Merchant right : “in the 1950s-60s, the vote for left-wing (socialist) parties in France and the Democratic Party in the US used to be associated with lower education and lower income voters. [The left] has gradually become associated since 1970s-80s with higher education voters, giving rise to a multiple-elite party system: high-education elites vote for the left, while high-income/high-wealth elites for the right, i.e., intellectual elite (Brahmin left) vs business elite (merchant right)” (Piketty, 2018) H. del Valle-Incl´ an Cruces Political change and IOP CELSI, March 2018 9 / 25
Why is it happening? Three main explanations have been proposed: - Cultural backslash hypothesis : “the spread of progressive values [such as environmental protection, increased acceptance of gender and racial equality, and equal rights for the LGBT community] has provoked a backlash from people who feel threatened by this development. Less educated and older citizens, especially white men, who were once the privileged majority culture in Western societies, [may] have come to feel that they are being marginalized within their own countries” (Inglehart and Norris, 2016) - Loosers of globalization hypothesis : global economic dynamics during last decades ( fi nancial crisis, o ff -shoring, automatization of routine jobs...) are responsible for the stagnation of incomes among median earners and the rise of income inequality within advanced economies (Milanovic, 2016) - Brahmin left vs. Merchant right : “in the 1950s-60s, the vote for left-wing (socialist) parties in France and the Democratic Party in the US used to be associated with lower education and lower income voters. [The left] has gradually become associated since 1970s-80s with higher education voters, giving rise to a multiple-elite party system: high-education elites vote for the left, while high-income/high-wealth elites for the right, i.e., intellectual elite (Brahmin left) vs business elite (merchant right)” (Piketty, 2018) H. del Valle-Incl´ an Cruces Political change and IOP CELSI, March 2018 9 / 25
Why is it happening? Our hypothesis is that people without high education and with low to medium incomes (the majority of the population) are su ff ering worsening economic conditions, and they could be blaming the political establishment for it Measuring ’economic hardship’ with income inequality, as have been proposed so far, does not provide evidence supporting this hypothesis Measuring it with inequality of opportunity might be more appropriate because it is perceived as especially unfair (Schokkaert and Devooght, 2003; Gaertner and Schwettmann, 2007; Cappelen et al., 2010; Alm ˚ as et al., 2011) H. del Valle-Incl´ an Cruces Political change and IOP CELSI, March 2018 10 / 25
Why is it happening? Our hypothesis is that people without high education and with low to medium incomes (the majority of the population) are su ff ering worsening economic conditions, and they could be blaming the political establishment for it Measuring ’economic hardship’ with income inequality, as have been proposed so far, does not provide evidence supporting this hypothesis Measuring it with inequality of opportunity might be more appropriate because it is perceived as especially unfair (Schokkaert and Devooght, 2003; Gaertner and Schwettmann, 2007; Cappelen et al., 2010; Alm ˚ as et al., 2011) H. del Valle-Incl´ an Cruces Political change and IOP CELSI, March 2018 10 / 25
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