Understanding fossil fuel consumption growth: why history matters Simon Pirani Senior Visiting Research Fellow, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies simonpirani@gmail.com Oxford Energy Colloquium, Tuesday 30 October 2018 1
Agenda Introduction 1. Some themes for interdisciplinary research 2. Putting political history (of the international climate negotiations) into context 3. Chronologies (1950 to now) Conclusions 2
Introduction ■ Fossil fuel consumption growth from the mid 20 th century is part of the “great acceleration” ■ Greenhouse gas emissions, and hence global warming, are caused by humans – but not by undifferentiated ■ Most fuel use is by and through big humanity. Fuel is used technological systems. Focus on these, by people living in and their place in social and economic specific sets of social systems relations 3
1. Themes for interdisciplinary research a. Consumption is correlated with economic growth, but not with population growth Population and total energy use: USA 400 2600 2400 350 2200 Energy use, mt of oil equivalent 300 Population, millions 2000 250 1800 1600 200 1400 150 1200 100 1000 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 Year Population Energy use 4
b. Technological systems have developed in certain ways, and not others, because of the social and economic, and to some extent political, contexts 5
c. The history of fuel-consuming technologies is also the history of “roads not taken” 1962: model changes to cars since 1949 cost $5 billion/year in the US, for bigger cars, extra petrol, retooling, etc. (Fisher et al, “The Cost of Automobile Model Changes Since 1949”, Journal of Political Economy 70:5) 1977: centralised electricity generation to supply residential heating is “like cutting butter with a chainsaw” (Amory Lovins, Soft Energy Paths, p. 40) 1988 : “the overzealous belief in growth […] leads directly to a large waste of resources”, such as building unneeded industrial production capacity (Daniel Spreng, Net-Energy Analysis, pp. 61-62) 2012 : “It is indeed a supreme irony that computers, sensors and computational ability have transformed every major industry except power- generation. […] The electricity meter […] holds retail consumers hostage […] Technology is available to break down this iron curtain meter [but has not been deployed]” (Johannsen et al, Global Energy Assessment, pp. 1159-1161) 6
d. A focus on systems, both technological and social, is necessary for understanding individual consumption Primary energy Final energy Useful energy Energy services Acceleration/ Getting from place Oil Petrol overcoming air to place resistance Technologies: oil wells - refineries - car manufacture - cars, roads, parking spaces Light and heat Illumination and Coal Electricity and heat emission warmth after dark Technologies: mines - power stations - electricity and heat networks - light bulbs, radiators Energy is “consumed” throughout the system, not only at the end 7
e. The commodification of energy products has been central to inequalities of energy supply Population, millions 8
Energy consumption per person per year, kg of oil equivalent 9000 Energy use 8000 per head 7000 figures: 6000 part, but 5000 not all, of 4000 the story 3000 2000 1000 0 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 2011 China Russian Federation Germany 9 Bangladesh India United States
2. Putting political history (the international climate negotiations) into context 1992 Rio agreement Non-OECD OECD 10 Slide by Simon Pirani, OIES
3. Chronologies The largest consuming technologies (electricity, ICE, steam turbines, chemical fertilisers) came from the second industrial revolution s The big volume increases came after 1950, during the “great acceleration” Trends that pushed consumption growth: urbanisation; industrialisation; changes in the labour process; motorisation; electrification; household consumption and consumerism 11
The 1950s-60s: post-war boom • Infrastructure developed in wartime played a crucial role • The USA was completely dominant • Roads, electricity, industry went to Europe • Rich world populations acquired cars • Household consumption grew • Appliances substituted for domestic labour, but the didn’t reduce hours 12
Fossil fuel consumption, 1972-1985, mtoe The 1970s 2500 “Energy crisis” is a meaningless term. 2000 There were two oil price shocks (1973, 1500 1979). They caused: ■ a real crisis for developing-world 1000 oil importers; ■ an oil price 500 adjustment for rich nations; ■ crises of 0 perception and 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 policy. OECD Oil OECD Gas OECD Coal 13 Non-OECD Oil Non-OECD Gas Non-OECD Coal
The 1980s: crises and oil price shocks • Consumption is still overwhelmingly in the “global north” • Efficiency gains and conservation gains. But some of these were reversed after oil prices fell in the mid 1980s • The discovery of global warming in the late 1980s proves to be a turning point 14
The 1990s: shunning the global warming challenge • Rio: “no binding targets” policy adopted • Subsidies for fossil fuel production and consumption start to grow • The age of neo-liberalism - which, in energy markets, means electricity liberalisation • Kyoto 1997: market mechanisms to decarbonise 15
The 2000s: China is a crucial factor Primary commercial energy use, millions tonnes oil equivalent 3500 3000 2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Slide by Simon 16 China India South Africa Russian Federation US Pirani, OIES
The 2000s: acceleration renewed Measured in the only way Mtoe/year that matters, i.e. by total fossil fuel consumption and total carbon emissions, climate policies have failed. Consumption rose steeply in the 2000s. As a proportion of primary commercial energy, fossil fuel use fell, but not as much as it did in the 1970s-80s 17
Conclusions ■ History is not neutral. The view presented, of consumption by and through technological, social and economic systems, is at odds with views focused on individual consumption and ecological damage by an undifferentiated humanity ■ Research on energy transitions concluded that changes in energy end-use services are key; that technological innovations are initially hit- and-miss, and diffusion is slow. There has been debate about the possibility of faster transitions. I propose a focus on the interaction of technological and social change ■ The lessons of global political history are relevant. The failure of the Rio process is a historical failure of states. A transition needs to be one in which the whole of society becomes the motive force of change 18
Published August 2018 "Insightful, precise and well-written, Burning Up turns energy consumption on its head. Pirani fills a crucial gap ... Anybody fighting climate change should read this" - Mika Minio-Paluello, campaigner at Platform London and co-author of The Oil Road: Journeys from the Caspian Sea to the City of London (Verso, 2013) "This meticulous depiction of how fossil fuels are woven into our human systems - not only technological but also economic, social and political - is an invaluable aid to getting them back under control" - Walt Patterson, author of Electricity vs Fire (2015) "Explains the technological, social and economic processes that have prioritised a particular way of satisfying society's demand for energy services" - Michael Bradshaw, Professor of Global Energy, Warwick Business School, UK, author of Global Energy Dilemmas (2013) 19
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