UN Security Council Resolution 1540: Monitoring and Detecting Breaches in Biosecurity & Illicit Trafficking of BW-Related Materials Dana Perkins, PhD 1540 Committee Expert Biological Weapons Convention Meeting of States Parties Side event on: Monitoring compliance relevant data – Launch of the Hamburg Research Group’s Trade Monitoring Website 12 December 2013, Geneva, Switzerland Unless otherwise specified, the opinions presented here are those of the presenter and may not necessarily reflect the views of the 1540 Committee, its Group of Experts, or the UN Security Council
Legally binding obligations on BW, Means of Delivery & Related Materials: Refrain from providing any form Implement and enforce appropriate controls of support to non-State actors over BW - related materials in order to: that attempt to develop, acquire, Account for and secure items in production, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use biological use, storage or transport; weapons (BW) and their means of Physically protect; delivery Detect, deter, prevent and combat the illicit Adopt and enforce appropriate trafficking and brokering through effective effective laws prohibiting border controls an law enforcement efforts; activities involving the Control the export, transit, trans-shipment proliferation of such weapons and re-export and the provision of funds and their means of delivery to and services related to such export and non-State actors, in particular for trans-shipment that would contribute to terrorist purposes, as well any proliferation; attempts to engage in such activities, assist or finance them Penalize violations. Resolution 1540 (2004): A Response to Threats to International Peace & Security
“… As a result of the national legislative and enforcement measures implemented to prohibit the illicit trafficking of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, related materials and their means of delivery, as well as counterproliferation training, the Moldovan Police successfully thwarted two incidents of the sale of highly enriched uranium (in August 2010 and June 2011, respectively) and arrested the perpetrators …” – Note verbale dated 17 April 2013 from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Moldova to the United Nations addressed to the Chair of the 1540 Committee Illicit Trafficking: Radiological and Nuclear Materials
“… INTERPOL assesses that the use of CBRN materials by terrorists is a current and significant threat to the international security which must be prevented…”-- INTERPOL CBRNE Intelligence Report, June 2013
http://www.medindia.net/news/Scientist-Arrested-for-Smuggling-Vials-Used-in-Ebola-Research-into-US-51293-1.htm
“… The introduction of this virus into New Zealand was a very well-planned, organized criminal event. The participants were boastful and arrogant about their criminal acts and showed little remorse. The perpetrators were able to circumvent one of the best and most secure airport and port biosecurity systems in the world. The virus entered New Zealand in three ways: mailed into the country in a vial, imported in a vial placed in an air traveler’s sock, and imported by an air traveler on a handkerchief that had been drenched in blood and tissues from an infected animal. Once the virus had entered the country, it required only a simple, low-tech procedure for the farmers to prepare purees for distribution around their farms. Liver, spleen, and lungs were placed in a kitchen blender and blended into a very potent “kitchen whizz” that was mixed with an appropriate vegetable or food source…”
State or non-State actor BW use / bioterrorism / illicit trafficking Seize / Secure Site Assessment Evidence Gathering Transport to Laboratory Lab Testing Lab Reporting
• The development and improvement of technical microbial forensics methods and effective cooperation in law enforcement and information / intelligence sharing to detect illicit trafficking of biological materials outside of regulatory control, and to prevent and respond to biosecurity events, implicitly strengthen the implementation and enforcement of resolution 1540 (2004). • Monitoring S&T developments and trends is significant in the context of implementing resolution 1540 (2004) as the resolution complements and reinforces BWC and the Security Council called upon all States to promote its universal adoption and full implementation of multilateral non-proliferation treaties to which they are parties, and strengthen them if necessary. Food for Thought
• Moreover, developments in S&T may create challenges in States’ effective control over biological (and chemical) weapons related materials and means of delivery to prevent their illicit trafficking by non-State actors [as mandated by resolution 1540 (2004)], and terrorists and criminals may exploit gaps and vulnerabilities in order to acquire technological expertise and materials. • Illicit proliferation networks are dynamic and often dispersed within the global business market • S&T advances may also lead to innovative approaches to arms control, verification and compliance monitoring in order to address future needs of the biological (and chemical) weapons non-proliferation regime. More Food for Thought
S& T developments: illustrative example
• “Civil society has worked both with governments and communities to stigmatize the use and possession of such weapons, constrain trafficking and create and strengthen norms to drive governmental and diplomatic initiatives towards further agreements, resolutions or treaties… • … Civil society is as diverse and multifaceted as nations and cultures are. Civil society engagement may be local, national, regional and international. At its broadest, it may be described as transnational, with many “border- crossing” links. These have been greatly enhanced with electronic and social media and communication. • Civil society encompasses individuals, NGOs, informal associations and loose coalitions, “forming connections across national borders and inserting themselves into a wide range of decision-making processes”… http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/civil-society-and-the-conference-on-disarmament-360.pdf
“… I’ve been asking myself, can we incorporate open source information technologies and social networking into arms control verification and monitoring?... Our new reality is a smaller, increasingly-networked world where the average citizen connects to other citizens in cyberspace hundreds of times each day. They exchange and share ideas on a wide variety of topics, why not put this vast problem solving entity to good use? Today, any event, anywhere on the planet, could be broadcast globally in seconds. That means it is harder to hide things. When it is harder to hide things, it is easier to be caught. The neighborhood gaze is a powerful tool, and it can help us make sure that countries are following the rules of arms control treaties and agreements. Open source information technologies improve arms control verification in at least two ways: either as a way of generating new information, or as analysis of information that already is out there… As the U.S. and Russian governments work to enhance and expand our arms control and nonproliferation efforts, we will need your help to find new ways to use the amazing information tools at our disposal to move the world closer to stable peace and security…” -- Remarks, Rose Gottemoeller, Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), Moscow, Russia, March 30, 2012 -- http://www.state.gov/t/us/187159.htm New Technologies and Arms Control
http://www.biological-arms-control.org/monitor/
“Arms Control Today: Based on UNSCOM's experience in Iraq, what are the lessons learned that can be applied to the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the strengthening of the Biological Weapons Convention? Ambassador Rolf Ekeus (former UNSCOM Executive Chair): UNSCOM managed to break through the secrecy surrounding Iraq's offensive biological weapons program through a combination of inspections and analytical work. Thus, an examination of the pattern of Iraqi imports of equipment and material, as well as of the quantities imported, in light of the country's declarations with regard to its civilian, non-prohibited programs, showed large discrepancies. For example, the number of fermenters and the quantities of complex growth media imported by Iraq many times surpassed reasonable civilian requirements. In a similar fashion, close analysis of the quantities of dual-use chemical compounds and equipment imported by Iraq provided UNSCOM analysts with enough data to sound the alarm. These are only some examples of detection possibilities...” http://www.armscontrol.org/print/216 Lessons Learned
Dana Perkins, PhD 1540 Committee Expert United Nations 300 East 42 nd St., Suite IN-03074H New York, NY 10017 Tel: +1 (917) 367 6023 (office) E-mail: PerkinsD@un.org Collective e-mail: 1540experts@un.org Website: http://www.un.org/sc/1540 Contact information
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