Trilemmas and Tradeoffs Living with Financial Globalization Maurice - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Trilemmas and Tradeoffs Living with Financial Globalization Maurice Obstfeld University of California, Berkeley, CEPR, and NBER Inaugural Asian Monetary Policy Forum 24 May 2014

Introduction Two contradictory recent views of monetary autonomy in small open economies: • The open economy is basically no different from the closed economy, provided the nominal exchange rate is flexible. • Small economies have no monetary autonomy, regardless of the exchange rate, except through capital controls. United States monetary and financial shocks dominate the global monetary environment. Recent “taper tantrum” highlights role of volatile capital flows for EMEs.

Here is Mike Woodford (2010) … From: International Dimensions of Monetary Policy , edited by Jordi Galí and Mark Gertler and (University of Chicago Press, 2010).

… and here is Hélène Rey (2013) From: Vox column summarizing Dilemma Not Trilemma: The Global Financial Cycle and Monetary Policy Independence , presented at the Jackson Hole Symposium, August 2013.

Which View is Closer to the Truth? • Woodford’s view reflects the pre-Lehman worldview (which he and we have moved beyond). • But financial markets and financial stability (FS) matter. • Even without financial issues, that view is too narrow: his argument is that policy can always move the AD curve. • One target, one instrument. • Rey points to monetary policy’s inability fully to deliver both macro stabilization and systemic FS. • A tradeoff problem -- even for a closed economy. • Exacerbated by an additional (financial) trilemma. • But does not contradict utility of exchange flexibility.

The Classic Monetary Trilemma The following three are not all mutually compatible: 1. Fixed exchange rate. 2. Unimpeded cross-border financial flows. 3. Monetary autonomy. Bretton Woods made US exceptional. Floating was supposed to change that, and “insulate” economies and free monetary policy (Milton Friedman, Harry Johnson).

So, How Does Monetary Policy Work? Stanley Fischer, “Myths of Monetary Policy,” Israel Economic Review , 2010.

A General Perspective • With targets > instruments, not all targets will be hit. • Attained level of “social welfare” depends on position of the tradeoff between targets consistent with the economy’s equilibrium (e.g., a short-run Phillips relationship). • Economic openness  gains from trade, but also can worsen some policy tradeoffs. • Even optimal exercise of “monetary autonomy” may leave the economy farther from policy bliss point than if more instruments were available.

“Monetary Autonomy” Is Only One Instrument for Multiple Goals • Even in closed economy: • Inflation vs. unemployment – “divine coincidence”? • Exchange rate side-effects in the open economy: • Sectoral objectives (e.g., export or tradables externalities). • Adjustment challenge for EMEs: market power, credit markets. • Dollarized liabilities  balance-sheet spillovers. • No “divine coincidence” for exchange rate. • So: harsher tradeoffs in the open economy, even abstracting from any global financial cycle  “fear of floating.” This is all well accepted ….

Recent Concerns Focus on a Broader Range of Transmission Channels -- with FS Implications •

Non-Standard Transmission Channels • Cross-border bank lending can relax quantitative credit constraints, undermine domestic credit control. • If agents hedge foreign dollar credits, covered interest parity  same cost as domestic-currency loans. • But they may chose not to  carry trades. • Domestic-currency bond markets have developed in EMEs but in many cases remain thin – vulnerable to shifts in foreign demand (Shin 2013), and could conceal off-balance sheet currency mismatches.

Non-Standard Transmission Channels •

Offshore Dollar Bank Credit and Debt Percent USD trillion 55 17 16 50 15 45 14 13 40 12 35 11 10 30 9 25 8 20 7 US domestic bank credit to non-banks (right axis) Offshore/domestic US dollar bank credit to non-banks (left axis) Offshore non-financials' dollar debt /offshore dollar bank loans to non-banks (left axis) Source : BIS, Global Liquidity Indicators

Exchange Rates Do Not Offset Financial Shocks • Imagine a portfolio shift toward an EME’s assets. • If the central bank intervenes, it will create liquidity. • Sterilization may be problematic. • Even if central bank does not intervene, and currency appreciates, domestic balance sheets may improve. • Even at a constant current account balance, there can be offsetting gross position changes – e.g., corporates borrow and place funds abroad. • Portfolio shifts can show up in other prices along with exchange rate, such as corporate borrowing spreads. • We need more/better general-equilibrium models.

Korean Borrowing Spreads U.S. Federal Funds Target Rate (percent) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 11/30/1999 04/30/2000 09/30/2000 02/28/2001 Corp BBB+ (5 year) Corp A- (3 year) USA Fed Funds Official Target Rate 07/31/2001 12/31/2001 05/31/2002 10/31/2002 03/31/2003 08/31/2003 01/31/2004 06/30/2004 11/30/2004 04/30/2005 09/30/2005 Corp BBBO (3 year) Corp BBB+ (1 year) Corp AAA (1 year) 02/28/2006 07/31/2006 12/31/2006 05/31/2007 10/31/2007 03/31/2008 08/31/2008 01/31/2009 06/30/2009 11/30/2009 04/30/2010 09/30/2010 Corp BBB- (3 year) Corp BBB+ (3 year) Corp AAA (3 year) 02/28/2011 07/31/2011 12/31/2011 05/31/2012 10/31/2012 03/31/2013 08/31/2013 01/31/2014 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 Korean Corporate Bond Spreads (basis points)

Evidence on Interest Rate Relationships •

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) US-base SR Multi-base Multi-base Multi-base US-base LR Multi-base Multi-base Multi-base SR SR with SR with VIX LR LR with LR with VIX Time Effects Percent Time Effects Percent Change Change US-base SR change 0.0571 (0.158) 0.202 0.0457 0.240 Multi-base SR change (0.171) (0.229) (0.177) US-base LR change 0.354 *** (0.0594) Multi-base LR 0.548 *** 0.430 *** 0.631 *** change (0.0668) (0.136) (0.0616) VIX Percent Change 0.00236 * 0.00291 *** (0.00139) (0.000663) Constant -0.00166 ** -0.00151 ** 0.000171 -0.00150 ** -0.000791 *** -0.000624 *** -0.00113 ** -0.000635 *** (0.000746) (0.000751) (0.000713) (0.000745) (0.000174) (0.000165) (0.000438) (0.000165) N 3273 3273 3273 3273 3076 3076 3076 3076 adj. R 2 0.034 0.036 0.061 0.036 0.048 0.084 0.138 0.094 Optimal Lags 5 5 5 5 0 0 0 0 p-value for F Test that growth and inflation change 2.81911E-12 5.34395E-12 2.29415E-07 2.31095E-11 0.07240475 0.17723405 0.04280572 0.13447361 variables (and their lags, where applicable) = 0

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) US-base Multi-base Multi-base Multi-base US-base Multi-base Multi-base Multi-base SR SR SR with SR with LR LR LR with LR with VIX Time VIX Time Percent Effects Percent Effects Change Change US-base SR change 0.0303 (0.166) Peg * US-base SR 0.464 * change (0.270) Multi-base SR change 0.0480 -0.0625 0.0856 (0.226) (0.268) (0.232) Peg * Multi-base SR 0.622 ** 0.491 ** 0.622 ** change (0.260) (0.239) (0.261) US-base LR change 0.344 *** (0.0606) Peg * US-base LR 0.221 change (0.203) Multi-base LR change 0.494 *** 0.418 *** 0.575 *** (0.0817) (0.136) (0.0755) Peg * Multi-base LR 0.164 0.0981 0.171 change (0.110) (0.110) (0.109) VIX Percent Change 0.00236 * 0.00293 *** (0.00139) (0.000668) Constant -0.00167 ** -0.00151 ** 0.000186 -0.00150 ** - - -0.00113 ** - 0.000792 *** 0.000618 *** 0.000628 *** (0.000741) (0.000737) (0.000718) (0.000731) (0.000174) (0.000164) (0.000438) (0.000164) N 3273 3273 3273 3273 3076 3076 3076 3076 adj R 2 0 035 0 038 0 062 0 038 0 048 0 086 0 138 0 095

Advanced versus Emerging/Developing • Both short and long-term correlations are higher for advanced than for emerging, though emerging data more sketchy. • Could reflect remaining capital controls in poorer countries. • For advanced countries, there is more policy coherence. • Sheets and Sockin (2013): growing correlation in arguments of Taylor rules.

So Monetary Autonomy Is Exercised … • … but if capital account openness makes the FS problem harder to manage, and if additional prudential policy instruments are unavailable, monetary policy will deviate more from its other targets at an optimum. • I will argue that financial openness inevitably degrades prudential tools. • So tradeoff for policy is worse … even if monetary policy is potentially effective.

Example • An EME is facing inflationary pressure and high domestic credit expansion. • If US yields fall, these pressures rise. • Country might prefer to opt for some interest rate increase, some currency appreciation, some direct lending restrictions (e.g. required bank capital). • But if foreign lenders can circumvent the restrictions, there will be more interest rate increase, more currency appreciation, less resistance to the inflation and the credit boom.

Why is FS Policy Harder in Open Economies? The Financial Trilemma The following three are not all mutually compatible (Schoenmaker 2013): 1. Financial stability. 2. Nonintervention in cross-border financial flows. 3. National control over financial supervision and regulation. Note: Valid under any exchange-rate regime .