Track 17: The New Attacker Model Dr. Ghassan Karame NEC - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Jan 11, 2024 •183 likes •256 views

Track 17: The New Attacker Model Dr. Ghassan Karame NEC Laboratories Europe Heidelberg, Germany ghassan@karame.org www.ghassankarame.com The Surge of a New Attacker Model Image Source: pcworld.com Image Source: TheLaw.tv Dr. Ghassan Karame

Track 17: The New Attacker Model Dr. Ghassan Karame NEC Laboratories Europe Heidelberg, Germany ghassan@karame.org www.ghassankarame.com
The Surge of a New Attacker Model Image Source: pcworld.com Image Source: TheLaw.tv Dr. Ghassan Karame
The Surge of a New Attacker Model Image Source: pcworld.com Source: wikipedia Image Source: TheLaw.tv Dr. Ghassan Karame
The New Attacker ▐ The new attacker controls the entire network  Mining data from social networks and Internet Service Providers (ISPs)  Performing illegal digital taps on private communication channels between individuals. ▐ The new attacker controls the secret keys  Secret keys were acquired by means of coercion, backdoors, etc. Image Source: ixdaily.com Dr. Ghassan Karame
This panel This panel will explore possible avenues to enhance user privacy in the presence of a powerful attacker model. Dr. Ghassan Karame

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