TPS Beamline Radiation Safety Interlock, a Bizarre Incident and its - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

TPS Beamline Radiation Safety Interlock, a Bizarre Incident and its Remedy Actions Joseph Liu, C.R. Chen Radiation and Operation Safety Division

TPS Personnel Safety Interlock shared tunnel of storage ring and booster Beamline hutch during Beam-On Radiation and Beamline Group Operation Safety Div.

Beamline Interlock TPS BL Interlock Logic Diagram Exp. Hutch Op. Hutch Front-End RF emergency emergency abnormal enable/disable Global Instrument & Control Rad. Safety Control Room abnormal display/reset FE Interlock HMS, PAB

Management Structure CR enable Control room I&C Trip beam Heavy Optical Photon Photon End station RF metal element shutter absorber shutter Shielding wall Experiment Accelerator Front end Optics hutch station Accelerator Operation Group Instrumentation & Vacuum Group Beamline Group Control Group Precision RF Group Mechanical Engineering Group

Beamline Emergency TPS EMG Shut-down Exp. Hutch Op. Hutch Front-End RF emergency emergency abnormal enable/disable Global Instrument & Control Rad. Safety Control Room abnormal display/reset

Hutch security failed yes yes Photon shutter Timer > 3 sec? normal closed? no no BL not ready Close HMS in to FE FE Upstream protects downstream

Interlock Logic Reviewed Hutch Interlock HMS Open Emergency Stop Enable PS Interlock Approval Door Closed CR Enable* Hutch Search Door locked Search start Button Completed Audio & Duck locked Hutch Visual Alarm Key Secured Secured Search Completed Button * Optics hutch: CR to FE Enable PS Closed Exp. Hutch: CR to BL Enable Signal (HMS to PAB) HMS Push Button On Drive HMS Open Radiation Safety Push Button Enable Logic Safety Bypass mode Protection (Interlock Off) Logic Bypass CR to FE Logic Enable FE Op. Approval Operation Enable Logic Beamline Ready CP Air Normal BL Operation Approval Logic FCV Open Component Protection Logic PAB Close FE HMS Interlock

TPS BL Safety Review Readiness Safety Report Interlock Check Radiation Survey Review others By Committee By BL & other By ROSD By Committee Mask shielding  TPS-05A OPEN    OK @300mA 4/19 Mask shielding  OPEN TPS-09A    OK @300mA 4/19   Mask shielding TPS-21A OPEN   @250mA 5/19 OK 5/26 @300mA 5/26  Mask shielding  TEST TPS-23A   （ Temporary ） OK @300mA 5/26 5/26 Mask shielding  TPS-25A OPEN    OK @300mA 4/19 × ＠ 250mA 5/19 Mask shielding Install TPS-41A   OK × ＠ 300mA 5/26 TPS-45A  Install

TPS 23 Incident Sep. 22, 2016 Radiation survey-OK 1. Measure dose inside hutch 2. HMS failed to close 3. BG BG BG BG BG BG (Not installed) (Not installed)

Radiation Exposure (Not installed) (Not installed) 1.3 mSv 0.3 mSv 0.03 mSv Average dose rate = 160 mSv/h TLD reading

Sequence SOP to access hutch Consequence ① close HMS ① HMS didn’t close ② unlock door ② beam didn’t trip ③ open door

The Cause ● BEAM ON when HUTCH OPEN National Instruments, NI Compact RIO 9074

Remedy Actions-FE ● NI Distributed System Manager on NI Compact RIO 9074----BUG ● Short term:  Switch IO from Real Time platform to FPGA system  Adding PLC as a watch dog ● Mid term:  Fail-Safe  Redundancy

Remedy Actions-BL Second route to trip beam Door locked when beam-on

Conclusions