2014 BWC Meeting of Experts Geneva , August 4-8, 2014 Biosecurity Education Sideline Event University of Insubria, August 7 The Role of a Biosecurity The Role of a Biosecurity Summit in Promoting Scientist Summit in Promoting Scientist Engagement and Education BY MAURIZIO MARTELLINI DIREC TOR, ICIS , UNIVERSITY OF INS UBRIA A ND SEC RETA RY G ENERA L, LA NDA U NETWORK C ENTRO VOLTA , C OM O, ITA LY
1. Changing International Security Landscape Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) Biosecurity Summit (BSS) � Increasing interest in nuclear � Revolution in the life sciences and energy for electric energy rapid growth of novel production and developments with multiple uses research/industrial/medical/ other � Dual-use researches of concern (in civilian applications synthetic biology, nano- synthetic biology, nano- � Potential risks of misuse, sabotage Potential risks of misuse, sabotage biotechnology, neural science, etc.) biotechnology, neural science, etc.) and theft of radioactive/HEU � Difficulties to verify compliance materials and of facilities with international obligations worldwide � Growing fears of non-state actors � Growing fears of non-state actors acquiring or developing biological acquiring nuclear weapon usable weapons materials (like the HEU) and radioactive sources (for radioactive dispersion devices) � Fragmentation of the global nuclear security architecture
1. Changing International Security Landscape: Comments and Recommendations � The end of the Cold War and the rapid revolution in science and technology have given rise to a range of security challenges and concern which require flexible approaches and systematic action at multiple levels. The biological non-proliferation regime is a case in point in this regard, not least because of its inherent point in this regard, not least because of its inherent limitations including the lack of verification system and adequate international infrastructure to coordinate the global biosecurity efforts. Given tremendous progress made in enhancing nuclear security, it is important to examine the extent to which a Biosecurity Summit (BSS) modeled on the Nuclear Security Summit could serve as a comprehensive framework for effectively addressing and tackling novel biosecurity concerns
2. Aims Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) Biosecurity Summit (BSS) � To promote nuclear concrete security � To strengthen the international measures, including the reduction of prohibition against biological weapons the amount of dangerous nuclear enshrined in the Biological and Toxin material in the world by moving from a Weapons Convention National approach to a voluntary � To enhance awareness and education Multilateral system build up on the Multilateral system build up on the in BioSecurity and Safety (B2S) in BioSecurity and Safety (B2S) 2010, 2012 and 2014 NSSs objectives 2010, 2012 and 2014 NSSs objectives � To prevent non-state actors from and achievements developing or otherwise acquiring � To strengthen the - nuclear security biological weapons regime (including not only the NPT) and the role of the IAEA � To prevent non-state actors from acquiring nuclear weapon usable materials and radioactive sources, and from sabotaging nuclear infrastructures � Enhancing a nuclear security culture integrated with a nuclear safety perspective
2. Aims: Comments and Recommendations � The BSS could serve as an important international mechanism for consolidating the efforts to ensure that the life sciences are not misused for hostile purposes. It could facilitate the coordination of projects and initiatives and help with better projects and initiatives and help with better channeling resources, evaluating effectiveness and strengthening “Biosecurity Awarness and Biotech (professional) Responsibility”
3. Key International Treaties and Agreements Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) Biosecurity Summit (BSS) � NPT (it does not make � 1925 Geneva Protocol reference to non-state actors, � BTWC but its 2010 Review � CWC Conference seems to signal � UNSC Resolution 1540 and its that the illicit trafficking issue that the illicit trafficking issue further extensions further extensions must be addressed � Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety irrespectively from the nature to the Convention on Biological of the cause) Diversity � Convention on Nuclear Safety ( it � WHO IHR 2005 is relevant for a holistic extension of the NSS scope to the safety issue as hinted at the Seoul 2012 NSS) � UNSC Resolution 1540 and its further extensions
3. Key International Treaties and Agreements: Comments and Recommendations � While those lists are only indicative and not exhaustive, the limitations of the biological non- proliferation regime are immediately evident. Unlike the NPT or CWC, the BTWC is a relatively weak treaty that lacks verification mechanisms and weak treaty that lacks verification mechanisms and implementing body. In terms of universalisation, 10 countries are yet to ratify the BTWC and another 16 are yet to join the Treaty. By contrast, the NPT has 189 Member States and the CWC has 190
4. International Initiatives and Mechanisms of Support Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) Biosecurity Summit (BSS) The Global Partnership Against the Spread of � The Global Partnership Against the � Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction Spread of Weapons and Materials (GP) of Mass Destruction (GP) The EU CBRN Centres of Excellence (CoEs) � � The EU CBRN Centres of Convention on the Physical Protection of � Excellence (CoEs) Excellence (CoEs) Nuclear Material (CPPNM) Nuclear Material (CPPNM) Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of � � INTERPOL Radioactive Sources � 1540 Committee International Convention for the Suppression � of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism � International Federation of Global Initiative to Combact Nuclear Biosafety Associations (IFBA) � Terrorism (GICNT) INTERPOL � 1540 Committee � World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) � International Nuclear Security Education � Network (INSEN) IAEA Nuclear Security Support Centres � (NSSCs)
4. International Initiatives and Mechanisms of Support: Comments and Recommendations � There is some overlap between the international politically- motivated efforts to promote nuclear security and biosecurity. However, it needs to be highlighted that the range of entities involved in promoting nuclear security include a range of non- government body, such as representatives of industry and academia. WINS plays a crucial role in engaging the private sector with nuclear security issues by focusing on capacity sector with nuclear security issues by focusing on capacity building, outreach and developing sustainable professional building, outreach and developing sustainable professional competency. The EU CBRN CoEs, NSSCs, INSEN constitute key mechanisms for promoting nuclear security awareness, training and education at several levels by supporting institutions in developing courses, exchanging training materials and sharing best practices, codes of conduct and lessons learned. By contrast, the engagement of biotechnology industry with biosecurity issues has remained limited. Moreover, many of the initiatives in the area of biosecurity are carried out in an ad-hoc manner through NGOs tasked with specific projects. This in turn creates obstacles to coordination, duplication of efforts and lack of sustainability
5. Key International Organizations Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) Biosecurity Summit (BSS) � International Atomic � BTWC Implementation Energy Agency (IAEA) Support Unit (SU) � World Health Organisation � World Health Organisation (WHO) � World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) � Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
5. Key International Organizations: Comments and Recommendations (1) � The IAEA is the principal international organisation tasked with coordinating and consolidating the efforts in fostering nuclear security worldwide. Since 2002, the IAEA Board of Governors prepares and approves 3-year Nuclear Security Plans outlining milestones and objectives to be met at global level for the purpose of ensuring that nuclear and radioactive materials are only used for peaceful purposes. The implementation of the Plans is financed through a Nuclear Security Fund to which Member States can contribute on a volunteer basis. By Fund to which Member States can contribute on a volunteer basis. By contrast, there is still an urgent need for international leadership in the contrast, there is still an urgent need for international leadership in the area of biosecurity. The BTWC Implementation Support Unit remains under-staffed and under-funded to fulfil the wide mandate of activities performed by the IAEA or the OPCW. Despite being a critical factor in the efforts to enhance biosecurity, the WHO has mainly focused its attention on natural outbreaks of disease and laboratory biosafety measures. Issues related to the hostile misapplication of novel life science research are still regarded as marginal. It is evident therefore that there is a gap in the area of biosecurity international leadership and the launch of a Biosecurity Summit could be instrumental in consolidating the global efforts to ensure that the life sciences are not misused for hostile purposes.
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