Lecture Series on Culture and Cognition, LSE, June 2010 The early ontogeny of collective intentionality and normativity Hannes Rakoczy Institute of Psychology, University of Göttingen
1. Simple forms of intentionality 1 st order Common primate heritage � perception of an objective world & instrumental intentional action 2. Simple intentionality 2 nd order (partly) common � understanding perception & action primate heritage 3. Shared/collective WE-intentionality uniquely human � joint attention (triangulation), communication, cooperation … 4. Cognitive-cultural dialectics enables Entry into collective intentionality & Individual intentionality (1 st & 2 nd order) culture - Language - Conventional practices transforms Rakoczy & Tomasello, 2007; Tomasello et al., 2005. BBS ; Tomasello & Rakoczy, 2003. Mind & Language
Collective intentionality: some conceptual distinctions � I�intentionality versus WE�intentionality �������������������������������������������������� ��������������� „In such cases [collective actions] one does act individually, but one‘s individual action – playing the violin part, for example, or passing the ball to another player- are done as part of the collective berhavior. [...] When I am engaged in collective action, I am doing what I am doing as part of our doing what we are doing. In all of the cases, an agent is acting, and doing what he or she does, only as part of a collective action“ (Searle, 2005, p.6)
Collective intentionality: some conceptual distinctions � I�intentionality versus WE�intentionality �������������������������������������������������� ��������������� � (Ir�)reducibilty of WE�intentionality Actor – attitude (content) − ����� ����������� �� ��!���"���� − #�����$��������� ����������� %��� �$��������� ������������&� − '������ �$��������� ����������� ������� ����������������������� ��������������� � Collective intentionality & normativity
Hierarchical Taxonomy of Facts (Searle, 1995) Intentionality Collective intentionality (= social facts) Individual intentionality (We do Y) (I do X) Individual 2nd order Cooperation (I know (you do X)) (without function assignment) simple complex � ���� ����!(��� ������$!������ �)�*���()� �)�*���()� 2 nd year + Communication + Collaborative activities
Cooperation in the second year Collaboration: division of labour and role structure � � coordination of roles & relevant communication �,����%�� �����-�����.� � spontaneous ���� �������� ��������� �'�� ����� �����-�����&����������� ��'�� ����������&� � ������ ������������� �������� �,����%�� �����-�����.�
Hierarchical Taxonomy of Facts (Searle, 1995) Intentionality Collective intentionality (= social facts) Individual intentionality (We do Y) (I do X) Individual 2nd order Assignment of Functions Cooperation (I know (you do X)) (without function assignment) Causal usage functions Status Functions simple complex ��*�� �� ������/���0��� ��*�� �� ����)� � ���� ����!(��� ������$!������ �)�*���()� �)�*���()� £ X counts as Y in context C � Institutional facts � � �
„Human beings have a capacity which, as far as I can tell, is not possessed by any other animal species, to assign functions to objects where the objects cannot perform the function in virtue of their physical structure alone, but only in virtue of the collective assignment or acceptance of the object as having a certain status and with that status a function. Obvious examples are money, private property and positions of political leadership“ (Searle, 2005, p. 7/8) Ontogenetic cradle king � Pretend play : „this piece of wood counts as an apple in our pretense“ (Walton, 1990) � Other games „this piece of wood counts as queen in chess“
Pretend play: developmental and comparative aspects Ontogeny: Emergence in second year � Comparatively: (most likely) uniquely human � Logical structure: assignment of status functions: � “This cup counts as ‘full‘ in our game“ � normative inferential structure: “If the cup counts as ‘full‘ in the game, then it is to be treated accordingly“ � � e.g. drink from it etc. � �
Status functions in pretend play (a) Early understanding & sharing of pretense (b) Status functions & context�specificity in pretend play (c) Grasping the normative structure of pretense
(a) Early understanding & sharing of pretense ����������1� ���������������� ���� �$��� ��$������) ������� 2��!�$!��*�0�����2- � ��)��( ���3 4��������( ���3 Rakoczy et al. (2004). Developmental Psychology ; Rakoczy et al. (2006). Br.J.Dev.Psy ; Rakoczy & Tomasello, 2006. Developmental Science
��*�0��(!��!�$�456789� M O D E ��)��(���� ��� 4��������(���� ��� L CHILD perceives both ������������� ������������ ”, respectively A C T + �����)� ����:���)���� ������ ��� + ���������� ��� I O + � �� ��������$���������������������� + � �� ��������$��������� �������� N ������� ��-(-����� ���������� ��� ������ ��-(-� ��������������%� ����������
Inferential pretense Inferential trying 2 22-month-olds 26-month-olds 36-month-olds 1.8 1.6 * Number of responses 1.4 * 1.2 * * * p = .08. 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 Pretense Trying Pretense Trying Pretense Trying model model model model model model (i) Action competence from 2 years (ii) Explicit linguistic competence years later only
(b) status functions & context specificity Y 1 Context 1 � X counts as Y in context C X Y 2 Context 2
Studies 1a/1b Studies 2a/2b counts as counts as ,)�����7�%��;) ������������ �������-� ����������������
(c) grasping the normative structure of joint pretending sandwich soap 7�%��;)������-� ������������� ����������
2 1.8 1.6 1.4 mean sum of trials (0-2) * 1.2 implicit protest other implicit negative protest 1 explicit protest 0.8 * 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 Experimental Control Experimental Control 2-year-olds 3-year-olds
Status functions in ����� ����� Intentionality Collective intentionality (= social facts) Individual intentionality (We do Y) (I do X) Individual 2nd order Assignment of Functions Cooperation (I know (you do X)) (without function assignment) Causal usage functions Status Functions simple complex ��*�� �� ������/���0��� ��*�� �� ����)� � ���� ����!(��� ������$!������ �)�*���()� �)�*���()� king X counts as Y in context C � Institutional facts � � �
Grasping the normative structure of simple ���� ����� Game phase: E 1 and child play a game Test phase: Third party (puppet) comes and performs act A Experimental condition: Control condition: = mistake ≠ mistake 7�%��;)��,����%�� �����������������-� ������������� ������������������ ��
Normative condition Control condition DEMO A Target act: „This is ������ “ Neutral: „Look! I can do this“ B Accident: „Oops, that‘s not ������ “ Neutral: „Look! And I can do that“ Puppet: „I‘m gonna DAX as well“ Puppet: „My turn now“ TEST � performs B � performs B � � � � � �
2 1.8 1.6 mean sum score (0-2) 1.4 * 1.2 imperative protest 1 normative protest p < .11 0.8 * 0.6 0.4 n.s. 0.2 0 Experimental Control Experimental Control 2-year-olds 3-year-olds
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