Angelo Prado Neal Harris Yoel Gluck SSL, GONE IN 30 SECONDS b r e a c h A BREACH beyond CRIME SSL, GONE IN 30 SECONDS
AGENDA Proceed with caution: Review of CRIME Introducing BREACH In the weeds Demo time! Mitigations b r e a c h SSL, GONE IN 30 SECONDS
PREVIOUSLY... CRIME Target Requirements Presented at Secrets in HTTP TLS compression ekoparty 2012 headers MITM A browser Juliano Rizzo Thai Duong b r e a c h SSL, GONE IN 30 SECONDS
SO ABOUT CRIME... The Compression Oracle: SSL doesn’t hide length SSL/SPDY compress headers CRIME issues requests with every possible character, and measures the ciphertext length Looks for the plaintext which compresses the most – guesses the secret byte by byte Requires small bootstrapping sequence knownKeyPrefix=secretCookieValue b r e a c h SSL, GONE IN 30 SECONDS
COMPRESSION OVERVIEW DEFLATE / GZIP LZ77: reducing redundancy Googling the googles -> Googling the g(-13,4)s Huffman coding: replace common bytes with shorter codes b r e a c h SSL, GONE IN 30 SECONDS
IT’S FIXED! TLS Compression Disabled b r e a c h SSL, GONE IN 30 SECONDS
DO NOT PANIC: TUBES SECURE b r e a c h SSL, GONE IN 30 SECONDS
Or are they? b r e a c h SSL, GONE IN 30 SECONDS
[ let’s bring it back to life] b r e a c h SSL, GONE IN 30 SECONDS
FIRST THINGS FIRST: FIX WIKIPEDIA b r e a c h SSL, GONE IN 30 SECONDS
INTRODUCING B rowser R econnaissance & E xfiltration via BREACH A daptive C ompression of H ypertext b r e a c h SSL, GONE IN 30 SECONDS
A CRIME AGAINST THE RESPONSE BODY b r e a c h SSL, GONE IN 30 SECONDS
(sample traffic) b r e a c h SSL, GONE IN 30 SECONDS
BREACH / the ingredients GZIP A secret in the response body · Very prevalent, any browser · CSRF, PII, ViewState … anything! Fairly stable pages Attacker-supplied guess · Less than 30 seconds for · In response body simple pages Three-character prefix MITM / traffic visibility · To bootstrap compression · No SSL tampering / downgrade Any version of SSL / TLS b r e a c h SSL, GONE IN 30 SECONDS
[PREFIX / sample bootstrap] secret (CSRF token) guess b r e a c h SSL, GONE IN 30 SECONDS
BREACH / architecture b r e a c h SSL, GONE IN 30 SECONDS
BREACH / command & control b r e a c h SSL, GONE IN 30 SECONDS
C&C/ logic Traffic Monitor MITM: ARP spoofing, Transparent relay SSL proxy DNS, DHCP, WPAD… HTML/JS Controller I. Dynamically generated for specific target server II. Injects & listens to iframe streamer from c&c:81 that dictates the new HTTP requests to be performed ( img.src=. ..) III. Issues the outbound HTTP requests to the target site via the victim's browser, session-riding a valid SSL channel IV. Upon synchronous completion of every request ( onerror ) , performs a unique callback to c&c:82 for the Traffic Monitor to measure encrypted response size b r e a c h SSL, GONE IN 30 SECONDS
C&C/ logic Main C&C Driver Coordinates character guessing Adaptively issues requests to target site Listens to JS callbacks upon request completion Measures -inbound- packets length Has built-in intelligence for compression oracle runtime recovery b r e a c h SSL, GONE IN 30 SECONDS
THE ORACLE MEASURE GUESSING ERROR SIZE DELTA BYTE-BY-BYTE RECOVERY b r e a c h SSL, GONE IN 30 SECONDS
SSL REVEALS LENGTH TCP connection SSL records HTTP clear text SSL cipher text 10 bytes b r e a c h SSL, GONE IN 30 SECONDS
COMPRESSION ORACLE (I) <html> … 48 bytes supersecret tkn= … supersecreX guess= after gzip <html> … 3 8 bytes supersecret tkn= … (-22, 10)X guess= b r e a c h SSL, GONE IN 30 SECONDS
COMPRESSION ORACLE (II) <html> … 48 bytes supersecret tkn= … supersecret guess= after gzip <html> … 3 7 bytes supersecret tkn= … (-22, 11) guess= b r e a c h SSL, GONE IN 30 SECONDS
b r e a c h SSL, GONE IN 30 SECONDS
THE ORACLE Huffman Coding Nightmares Correct Guess https://target-server.com/page.php?blah=blah2... &secret=4bf (response: 1358 bytes) b Incorrect Guess https://target-server.com/page.php?blah=blah2... a &secret=4bf (response: 1358 bytes) b r e a c h SSL, GONE IN 30 SECONDS
THE ORACLE Fighting Huffman Coding Two Tries + random [ dynamic ] padding https://target-server.com/page.php?blah=blah2... &secret=4bf {}{}(...){}{}{}{}{} 7 &secret=4bf {}{}(...){}{}{}{}{} 7 Character set pool + random padding https://target-server.com/page.php?blah=blah2... &secret=4bf {}{}(...){}{}{}{}{}---a-b-c-d- … -5-6-8-9- … 7 8 &secret=4bf {}{}(...){}{}{}{}{}---a-b-c-d- … -5-6-7-9- … b r e a c h SSL, GONE IN 30 SECONDS
THE ORACLE Two Tries Reality Less than ideal conditions: In theory, two-tries allows for short-circuiting once winner is found In practice, still need to evaluate all candidates Huffman encoding causes collisions b r e a c h SSL, GONE IN 30 SECONDS
ROADBLOCKS Conflict & Recovery mechanisms (no winners / too many winners) Look-ahead (2+ characters) – reliable, but expensive Best value / averages Rollback (last-known conflict) Check compression ratio of guess string Page URL / HTML entity encoding Can interfere with bootstrapping b r e a c h SSL, GONE IN 30 SECONDS
MORE ROADBLOCKS Stream cipher vs. block cipher Stream cipher reveals exact plain text length 10 bytes Compressed HTTP response SSL cipher text b r e a c h SSL, GONE IN 30 SECONDS
MORE ROADBLOCKS Stream cipher vs. block cipher Block cipher hides exact plain text length 16 bytes Compressed HTTP response Compressed HTTP response SSL cipher text Align response to a tipping point Guess Window (keeping response aligned) b r e a c h SSL, GONE IN 30 SECONDS
EVEN MORE ROADBLOCKS Keep-Alive (a premature death) Image requests vs. scripts vs. CORS requests Browser synchronicity limits (1x) Hard to correlate HTTP requests to TCP segments Filtering out noise Active application? Background polling? b r e a c h SSL, GONE IN 30 SECONDS
YET MORE ROADBLOCKS ‘Unstable’ pages (w/ random DOM blocks) Averaging & outlier removal The war against Huffman coding Weight (symbol) normalization Circumventing cache Random timestamp Other Oracles Patent-pending! b r e a c h SSL, GONE IN 30 SECONDS
OVERWHELMED? b r e a c h SSL, GONE IN 30 SECONDS
DEMO TIME (let us pray) b r e a c h SSL, GONE IN 30 SECONDS
THE TOOL b r e a c h SSL, GONE IN 30 SECONDS
MITIGATIONS RANDOMIZING DYNAMIC MASKING THE LENGTH SECRETS THE SECRET · variable padding · dynamic CSRF · random XOR – easy, · fighting against math tokens per request dirty, practical path · /FAIL · downstream enough SEPARATING CSRF-PROTECT THROTTLING SECRETS EVERYTHING & MONITORING · deliver secrets in · unrealistic input-less servlets DISABLING GZIP · chunked secret FOR DYNAMIC separation (lib patch) PAGES b r e a c h SSL, GONE IN 30 SECONDS
FUTUREWORK Better understanding of DEFLATE / GZIP Beyond HTTPS Very generic side-channel Other protocols, contexts? Stay tuned for the next BREACH b r e a c h SSL, GONE IN 30 SECONDS
WANT MORE? AGENTS STANDING BY BreachAttack.com PAPER PRESENTATION POC TOOL b r e a c h SSL, GONE IN 30 SECONDS
THANK YOU EVERYBODY ! b r e a c h SSL, GONE IN 30 SECONDS
BREACHATTACK.COM Angelo Prado Neal Harris Yoel Gluck angelpm@gmail.com neal.harris@gmail.com yoel.gluck2@gmail.com @PradoAngelo @IAmTheNeal If you liked the talk*, don’t forget to scan your badge for the evaluation survey * ignore otherwise b r e a c h SSL, GONE IN 30 SECONDS
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