Socrates, Meno, and Definitions David Pattillo University of Notre - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Socrates, Meno, and Definitions David Pattillo University of Notre Dame Fall, 2015

Platontic Dialogues “Meno” is a dialogue written by Plato (429-347 B.C) You’ll notice that the dialogue is between Socrates (470-399 B.C), Plato’s teacher, and Meno. This is the style of Plato’s writings. Socrates never wrote anything, rather he walked the streets of Athens talking to people. Plato’s dialogues are a mix of things Socrates likely actually said and Plato’s own philosophical views which he puts in the mouth of Socrates. For the sake of this class, we will not attempt to distinguish Plato’s views from Socrates’ views.

Socrates Socrates was never popular...Why? Socratic method: (proceeds by Socrates asking questions) You think you know something ↓ You realize you never actually understood it to begin with The person is left stunned/perplexed The end goal is not numbness; the end goal is to realize one’s ignorance so that one can start building up one’s knowledge in a less confused way.

Meno The Meno begins by Meno asking Socrates the question Can you tell me Socrates, can virtue be taught? Or is it not teachable but the result of practice, or is it neither or these, but men possess it by nature or some other way? Socrates responds I do not even have any knowledge of what virtue itself is...If I do not know what something is, how could I know what qualities it possesses? This is Plato’s doctrine of the Primacy of Definitions: Every inquiry about X ought to begin with the question “What is X?” Is this plausible?

Definitions Meno repeatedly tries and fails to give a definition of virtue Through this Plato is trying to show us the proper method for giving definitions There are at least 5 things Plato shows us about a good definition of X: ◮ It should not confuse X with instances of X (72b, 73e) Meno gives a list of different virtues for men, women, children, slaves etc. Socrates compares this to giving different instances of bees. What we want to know to define “beehood” is what they have in common in virtue of all being bees (likewise with health, strength). We want to know what unites all instances of virtue as virtues.

Definitions There are at least 5 things Plato shows us about a good definition of X: ◮ It should not confuse X with instances of X (72b, 73e) ◮ It should be given in terms that are clearer than X (75d, 76d) Socrates define shape as that which always follows color Meno complains that this is not helpful because color is no more clear than shape Socrates responds in a mocking way by defining color as “an effluvium from shapes which fits the sight and is perceived,” which Meno claims to understand. The point is that his first definition was in fact much clearer, but this clarity condition is somewhat subjective

Definitions There are at least 5 things Plato shows us about a good definition of X: ◮ It should not confuse X with instances of X (72b, 73e) ◮ It should be given in terms that are clearer than X (75d, 76d) ◮ It should not contain superfluous material (77b-78b) Meno defines virtue as desiring beautiful (good) things and having the power to acquire them. Socrates argues that everyone always desires good things, even if they are mistaken in what things are actually good. Thus, desiring good things is a superfluous condition Compare this to taking any of the previous necessary and sufficient conditions we’ve had and sticking on the end “and either being Teddy Roosevelt or not being Teddy Roosevelt”. It is true of everything, so it does not contribute anything important to our conditions.

Definitions There are at least 5 things Plato shows us about a good definition of X: ◮ It should not confuse X with instances of X (72b, 73e) ◮ It should be given in terms that are clearer than X (75d, 76d) ◮ It should not contain superfluous material (77b-78b) ◮ It should not be circular (78c-79c) Meno, at Socrates prompting, defines virtue as the power of securing good things justly and piously Justice and piety are virtues, so this amounts to saying that an action is a virtue if it is performed with virtue This is obviously only helpful if we already know what virtue is; i.e. it is unhelpful as a definition

Definitions There are at least 5 things Plato shows us about a good definition of X: ◮ It should not confuse X with instances of X (72b, 73e) ◮ It should be given in terms that are clearer than X (75d, 76d) ◮ It should not contain superfluous material (77b-78b) ◮ It should not be circular (78c-79c) ◮ It should give necessary and sufficient conditions (73d) Meno defines virtue as being able to rule over people Socrates points out that this is not necessary, because children and slaves can be virtuous Also, it is not sufficient because it does not require them to rule justly Are these plausible? Are there others?