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Selected issues I. IMF resources and reform II. Financial - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Selected issues I. IMF resources and reform II. Financial Transaction Tax III. Tax havens PUZZLE 1: Why did Brazil agree with the 2010 reform (incl. quota doubling, quota realignment, Board reform)? Brazils quota from 1.78 to 2.32%, but


  1. Selected issues

  2. I. IMF resources and reform II. Financial Transaction Tax III. Tax havens

  3. PUZZLE 1: Why did Brazil agree with the 2010 reform (incl. quota doubling, quota realignment, Board reform)?  Brazil’s quota from 1.78 to 2.32%, but GDP blend share is 2.65%.  Calculated quota share would be larger than 2.65% if quota formula took into account more GDP PPP (Brazil: 2.9 %), and population.

  4.  Overall net shift to emerging and developing economies (EMDCs) = 2.6 % (South Korea and Singapore included).  Executive Board : “minus 2 advanced EU seats” (full -time equivalent) – not secured yet that these FTE seats go to EMDCs  US veto intact – European Managing Director

  5.  Still, Brazil committed about 13.5 billion USD to New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB) (= Russia, India) This might be considered as a disappointing deal for Brazil. Theoretically, Brazil could have “walked away”, by not agreeing and not contributing to the NAB.

  6.  No agreement within BRIC to take tough stance. Brazil and India most vocal in criticizing status quo. China patient and “peaceful rise.”  Partnership between US and BRICs on IMF reform (at the expense of EU).  Brazil responsible player at zenith of global financial crisis, attached to IMF. Yet, Brazil contributes only 2.38 % of NAB (same order of magnitude as Belgium, Netherlands, Switzerland).

  7.  Walking away would have been very symbolic, but only symbolic. EU countries could compensate for non-participation by BRICs.  Moment of truth has yet to come: revision of Quota Formula by Jan. 2013 and new quota review by 2014 = integral part of 2010 reform package.  Managing Director: BRICs divided …

  8.  Brazil is already in Executive Board ! – the stakes have to be put into perspective.  Agenda of Brazil in favor of other EMDCs ?

  9.  IMF asks more money, pledges up to $430 billion been made.  But BRICs make concrete new pledges conditional upon full implementation of 2010 reform, including quota formula (but nothing concrete on formula agreed yet).  Timely implementation of 2010 package jeopardized by legislative process in US.

  10.  Unclear how Board reform will work out – what should Europeans do ? ◦ Possibility that small EU countries rotate with each other or with “not advanced” (i.e. transitional) EU/European countries. ◦ Rotation Belgium with Turkey ? (unlikely) ◦ Small EU countries and Switzerland disappear from Board ? ◦ Rotation among large EU countries or with small European countries (unwilling…) ◦ Exit of Belgium, Netherlands, and the like is not only possible option and not desirable.  IMF is an official multilateral institution, based on free constituency formation, and should not be run by the G20.

  11.  PUZZLE II: Where is the spirit of 2004, when Presidents Lula and Chirac together campaigned for the Tobin tax ?

  12.  2002: Disappointment about 2002 UN Conference “ Financing for Development” in Monterrey.  2004: Creation of Leading Group (Groupe Pilote) on Innovative Financing for Development (not only Tobin tax), led by Pres. Chirac and Pres. Lula. (sort of “ coalition of the willing ”)  Moment of hope for African countries, civil society worldwide, etc.

  13.  Global financial crisis  new momentum in EU (in particular geared at letting financial sector pay for the crisis)  At G20: Financial Transaction Tax for development and climate finance on the agenda – campaign led by Pres. Sarkozy (incl. Bill Gates report).

  14.  At G20 Cannes summit Nov. 2011: Pres. Sarkozy announces support from Brazil, Argentina, South Africa and others. Pres. Roussef : “We are not opposed if others agree”.  More forceful endorsement will be needed  Brazilian policies and debate on domestic FTT, but outside global/G20 framework.

  15.  Domestic FTT debate is difficult.  Position of financial establishment ?  Little momentum for global FTT in emerging economies across the board – in EM’s other experience with crisis and role of their financial sectors therein.

  16.  Global financial crisis  downward pressure on official development aid, but growing demand for additional finance for climate mitigation and adaption. Not many creative plans on the table.  After years of struggle some momentum in the Euro area at the highest level, for this highly development-relevant agenda.  But large EMDCs lukewarm…  Europeans somewhat isolated.

  17.  Stronger partnership between EU and Brazil on combatting tax havens, along with others.  Evaluation in OECD-led Global Forum. ◦ “Weak” OECD standard on information exchange upon request written stone ? ◦ Global and Brazilian support for EU model of automatic information exchange ? ◦ Support by India ◦ Development-relevant agenda

  18.  Brazil emerging, assertive, but (too) pragmatic player ?  EU conservative on IMF reform, but isolated in certain progressive, development-relevant agendas ?  Other examples: G20 and commodities; G20 development working group and aid.

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