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Aug 29, 2022 •244 likes •516 views

Return-to-libc Attacks Outline Non-executable Stack countermeasure How to defeat the countermeasure Tasks involved in the attack Function Prologue and Epilogue Launching attack Non-executable Stack Running shellcode in C

  1. Return-to-libc Attacks

  2. Outline ● Non-executable Stack countermeasure ● How to defeat the countermeasure ● Tasks involved in the attack ● Function Prologue and Epilogue ● Launching attack

  3. Non-executable Stack Running shellcode in C program Calls shellcode

  4. Non-executable Stack ● With executable stack ● With non-executable stack

  5. How to Defeat This Countermeasure Jump to existing code: e.g. libc library. Function: system(cmd) : cmd argument is a command which gets executed.

  6. Environment Setup This code has potential buffer overflow problem in vul_func() Buffer overflow problem

  7. Environment Setup “Non executable stack” countermeasure is switched on , StackGuard protection is switched off and address randomization is turned off . Root owned Set-UID program.

  8. Overview of the Attack Task A : Find address of system() . ● To overwrite return address with system()’s address. Task B : Find address of the “/bin/sh” string. ● To run command “/bin/sh” from system() Task C : Construct arguments for system() ● To find location in the stack to place “/bin/sh” address (argument for system())

  9. Task A : To Find system() ’s Address. ● Debug the vulnerable program using gdb ● Using p (print) command, print address of system() and exit().

  10. Task B : To Find “/bin/sh” String Address Export an environment variable called “ MYSHELL ” with value “ /bin/sh ”. MYSHELL is passed to the vulnerable program as an environment variable, which is stored on the stack. We can find its address.

  11. Task B : To Find “/bin/sh” String Address Export “ MYSHELL ” environment variable and execute the code. Code to display address of environment variable

  12. Task B : Some Considerations ● Address of “MYSHELL” environment variable is sensitive to the length of the program name. ● If the program name is changed from env55 to env77, we get a different address.

  13. Task C : Argument for system() ● Arguments are accessed with respect to ebp . ● Argument for system() needs to be on the stack. Need to know where exactly ebp is after we have “returned” to system(), so we can put the argument at ebp + 8 . Frame for the system() function

  14. Task C : Argument for system() Function Prologue esp : Stack pointer ebp : Frame Pointer

  15. Task C : Argument for system() Function Epilogue esp : Stack pointer ebp : Frame Pointer

  16. Function Prologue and Epilogue example 1 2 1 Function prologue Function epilogue 2 8(%ebp) ⇒ %ebp + 8

  17. How to Find system()’s Argument Address? Change ebp and esp Modified Use of vul_func() system() Return system()’s epilogue prologue Address argument ● In order to find the system() argument, we need to understand how the ebp and esp registers change with the function calls. ● Between the time when return address is modified and system argument is used, vul_func() returns and system() prologue begins.

  18. Memory Map to Understand system() Argument

  19. Flow Chart to understand system() argument Return address is ebp is replaced by esp changed to system() Jump to system() after vul_func() epilogue address. “/bin/sh” is stored in ebp is set to current system() prologue is ebp+8 value of esp executed Check the memory map ebp + 4 is treated as return address of system(). We can put exit() address so that on system() return exit() is called and the program doesn’t crash.

  20. Malicious Code ebp + 12 ebp + 8 ebp + 4

  21. Launch the attack Execute the exploit code and then the vulnerable code ●

  22. Return-Oriented Programming ● In the return-to-libc attack, we can only chain two functions together ● The technique can be generalized: ○ Chain many functions together ○ Chain blocks of code together ● The generalized technique is called Return-Oriented Programming (ROP)

  23. Chaining Function Calls (without Arguments)

  24. Chaining Function Calls with Arguments Idea: skipping function prologue

  25. Chaining Function Calls with Arguments Idea: using leave and ret

  26. Chaining Function Calls with Zero in the Argument Idea: using a function call to dynamically change argument to zero on the stack Sequence of function calls (T is the address of the zero): use 4 sprint() to change setuid()’s argument to zero, before the setuid function is invoked. Invoke setuid(0) before invoking system(“/bin/sh”) can defeat the privilege- dropping countermeasure implemented by shell programs.

  27. Summary ● The Non-executable-stack mechanism can be bypassed ● To conduct the attack, we need to understand low-level details about function invocation ● The technique can be further generalized to Return Oriented Programming (ROP)

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