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Recent Results and Future Directions in Strategy Logic Fabio Mogavero 1 Aniello Murano 1 Giuseppe Perelli 1 Moshe Y. Vardi 2 1 Universit degli Studi di Napoli "Federico II", Napoli, Italy 2 Rice University, Houston, Texas, USA 10th


  1. Recent Results and Future Directions in Strategy Logic Fabio Mogavero 1 Aniello Murano 1 Giuseppe Perelli 1 Moshe Y. Vardi 2 1 Università degli Studi di Napoli "Federico II", Napoli, Italy 2 Rice University, Houston, Texas, USA 10th school about Modelling and Verifying Parallel Processes Marseille, France, December 4th, 2012 Fabio Mogavero, Aniello Murano, Giuseppe Perelli , Moshe Y. Vardi Università degli Studi di Napoli "Federico II", Rice University Recent Results and Future Directions in Strategy Logic 1 / 16

  2. Aim of our work Idea We are looking for a logic in which we can talk about the strategic behavior of agents in generic multi-player concurrent games. Application It can be used as a specification language for the formal verification and synthesis of modular and interactive systems. Fabio Mogavero, Aniello Murano, Giuseppe Perelli , Moshe Y. Vardi Università degli Studi di Napoli "Federico II", Rice University Recent Results and Future Directions in Strategy Logic 2 / 16

  3. Strategic reasoning Example (Reactive synthesis) Synthesize an interactive system that satisfies a given specification, independently of the possible sequences of inputs. Nash equilibrium Verify that all players of a game have optimal strategies (each player has a strategy such that it is rational for him to adhere to it assuming that all the other players also do so). Fabio Mogavero, Aniello Murano, Giuseppe Perelli , Moshe Y. Vardi Università degli Studi di Napoli "Federico II", Rice University Recent Results and Future Directions in Strategy Logic 3 / 16

  4. ∗ The previous logic A TL Alternating-time Temporal Logic [Alur, Henzinger and Kupferman, 2002] ��{ α , β }�� G ¬ fail : “Agents α and β cooperate to ensure that a system (having possibly more than two processes (agents)) never enters a fail state”. Implicit strategies. 1 alternation of quantification. Fabio Mogavero, Aniello Murano, Giuseppe Perelli , Moshe Y. Vardi Università degli Studi di Napoli "Federico II", Rice University Recent Results and Future Directions in Strategy Logic 4 / 16

  5. Our contribution We introduce Strategy Logic (S L ) for explicit reasoning about strategies in multi-player concurrent games. We also study a chain of more tractable syntactic fragments which results to be strictly ∗ . more expressive than A TL Fabio Mogavero, Aniello Murano, Giuseppe Perelli , Moshe Y. Vardi Università degli Studi di Napoli "Federico II", Rice University Recent Results and Future Directions in Strategy Logic 5 / 16

  6. Underlying framework: the concurrent game structure s 0 s 3 s 6 Acts Acts ¬ p ¬ p / 0 Acts Acts Acts Acts s 1 s 4 Acts ¬ p Acts p Acts Acts s 2 s 5 Acts Acts p p A Concurrent Game Structure is a graph in which each state is labeled by atomic propositions and each edge is labeled with the actions that agents can choose. A strategy maps histories of the game into actions. Plays are completely determined by the strategies. Fabio Mogavero, Aniello Murano, Giuseppe Perelli , Moshe Y. Vardi Università degli Studi di Napoli "Federico II", Rice University Recent Results and Future Directions in Strategy Logic 6 / 16

  7. Strategy Logic [Mogavero, Murano, and Vardi, 2010] S L syntactically extends L TL by means of strategy quantifiers , the existential �� x �� and the universal [[ x ]] , and agent binding ( a , x ) . Syntax S L formulas are built inductively in the following way, where x is a variable and a an agent. ϕ ::= L TL | �� x �� ϕ | [[ x ]] ϕ | ( a , x ) ϕ . Informal semantics �� x �� ϕ : “there exists a strategy x for which ϕ is true” . [[ x ]] ϕ : “for all strategies x, it holds that ϕ is true” . ( a , x ) ϕ : “ ϕ holds, when the agent a uses the strategy x” . Fabio Mogavero, Aniello Murano, Giuseppe Perelli , Moshe Y. Vardi Università degli Studi di Napoli "Federico II", Rice University Recent Results and Future Directions in Strategy Logic 7 / 16

  8. Example: Failure is not an option No failure property “In a system S built on three processes, α , β , and γ , the first two have to cooperate in order to ensure that S never enters a failure state”. Three different formalization in S L . �� x ���� y �� [[ z ]]( α , x )( β , y )( γ , z )( G ¬ fail ) : α and β have two strategies, x and y, respectively, that, independently of what γ decides, ensure that a failure state is never reached. �� x �� [[ z ]] �� y �� ( α , x )( β , y )( γ , z )( G ¬ fail ) : β can chose his strategy y dependently of that one chosen by γ . �� x �� [[ z ]]( α , x )( β , x )( γ , z )( G ¬ fail ) : α and β have a common strategy x to ensure the required property. Fabio Mogavero, Aniello Murano, Giuseppe Perelli , Moshe Y. Vardi Università degli Studi di Napoli "Federico II", Rice University Recent Results and Future Directions in Strategy Logic 8 / 16

  9. Example: Multi-player Nash equilibrium Nash equilibrium Let G be a game with the n agents α 1 ,..., α n , each one having its own L TL goal ψ 1 ,..., ψ n . We want to know if G admits a Nash equilibrium, i.e., if there is a “best” strategy x i w.r.t. the goal ψ i , for each agent α i , once all other strategies are fixed. ϕ NE � �� x 1 ��···�� x n �� ( α 1 , x 1 ) ··· ( α n , x n )( � n i = 1 ( �� y �� ( α i , y ) ψ i ) → ψ i ) . Intuitively, if G | = ϕ NE then x 1 ,..., x n form a Nash equilibrium, since, when an agent α i has a strategy y that allows the satisfaction of ψ i , he can use x i instead of y , assuming that the remaining agents α 1 ,..., α i − 1 , α i + 1 ,..., α n use x 1 ,..., x i − 1 , x i + 1 ,..., x n . Fabio Mogavero, Aniello Murano, Giuseppe Perelli , Moshe Y. Vardi Università degli Studi di Napoli "Federico II", Rice University Recent Results and Future Directions in Strategy Logic 9 / 16

  10. Model-theoretic properties ∗ A TL ... ... ... S L Bisimulation Invariance Yes ... ... ... No State-tree Yes ... ... ... Yes Bounded model property Yes ... ... ... No Fabio Mogavero, Aniello Murano, Giuseppe Perelli , Moshe Y. Vardi Università degli Studi di Napoli "Federico II", Rice University Recent Results and Future Directions in Strategy Logic 10 / 16

  11. Decision problems Model-checking Satisfiability Σ 1 S L N ON E LEMENTARY - COMPLETE 1 - HARD ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ∗ A TL 2E XP T IME - COMPLETE 2E XP T IME - COMPLETE Fabio Mogavero, Aniello Murano, Giuseppe Perelli , Moshe Y. Vardi Università degli Studi di Napoli "Federico II", Rice University Recent Results and Future Directions in Strategy Logic 11 / 16

  12. Decision problems Model-checking Satisfiability Σ 1 S L N ON E LEMENTARY - COMPLETE 1 - HARD ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ∗ A TL 2E XP T IME - COMPLETE 2E XP T IME - COMPLETE ∗ is more tractable than S L ? Why A TL Fabio Mogavero, Aniello Murano, Giuseppe Perelli , Moshe Y. Vardi Università degli Studi di Napoli "Federico II", Rice University Recent Results and Future Directions in Strategy Logic 11 / 16

  13. A possible solution Answer “ S L allows to write formulas for which the satisfiability on a play depends, in some way, on the satisfiability on other independent plays.” Our results We introduce three fragments, called S L [ NG ] , S L [ BG ] , and S L [1 G ] , with decreasing expressiveness. [Mogavero, Murano, Perelli, and Vardi, 2012] ∗ The less expressive fragment S L [1 G ] is anyway strictly more expressive than A TL but still it does not have the ability to write such delicate formulas. The ∗ . complexities of the decision problems for S L [1 G ] are the same as for A TL Fabio Mogavero, Aniello Murano, Giuseppe Perelli , Moshe Y. Vardi Università degli Studi di Napoli "Federico II", Rice University Recent Results and Future Directions in Strategy Logic 12 / 16

  14. Model-theoretic properties ∗ A TL S L [1 G ] S L [ BG ] S L [ NG ] S L Bisimulation Invariance Yes Yes No No No State-tree model Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Bounded model property Yes Yes No No No Fabio Mogavero, Aniello Murano, Giuseppe Perelli , Moshe Y. Vardi Università degli Studi di Napoli "Federico II", Rice University Recent Results and Future Directions in Strategy Logic 13 / 16

  15. Decision problems Model-checking Satisfiability Σ 1 S L N ON E LEMENTARY - COMPLETE 1 - HARD Σ 1 S L [ NG ] N ON E LEMENTARY - COMPLETE 1 - HARD Σ 1 S L [ BG ] ? 1 - HARD S L [1 G ] 2E XP T IME - COMPLETE 2E XP T IME - COMPLETE ∗ A TL 2E XP T IME - COMPLETE 2E XP T IME - COMPLETE Fabio Mogavero, Aniello Murano, Giuseppe Perelli , Moshe Y. Vardi Università degli Studi di Napoli "Federico II", Rice University Recent Results and Future Directions in Strategy Logic 14 / 16

  16. Future works Open problems S L [ BG ] model checking. S L on turn-based structures. Possible extensions Graded Strategy Logic. Coalition Strategy Logic. Normative Systems with Strategy Logic. Fabio Mogavero, Aniello Murano, Giuseppe Perelli , Moshe Y. Vardi Università degli Studi di Napoli "Federico II", Rice University Recent Results and Future Directions in Strategy Logic 15 / 16

  17. Thank you very much for your attention! Fabio Mogavero, Aniello Murano, Giuseppe Perelli , Moshe Y. Vardi Università degli Studi di Napoli "Federico II", Rice University Recent Results and Future Directions in Strategy Logic 16 / 16

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