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Railway Slot Auctioning Ralf Borndrfer joint work with Martin Grtschel Thomas Schlechte Arrival/ M ATHEON Fall School on Timetabling and Line Planning Dabendorf, 29. September 2006 DFG Research Center M ATHEON Mathematics for Key


  1. Railway Slot Auctioning Ralf Borndörfer joint work with Martin Grötschel Thomas Schlechte Arrival/ M ATHEON Fall School on Timetabling and Line Planning Dabendorf, 29. September 2006 � DFG Research Center M ATHEON Mathematics for Key Technologies Ralf Borndörfer � Zuse-Institute Berlin (ZIB) borndoerfer@zib.de http://www.zib.de/borndoerfer

  2. 2 Project "Trassenbörse" Multiple EVUs Routerequests, Single EVU Multiple EVUs Auctiondesgin Routerequests, Auktio Routeportal Auctiondesgin W eb- Auktio Railsys Single winner Free Many current Bids Request Routes winner current Many Bids Trackallocation, Trackallocation, Routesearch Optimization Optimization Description Railsys TS-Opt Implementation TS-Opt Infrastructure, Infrastracture Drivingdynamics Infrastructure, Adjustment Drivingdynamics Railsys I nfraGen I nfraGen Ralf Borndörfer

  3. 3 Overview � Rail Track Auctions � The Optimal Track Allocation Problem (OPTRA) � Mathematical Models � Computational Results Ralf Borndörfer

  4. 4 Background � Problems � Network utilization � Deficit � European Union � Establish a rail traffic market � Open the market to competition � Improve cost recovery of infrastructure provider, reduce subsidies � Deregulate/regulate this market � Project � WiP (TUB), SFWBB (TUB), I&M, Z, ZIB, IVE, rmcon Ralf Borndörfer

  5. 5 Auctioning Approach � Goals � More traffic at lower cost � Better service � How do you measure? � Possible answer: in terms of willingness to pay � What is the „commodity“ of this market? � Possible answer: timetabled track = dedicated, timetabled track section = use of railway infrastructure in time and space � How does the market work? � Possible answer: by auctioning timetabled tracks Ralf Borndörfer

  6. 6 Arguments for Auctions � Auctions can … � resolve user conflicts in such a way that the bidder with the highest willigness to pay receives the commodity (efficient allocation, wellfare maximization) � maximize the auctioneer’s earnings � reveal the bidders’ willigness to pay � reveal bottlenecks and the added value if they are removed � Economists argue … � that a “working auctioning system” is usually superior to alternative methods such as bargaining, fixed prices, etc. Ralf Borndörfer

  7. 7 Examples � I n ancient times … � Auctions are known since 500 b.c. � March 28, 193 a.d.: The pretorians auction the Roman Emperor‘s throne to Marcus Didius Severus Iulianus, who ruled as Iulianus I. for 66 days � I n modern times … � Traditional auctions (antiques, flowers, stamps, etc.) � Stock market � eBay etc. � Oil drilling rights, energy spot market, etc. � Procurement � Sears, Roebuck & Co. � Frequency auctions in mobile telecommunication � Regional monopolies (franchising) at British Rail Ralf Borndörfer

  8. 8 Sears, Roebuck & Co. � 3-year contracts for transports on dedicated routes � First auction in 1994 with 854 contracts � Combinatorial auction � „And-“ and „or-“ bids allowed � 2 854 ( ≈ 10 257 ) theoretically possible combinations � Sequential auction (5 rounds, 1 month between rounds) � Results � 13% cost reduction � Extension to 1.400 contracts (14% cost reduction) Ralf Borndörfer

  9. 9 Frequency Auctions (Cramton 2001, Spectrum Auctions, Handbook of Telecommunications Economics ) � Prices for mobile telecommunication frequencies (2x10 MHz+ 5MHz) � Low earnings are not per se inefficient � Only min. prices = > insufficient cost recovery Ralf Borndörfer

  10. Borndörfer Ralf 10

  11. Track Request Form Borndörfer Ralf 11

  12. Rail Track Auctioning Borndörfer Ralf 12

  13. 13 Rail Track Auction BEGIN Minimum Bid = Basic Price EVUs decide on bids for bundles of timetabled tracks Bids is unchanged OPTRA finds Bids are increased by a allocation with maximum earnings minimum increment Bid is assigned All bids assigned: Bid is not assigned END Ralf Borndörfer

  14. 14 Overview � Rail Track Auctions � The Optimal Track Allocation Problem (OPTRA) � Mathematical Models � Computational Results Ralf Borndörfer

  15. 15 Optimal Track Allocation Problem (OPTRA) I nput � Set of bids for timetabled tracks incl. willingness to pay � Available infrastructure (space and time) Output � Assignment of bids that maximizes the total willigness to pay � Conflict free track assignments for the chosen bids Ralf Borndörfer

  16. 16 Track Allocation Problem � Route/Track Ralf Borndörfer

  17. I nfrastructure Borndörfer Ralf 17

  18. 18 Blocks and Standardized Dynamics State (i,T,t,v) � Directed block i � Train type T � Starting time t, velocity v v s i j k Ralf Borndörfer

  19. 19 Standard Train Types train V max train security … type [km/ h] length [m] ICE 250 410 LZB IC 200 400 LZB RE 160 225 Signal RB 120 100 Signal SB 140 125 Signal ICG 100 600 Signal Ralf Borndörfer

  20. 20 Track Allocation Problem � Route/Track � Route Bundle/Bid Ralf Borndörfer

  21. 21 Variable Bids Bid = Basic Bid + Departure/Arrival Time Bonus + Travel Time Bonus € € 90 4 €/min 80 Travel 12:00 12:08 12:20 Dep. time 40 60 time [min] Ralf Borndörfer

  22. 22 Bids for Timetabled Tracks � Train number(s) and type(s) � Starting station, earliest starting time � Final station, latest arrival time � Basic bid (in Euro) � Intermediate stops (Station, min. stopping time, arrival interval) � Connections � Combinatorial bids Ralf Borndörfer

  23. 23 Track Allocation Problem � Route/Track � Route Bundle/Bid � Scheduling Graph Ralf Borndörfer

  24. 24 Track Allocation Problem � Route/Track � Route Bundle/Bid � Scheduling Graph � Conflict Ralf Borndörfer

  25. Block Conflict Borndörfer Ralf 25

  26. 26 Track Allocation Problem � Route/Track � Route Bundle/Bid � Scheduling Graph � Conflict � Headway Times � Station Capacities � This Talk: Only Block Occupancy Conflicts Ralf Borndörfer

  27. 27 Track Allocation Problem � Route/Track � Route Bundle/Bid � Scheduling Graph � Conflict � Track Allocation (Timetable) Ralf Borndörfer

  28. 28 Track Allocation Problem � Route/Track … … � Route Bundle/Bid � Scheduling Graph � Conflict � Track Allocation (Timetable) � Optimal Track Allocation Problem (OPTRA) Ralf Borndörfer

  29. 29 Optimal Track Allocation Problem difficult! 3 x + 1 x = ??? A B C D I. variant II. III. ICE slower time ICE goes ICE drops out Ralf Borndörfer

  30. 30 Track Allocation Problem � Route/Track Proposition [Caprara, Fischetti, Toth (02)]: � Route Bundle/Bid OPTRA is NP -hard. � Scheduling Graph � Conflict Proof: � Track Allocation Reduction from Independent-Set. (Timetable) � Optimal Track Allocation Problem (OPTRA) � Complexity Ralf Borndörfer

  31. 31 Selected Literature Brännlund et al. (1998) � Standardized Driving Dynamics ∈ � States (i,T,t,v) v {0,v (i)} std � Path formulation � Computational experiments with 17 stations at the route Uppsala-Borlänge, 26 trains, 40,000 states Caprara, Fischetti & Toth (2002) � Multi commodity flow model � Lagrangian relaxation approach � Computational experiments on low traffic and congested scenarios Ralf Borndörfer

  32. 32 I P Model OPTRA 1 � Arc-based � Routes: Multiflow � Conflicts: Packing (pairwise) � This talk: Block occupancy conflicts only Variables � Arc occupancy Constraints � Flow conservation � Arc conflicts (pairwise) Objective Ralf � Maximize proceedings Borndörfer

  33. 33 I P Model OPTRA 1 � Arc-based � Routes: Multiflow � Conflicts: Packing (pairwise) � Conflict Graph (Interval Graph) � Cliques � Perfectness Ralf Borndörfer

  34. 34 I P Model OPTRA 2 � Arc-based � Routes: Multiflow � Conflicts: Packing (Max. Cliques) � Proposition: The LP-relaxation of OPTRA 2 can be Variables � solved in Arc occupancy Constraints polynomial time. � Flow conservation � Arc conflicts (cliques) Objective Ralf � Maximize proceedings Borndörfer

  35. 35 Multicommodity Flow Model with Packing Constraints � Arc-based � Routes: Multiflow � Conflicts: Packing (Max. Cliques) � Proposition: The LP-relaxation of OPTRA 2 can be solved in polynomial time. � Looks like … Ralf Borndörfer

  36. 36 I P Model OPTRA 3 � Track Occupancy Configurations Ralf Borndörfer

  37. 37 I P Model OPTRA 3 � Track Occupancy Configurations Ralf Borndörfer

  38. 38 I P Model OPTRA 3 � Path-based Routes � Path-based Configs Variables � Path und config usage Constraints � Path and config choice � Path-config-coupling (track capacity) Objective Function � Ralf Maximize proceedings Borndörfer

  39. 39 I P Model OPTRA 3 � Path-based Routes � Path-based Configs � Shadow prices (useful in auction) � Slot prices σ i � Track prices τ r � Arc prices α a Ralf Borndörfer

  40. 40 I P Model OPTRA 3 � Path-based Routes � Path-based Configs � Shadow prices � Proposition: ⊇ P LP (OPTRA 1 ) ⊇ P LP (OPTRA 2 ) = P LP (OPTRA 3 ). Ralf Borndörfer

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