Questions of Trust Jason Quinley, Christopher Ahern University of T - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Questions of Trust Jason Quinley, Christopher Ahern University of T¨ ubingen, University of Pennsylvania August 13, 2012 Quinley and Ahern () Questions of Trust August 13, 2012 1 / 35

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Goals Explain existence of polite linguistic behavior in various contexts. What are polite linguistic expressions? Why do we use polite expressions? When do we use polite expressions? Quinley and Ahern () Questions of Trust August 13, 2012 2 / 35

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Talk Outline Introduction 1 Politeness Theory 2 Game Theory 3 Trust and Modals 4 Conclusion 5 Quinley and Ahern () Questions of Trust August 13, 2012 3 / 35

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Consider the following... Questions Will/Would you lend me a dollar? Will/Would you open the door? Will/Would you turn that music down? Will/Would you marry me? Answers Would seems more appropriate for the first three, whereas will a is better in the last. a Do you want to will always suffice here. Quinley and Ahern () Questions of Trust August 13, 2012 4 / 35

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Why be polite? Scarcity Resources are limited, life requires cooperation. Ambiguity Information regarding the intentions of other is not always abundant. Politeness Offers a strategic solution for these two problems and increasing the range of interactions between individuals with other-regarding preferences. Quinley and Ahern () Questions of Trust August 13, 2012 5 / 35

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion What politeness gets us Humor(/Cruelty) A: Would you marry me? B: I would if you were rich/handsome/x! (A: Well I was just asking hypothetically.) We commit ourselves to actions by our words. The ways in which this plays out reveals the underlying structure of the games being played. Quinley and Ahern () Questions of Trust August 13, 2012 6 / 35

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Crucial points from politeness theory Face Face-threatening acts (FTAs) Strategic handling of FTAs Quinley and Ahern () Questions of Trust August 13, 2012 7 / 35

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Face What is face? Autonomy and Affiliation Brown and Levinson (1978) Face (Goffman, 1982) consists of an individual’s basic needs: Negative face: the basic claim to territories, personal preserves, right to non-distraction, i.e. freedom of action and freedom from imposition. Positive face: the positive consistent self-image or ’personality’ (including the approval by others of this self-image) claimed by interactants. Quinley and Ahern () Questions of Trust August 13, 2012 8 / 35

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Face-threatening acts Face-threatening acts When situations call for it... Speakers must commit a face-threatening act ( FTA ). In order to mitigate the weight of a FTA, speakers may use several strategies. Don’t Redress On Record Positive Politeness Do FTA Redress Negative Politeness Intention Off Record Don’t do FTA Quinley and Ahern () Questions of Trust August 13, 2012 9 / 35

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Crucial points from game theory Sequential Games Cooperation vs. Coordination Preferences vs. Payoffs Quinley and Ahern () Questions of Trust August 13, 2012 10 / 35

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Sequential Games Cooperation: Prisoner’s Dilemma X C D B Y Y C D C D (2,2) (0,3) (3,0) (1,1) Quinley and Ahern () Questions of Trust August 13, 2012 11 / 35

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Sequential Games Coordination: Pure Coordination Game X B A B Y Y A B A B (1,1) (0,0) (0,0) (1,1) Quinley and Ahern () Questions of Trust August 13, 2012 12 / 35

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Formal Mechanisms for Analyzing Trust Trust Games Other-regarding preferences Self-enforcing equilibria Quinley and Ahern () Questions of Trust August 13, 2012 13 / 35

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Trust Games Trust Games Consist of... An Investor and a Trustee. Investor begins with an Initial endowment, which he can keep or invest. If he invests the endowment with the Trustee it grows by some amount/ The Trustee must then decide what amount, if any, to return to the Investor. Cooperation Trustee does best when he keeps all money invested. Knowing this, Investor should never invest. Everyone does worse than they could by cooperating. Quinley and Ahern () Questions of Trust August 13, 2012 14 / 35

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Trust Games Requests as Trust Games Quinley (2012) Asymmetries in abilities lead to requests. Requests involve a loss of face on the part of the requester, and carry a risk that the request will be denied. X can ask ( A ) or not ask Y ( ¬ A ) to grant a request. Y can grant ( G ) or not grant ( ¬ G ) the request. Main Results Repetition, reputation, and observation increase trust and requests (probability of cooperation). Quinley and Ahern () Questions of Trust August 13, 2012 15 / 35

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Trust Games Requests as Extended Trust Games More Structure X can ask ( A ) or not ask Y ( ¬ A ) to grant a request. Y can grant ( G ) or not grant ( ¬ G ) the request. X can thank ( T ) Y for granting the request, or not ( ¬ T ). Quinley and Ahern () Questions of Trust August 13, 2012 16 / 35

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Trust Games Game Structure X X A ¬ A A Y ¬ A Y G ¬ G X ¬ G G ¬ T T Figure: Classic vs. Extended Request Trust Game: Player X can choose to Ask (A) something from Player Y , who can then choose to Grant (G) the favor. Player X can choose to Thank ( T ) or not Thank ( ¬ T ) player Y . Quinley and Ahern () Questions of Trust August 13, 2012 17 / 35

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Trust Games Payoff Structure Costs c x is the cost to X to achieve desired outcome. c y is cost to Y . ( c y < c x ) b x is the benefit to X of Y granting request. ( b x < c x ) Face A requires face “payment” f r by X . Y receives m r f r from A . ( m r > 1) T requires face “payment” f t by X . Y receives m t f t from T . ( m t > 1) Quinley and Ahern () Questions of Trust August 13, 2012 18 / 35

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Trust Games Payoff Structure Quinley and Ahern () Questions of Trust August 13, 2012 19 / 35

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Trust Games What to expect Rollback Equilibrium(Backward Induction) X prefers ¬ T to T Y prefers ¬ G to ¬ T X prefers ¬ A to ¬ G Result No one should ever make requests because they will never be granted. Yet we can, and do, make polite requests of strangers we will never interact with again. Why is this possible? Quinley and Ahern () Questions of Trust August 13, 2012 20 / 35

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Other-Regarding Preferences Homo economicus or Homo empathicus Theoretical (Rabin 1993, Fehr & Schmidt 1999, Levine 1998) Behavioral (Fehr & Schmidt 2003, Camerer 2003) Neurobiological (Fehr 2009) Quinley and Ahern () Questions of Trust August 13, 2012 21 / 35

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Other-Regarding Preferences Sympathy (Sally 2000, 2001) Sympathy Distribution For each agent, there is a distribution, δ i ∈ ∆ ( U ) , such that ∑ j δ i ( U j ) = 1, which determines how much that agent cares about her own payoffs and those of others. Homo economicus : Classical Utility δ i ( U j ) = 0 for all j � = i . New utility function V i = δ i ( U i ) · U i +( 1 − δ i ( U i )) · U j Quinley and Ahern () Questions of Trust August 13, 2012 22 / 35

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Application in Trust Games When do we thank people? Condition It suffices for X to prefer T to ¬ T for V x ( T ) > V x ( ¬ T ) , which is true when: 1 δ x ( U y ) > 1 + m t Interpretation The greater the benefit to Y for thanking, the less X has to care about Ys payoff to do so. Quinley and Ahern () Questions of Trust August 13, 2012 23 / 35

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Application in Trust Games When to grant a request? Condition It suffices for Y to prefer T to ¬ G for V y ( T ) > V y ( ¬ G ) , which is true when: ( c y − m t f t ) ( c y − m t f t )+ b x + c x − f t < δ y ( U x ) Interpretation The greater the benefit to X relative to c x and c y determines this threshold. If c x is much greater than c y this becomes very small. Quinley and Ahern () Questions of Trust August 13, 2012 24 / 35