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Privacy-Enabling Social Networking Over Untrusted Networks Jonathan Anderson, Claudia Diaz * , Joseph Bonneau and Frank Stajano {jonathan.anderson,joseph.bonneau,frank.stajano}@cl.cam.ac.uk claudia.diaz@esat.kuleuven.be Computer Laboratory *


  1. Privacy-Enabling Social Networking Over Untrusted Networks Jonathan Anderson, Claudia Diaz * , Joseph Bonneau and Frank Stajano {jonathan.anderson,joseph.bonneau,frank.stajano}@cl.cam.ac.uk claudia.diaz@esat.kuleuven.be Computer Laboratory * K.U. Leuven ESAT/COSIC Monday, August 17, 2009 1

  2. Outline • Social networks require absolute trust • Operators don’t protect their users • Smart clients can protect themselves • Protocols • Privacy • Performance 2 Monday, August 17, 2009 2

  3. Social Networks Require Absolute Trust 3 Monday, August 17, 2009 3

  4. Social Networks Require Absolute Trust 3 Monday, August 17, 2009 3

  5. Social Networks Require Absolute Trust 3 Monday, August 17, 2009 3

  6. Social Networks Require Absolute Trust 3 Monday, August 17, 2009 3

  7. Social Networks Require Absolute Trust 3 Monday, August 17, 2009 3

  8. Social Networks Require Absolute Trust 3 Monday, August 17, 2009 3

  9. Network Operators Don’t Protect Their Users 4 Monday, August 17, 2009 4

  10. Network Operators Don’t Protect Their Users 4 Monday, August 17, 2009 4

  11. Smart Clients Can Protect Themselves • Stop trusting the network! • Smart clients, dumb servers 5 Monday, August 17, 2009 5

  12. How Do You Facebook? Monday, August 17, 2009 6

  13. How Do You Facebook? Monday, August 17, 2009 6

  14. Decentralised Architecture 7 Monday, August 17, 2009 7

  15. Decentralised Architecture 7 Monday, August 17, 2009 7

  16. Decentralised Architecture 7 Monday, August 17, 2009 7

  17. Privacy Requirements • Protect content and links • Adversaries: • Other users • Application developers • Network operator • Reduce to social contract 8 Monday, August 17, 2009 8

  18. Software Architecture 9 Monday, August 17, 2009 9

  19. Software Architecture                       9 Monday, August 17, 2009 9

  20. Software Architecture            10 Monday, August 17, 2009 10

  21. Application Layer • Sandboxed applications • Security API • Restrictive default policies • User policy specification 11 Monday, August 17, 2009 11

  22. Software Architecture            12 Monday, August 17, 2009 12

  23. Data Structures Layer 13 Monday, August 17, 2009 13

  24. Data Structures Layer 13 Monday, August 17, 2009 13

  25. Data Structures Layer 13 Monday, August 17, 2009 13

  26. Data Structures Layer 14 Monday, August 17, 2009 14

  27. Data Structures Layer 14 Monday, August 17, 2009 14

  28. Data Structures Layer 15 Monday, August 17, 2009 15

  29. Data Structures Layer 15 Monday, August 17, 2009 15

  30. Data Structures Layer 15 Monday, August 17, 2009 15

  31. Software Architecture            16 Monday, August 17, 2009 16

  32. Cryptography Layer • Encryption, digital signatures, etc. • Key Management • Identity Verification • Link Hiding 17 Monday, August 17, 2009 17

  33. Encrypted Blocks • Unique symmetric key per block per ACL revision • This sounds familiar... • No revocation guarantees 18 Monday, August 17, 2009 18

  34. Key Management • Direct distribution via PK • Key hierarchy • “Group key” blocks • Hidden links 19 Monday, August 17, 2009 19

  35. Link Hiding 03 00 4d 0b 59 7a e5 b0 7a bf 89 c8 f6 b0 2d 74 76 2d 30 64 67 9a 42 f6 34 15 bc 66 71 91 2a 34 0e e6 45 c4 ff 8f d7 90 95 4a e3 a8 2e 20 Monday, August 17, 2009 20

  36. Link Hiding E K 1 03 00 4d 0b 59 7a e5 b0 7a bf 89 c8 f6 b0 2d + 74 76 2d 30 64 67 9a 42 f6 34 15 bc 66 71 91 2a 34 0e e6 45 c4 ff 8f d7 90 95 4a e3 a8 2e E K 2 + 20 Monday, August 17, 2009 20

  37. Link Hiding E K 1 03 00 4d 0b 59 7a e5 b0 7a bf 89 c8 f6 b0 2d + 74 76 2d 30 64 67 9a 42 f6 34 15 bc 66 71 91 2a 34 0e e6 45 c4 ff 8f d7 90 95 4a e3 a8 2e E K 2 + 20 Monday, August 17, 2009 20

  38. Link Hiding E K 1 03 00 4d 0b 59 7a e5 b0 7a bf 89 c8 f6 b0 2d + 74 76 2d 30 64 67 9a 42 f6 34 15 bc 66 71 91 2a 34 0e e6 45 c4 ff 8f d7 90 95 4a e3 a8 2e 1e fb L I N K : a b c .. .. 92 71 44 99 1c ff bf d9 5a e1 03 08 8e 7d 9b c2 45 56 aa dd 0e 64 fc 7f a3 c4 77 77 e6 a0 81 c4 5a E K 2 + ad e6 e1 69 fd 4e 70 3c da ce f8 c6 94 0f e7 3c 6b 66 c5 39 6c 1c 74 c1 14 ef 53 L I N K : d e f .. .. 70 32 22 12 37 9d 92 e4 20 Monday, August 17, 2009 20

  39. Messaging • Asynchronous • Encryption • Signing • Synchronous • OTR 21 Monday, August 17, 2009 21

  40. Identity Verification • PKI • Web of Trust • Fingerprint Exchange • Multi-Channel Protocol 22 Monday, August 17, 2009 22

  41. Fingerprint Exchange • CryptoIDs • “a little longer than most email addresses, a little shorter than most postal addresses, and about the same size as a credit card plus its 4- digit expiration date” • f3v4g.ifcen.r3rj5.embx8 • small enough for a business card 23 Monday, August 17, 2009 23

  42. Mutual Identity Verification • Wong-Stajano protocol • Exchange of small nonces • Nonces can be cryptographically weak • Relies on data origin authenticity 24 Monday, August 17, 2009 24

  43. Joint Content • Digital signature convention • Sign content and context 25 Monday, August 17, 2009 25

  44. Software Architecture            26 Monday, August 17, 2009 26

  45. Network Layer • GET, POST • Access control • Not for confidentiality • Ok for integrity • Extra: mailboxes? 27 Monday, August 17, 2009 27

  46. Implementation 28 Monday, August 17, 2009 28

  47. Implementation 28 Monday, August 17, 2009 28

  48. Implementation 28 Monday, August 17, 2009 28

  49. Performance • Server • Storage scales (roughly) linearly with users • Computation scales linearly with storage • I/O-bound clients (branching factor) 29 Monday, August 17, 2009 29

  50. Open Problems • Usability of policy specification • End user development • Security API 30 Monday, August 17, 2009 30

  51. Discussion ? 31 Monday, August 17, 2009 31

  52. Appendix • Wong-Stajano protocol • Crypto performance 32 Monday, August 17, 2009 32

  53. Wong-Stajano Protocol A → B : K A B → A : K B A → B : H(A | K A | K B | R a | K a ) B → A : H(B | K A | K B | R b | K b ) A ⇒ B : R a B ⇒ A : R b A → B : K a B → A : K b A ⇒ B : outcome B ⇒ A : outcome 33 Monday, August 17, 2009 33

  54. Crypto Performance • SunJCE v1.7 on Intel Core2 Quad CPU Q6600 @ 2.4 GHz • RSA • 1024b en/decryption @ 600 kB/s, 30 kB/s • 2048b RSA en/decryption @ 200 kB/s, 7 kB/s • AES: 128b @ 35 MB/s 34 Monday, August 17, 2009 34

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