Prisoners Dilemma Tit-For-Tat J. Cern, B. Boansk, B. An EC-20 1 - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Machines Play Extensive-Form Games Machines as Strategies Coop Defect Coop C C (1,1) (0,5) C D D Defect D (5,0) (3,3) Prisoner’s Dilemma Tit-For-Tat J. ˇ Cerný, B. Bošanský, B. An EC-20 1 / 4

Machines Play Extensive-Form Games Generalization different actions valid machine A B m A D n (0,4) m n E invalid machine C D E F m,n A (2,1) (1,3) (1,1) (1,0) J. ˇ Cerný, B. Bošanský, B. An EC-20 2 / 4

Machines Play Extensive-Form Games Main Results RI: For every pure strategy there exists a canonical machine representing it. RII: Minimizing size of a machine and verifying its consistency is a polynomial problem. RIII: Computing SSE / MAXPAY-EFCE in a restriction induced by a small class of machine strategies is a polynomial problem. J. ˇ Cerný, B. Bošanský, B. An EC-20 3 / 4

Machines Play Extensive-Form Games Experimental Evaluation 10 − 1 100 10 − 2 10 10 − 3 c 1 c 2 c 3 c 1 c 2 c 3 Configuration Configuration Deviations Speedups J. ˇ Cerný, B. Bošanský, B. An EC-20 4 / 4